



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JPRS Report



Soviet Union

Military Affairs

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Military Affairs

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CONTENTS

25 October 1990

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

Moiseyev Queried on Troop Political Actions [S. Chernov; SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 12 Jul 90]	1
Responses to A. Mikhaylov Article on Army Status, Prestige [KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 10, May 90]	1
RSFSR Party Conference Delegates on Party Problems, Solutions [A. Tubyshkin, et al; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 19 Jun 90]	7
Army Komsomol Council Chairman Lt Col A. Reshetnikov Interviewed [A.L. Reshetnikov; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 12, Jun 90]	9
Kazakhstan's War Veterans Accorded New Privileges [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 3 Jul 90]	14
Creation of United Military Trade Union Organization Proposed [TRUD; 4 Jul, 90]	16
Journalist Attacks Views of Writer K. Rash on Army Discipline [I. Korolkov; SOYUZ No 28, Jul 90] ...	16
Col Ye Yelmanov Explains Disposition of Party Dues [A. Vorobyev, Yu Samsonov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 20 Jul 90]	19
Col Gen N. Gryaznov on Military Housing Difficulties in Moscow [N. Gryaznov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 8 Aug 90]	19
Reasons for Draft Evasion Probed: Col A. Rybchinskiy Comments [G. Konchyus; TRUD, 9 Aug 90]	20
Military Members of RSFSR CP Leadership Organizations [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 20 Sep 90]	22
Col Gen Burlakov on Military Reform [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 Sep 90]	23

MILITARY SCIENCE

Problems With Military-Scientific Research [Yu.V. Kryuchkov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 1 Jul 90]	24
'Non-Offensive Defense' Vs. NATO Doctrinal Thinking [S. Pechorov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 1 Aug 90]	26
ABM System's Role in Deterrence Viewed [A. Dokuchayev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 5 Oct 90]	27

WARSAW PACT

Disposal of Military Property in Czechoslovakia [M. Zubkov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 4 Aug 90]	30
Tempo of Polish Military Reform Questioned [F. Martinkevich; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 2 Aug 90]	30
Cost of Withdrawal of Troops from Czechoslovakia [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 5 Aug 90]	31

ARMED FORCES

Discussion of Financial Costs of Professional Service [N. Karasev; MORSKOY SBORNIK No 6, Jun 90]	32
Development of Armaments 'Storage Base' in Ukraine [A. Polyakov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 29 Jun 90]	35
Kiev MD Prepares to Receive Troops From East Europe [N. Motorin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 26 Jul 90]	37
Housing, Social Problems Facing Returning Servicemen [A. Belousov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 Jul 90]	38
Effects of Certain Chemical Weapons [VOYENNY VESTNIK No 8, Aug 90]	40
Cases of 'Extortion' Reported in Transbaykal MD [Yu. Dmitriyev; TRUD, 5 Aug 90]	42
Lt Gen Nadolskiy on Military Aid to Harvest [A. Nadolskiy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 8 Aug 90]	43
Problems of Military Construction in Areas of Seismic Danger [I. Ivanyuk; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 8 Aug 90]	44
Terms of Pension Entitlement for Soldiers' Wives Discussed [ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 32, 11-17 Aug 90]	45
Odessa Confronts Influx of Military Deserters [V. Fedotov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 15 Aug 90]	46
Reader Asks If Military Legislators Are Double-Dipping [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 20 Sep 90]	47

AIR FORCE, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Costs of Dismantling Krasnoyarsk Radar [N. Panyukov; <i>RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA</i> , 9 Oct 90]	48
---	----

NAVAL FORCES

Discussion of Mine Sweeping Equipment [V. Krasnov; <i>VOYENNYE ZNANIYA</i> No 7, Jul 90]	50
Problem of Scrapped Ships in Northern Fleet Area [A. Bystrov; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 10 Jul 90]	52
Discussion of Agreement To Raise 'Komsomolets' [V. Badrukin; <i>TRUD</i> , 14 Jul 90]	54
Pacific Fleet Handling of Retired Vessels [<i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 1 Aug 90]	55
Submarine Officers' Attitudes Toward Shorter-Term Contract Service [L. Rogulev, et al; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 11 Aug 90]	57

REAR SERVICES, DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

Discussion Group on Recent Problems of Conversion [<i>KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL</i> No 11, Jun 90]	59
Defense Clothing Supply Plan Underfulfilled [G. Sviridov; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 26 Jul 90]	63
Return of Precious Metals to Civilian Economy [N. Medvedev; <i>IZVESTIYA</i> , 28 Jul 90]	63
Col Gen Vorontsov Notes Shortage of Transport Equipment [Yu. Vorontsov; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 5 Aug 90]	64
Conversion in Aviation Industry Discussed [V. Zelenov; <i>SOVETSKAYA TORGOVLYA</i> , 7 Aug 90]	65
Military Agricultural Enterprises Bring in Harvest [G. Kurdakov; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 14 Aug 90]	67

PRE-DRAFT TRAINING AND THE DRAFT

DOSAAF: Draft Guidelines for Restructuring [<i>SOVETSKIY PATRIOT</i> No 24, 11-17 Jun 90]	69
Briefing Held Concerning Fall Military Draft [A. Vorobyev, M. Syrtlanov; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 4 Oct 90]	73
Odessa Military Staff Chief Discusses Fall Draft [A. Sergeyev; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 9 Oct 90]	74

MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

New Rules for Acceptance Into Military Schools [Yu. Rodionov; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 16 Jun 90]	76
---	----

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

European Conference on Conscientious Objectors, Alternative Service [V. Volkov, N. Glebov; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 31 Jul 90]	79
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Moiseyev Queried on Troop Political Actions

90UM0773A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 12 Jul 90 p 1

[Article by S. Chernov: "The Army and Politics". Included in the article is an apparent photocopy of a letter written and signed by First Deputy Minister of Defense General of the Army M. Moiseyev.]

[Text] The participation of military units stationed on Estonian soil in events concerning the internal political life of the republic is not news. This participation covers a wide range of activities, from performing musical interludes during meetings at the City Hall, to the impressive, new-style, high-stepping marches seen in the Parnuskiy District.

The most "politically" active units in Estonia are the airborne subunits, which are careful not to pass up any event considered to be of the slightest political significance. This was the case, for example, in Kokhtla-Yarve, where paratroopers assigned to a VDV [airborne] division from Vilyandi, teamed together with so-called workers units to provide physical security during a memorial conference of deputies from all levels of government which was convened to draw support for federation solidarity.

The attempts by the paratroopers to stay abreast of the political processes taking place in Estonia could not help but gain the interest of the republic government, which sent an inquiry into the matter to the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. N. Ryzhkov responded in a perfunctory manner by forwarding the inquiry to the First Deputy Minister of Defense, General of the Army M. Moiseyev.

In turn a response was issued.

According to this response, the paratroopers in the Parnuskiy District were also apparently off duty, however they had been allowed to go "apple-picking in the forest" in 28 BMP's [infantry fighting vehicles], 15 trucks, and six helicopters which arrived later in the day. At this rate they will soon be going to the movies in tanks and fishing from submarines.

[Following is the letter of response from General of the Army M. Moiseyev to the Chairman of the Estonian Council of Ministers, dated 28 June 1990. The letterhead reads: "First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. 28 June 1990. No 312/I/[Illegible letters].]

TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE ESTONIAN SSSR

Comrade Savisaar E.S.

In answer to your inquiry, I submit that an airborne subunit was indeed located in the town of Kokhtla-Yarve on 26 May of this year. The unit, which was billeted in the town, had been given leave at the conclusion of a military exercise that was held there.

On this particular Saturday part of this subunit, together with soldiers from other units in the garrison, were either off duty or carrying out normal patrol duty to insure proper conduct among the soldiers in the town.

It is possible that individual soldiers from these units could have been in the areas where the events you alluded to were being held. However, according to the report provided by the Baltic Military District Command, in no way did they participate in the activities surrounding those events.

General of the Army M. Moiseyev

Responses to A. Mikhaylov Article on Army Status, Prestige

90UM0668A Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 90
(signed to press 21 May 90) pp 14-27

[Responses to article by A. Mikhaylov in LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA: "The Man in Military Uniform"]

[Excerpts] *At the end of last year an article by A. Mikhaylov was published in LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA under this headline. Its author brought out a rather extensive list of current problems of our army. This material also attracted the attention of readers of our journal. We received numerous responses from them, which reflect both agreement with some of A. Mikhaylov's thoughts, and clear non-acceptance of some of his conclusions. In this way a discussion by correspondence developed. We are reprinting the article by A. Mikhaylov, and publishing the most interesting responses to it.*

The currently popular opinion of a number of respected people on introducing a professional army is gradually drowning out the voices of specialists who have expressed categorical opposition to this. There are disagreements on this question even among military people. One day, on the occasion of a promotion ceremony, several officers got into a dispute on this question. Opinions were divided. The junior officers were in favor, and those who were crowned with stars and vested with important duties were against. They had the same motive—"It is costly!" This is, of course, so, but it seems to me that here they were being cunning. The fact is that a professional army, based on a high degree of competition, might disturb the calm of a military leader invested with power. The higher the duty position, the higher should be the intellectual and physical form of the person occupying it.

The idealization of a professional army by the young officers is based on the fact that it is precisely competition that will help their rapid advancement.

In an interview in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, the legendary helicopter pilot Col Rutskoy named the approximate amount of pay of a soldier in a volunteer army—500 rubles. Consequently, the pay of even a junior officer might be approximately 700 rubles. It is namely those rubles, earned by blood and sweat, on which our economic

leaders laid their eyes. Thus, by making a simple calculation we can come to the conclusion that in the event of even a substantial reduction in the armed forces and introduction of a professional army, they will not be able to give a single penny from the Ministry of Defense treasury to anyone. To this it is necessary to include expenditures for the construction of comfortable housing, not barracks for soldiers and officers, and for creating humane living conditions for their families.

Why do we always talk about money and politics? Let us, rather, talk about the soul. And my soul hurts from the fact that even in its outward appearance our officer corps is beginning to lose its character. The concept of "an officer's honor" is more often used only in combination with "court of officer's honor." When I see a paunchy major, who has trouble buttoning up his dress-coat, a captain wearing worn out boots, a lieutenant with a string bag in his hand, or a colonel shouldering his way through a crowd, I become outraged. I allow myself to recall the long forgotten rule: If a Russian officer did not have money for a coachman, he was obligated to walk, so as not to diminish the honor of the greatcoat by traveling on the tram.

And this is why I allow myself to express such a view. Are there not too many people in military uniform on the streets, for example, of the capital? One foreigner asked with amazement: "Is Moscow under siege?" Looking around through his eyes, I was amazed at the abundance of sailors on Kirovskaya, and of colonels and generals on Frunzenskaya and Arbatskaya streets.

Let us think about it, not diminishing the honor and the worth of the uniform. Well, why does a military academy instructor, a ministry official, etc., walk along the street in uniform without any special need to do so? They say that it instills discipline. But, officers from state security or the MUR [Moscow Office of Criminal Investigation] are no less disciplined, although they appear in uniform only on special occasions.

In a number of NATO countries, a serviceman may appear in uniform within an established radius of the military unit. Farther he may not go!

In Italy a soldier is let off on leave after changing into civilian clothes, and only their short-clipped hair gives away a recruit called up for service.

But here is another thing that has alarmed me today. An announcer on the program "Vremya" announced with rejoicing in his voice that the 13th Gds Tank Div is being removed from Hungary and disbanded. Yes, that very Rodentsev Division, which defended and protected Stalin-grad. The fact that we are removing our army subunits from other countries is not merely an act of peaceableness, it is the logic of the times, but... We speak about the destruction of the temple of Christ the Savior with pain in our hearts. It symbolized the greatness of the Russian spirit. But, you see, such units as the 13th Gds manifested this spirit, the spirit of highest patriotism! Is it not blasphemous to disband namely guards units?

Where are they, the Akhtyrskiy, Semenovskiy and Preobrazhenskiy regiments, which have gone down in history? Their names remained in the names of streets or metro stations. Where are the greatcoats of the officers, by which military men were distinguished as representatives of a specific glorious formation?

Unification, cheapening, standardization. Today we do not distinguish a member of the Taman Division from a member of the construction troops, a Kantemirov soldier from a missileman. Moreover, looking at the television screen, sometimes one cannot distinguish a Soviet soldier from a Contra by his uniform. Everyone can understand. But the bitterness and vexation from this do not leave.

In a number of Western armies that have old traditions, it is possible to establish their unit with precision down to platoon level, according to the shoulder tabs, and markings on vehicles. In the U.S. the real names of units are written on the gates of the military post. Apropos of this, they have their own emblems and coats of arms. These fellows safeguard their secrets no less than we do, but they also know the price of something else no less important, the patriotism of the platoon, company, state and country. This begins from the attributes of clothing, and ends with the highest symbols of the state. Let us think. Why does the stars and stripes wave over a sports hall in a provincial U.S. town? And who among us has seen the USSR flag over a military barracks?

In the past the opinion was widespread that we were safeguarding it from being defiled or violated. At one time we agreed with this. But, today I am convinced that in this very way we have defiled our own souls, remembering about our affiliations and purposes only on revolutionary holidays, and days of national mourning.

Today we have encountered two mutually exclusive processes occasioned by life—reduction of the armed forces, and the need to raise the prestige of serving in them. Compromise is needed!

Aleksandr MIKHAYLOV. LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA No 51, 22 Dec 89.

* * *

Division Commander, Gds Maj Gen V. Neverov, Hero of the Soviet Union:

"I Am For Such an Army"

I follow attentively publications about the armed forces in the central press. Many authors are trying to look into such a complex mechanism as the army, which, of course, requires repair.

The article by A. Mikhaylov, in my view along with those of others, is beneficial in many ways. The author did not take the path of running down anything and everything, but raised problems that require solutions. For example, the question of shifting to hire, which is troubling to

many of us military people. I am for such an army. But under one condition. It must engage exclusively in its own work.

A reasonable question arises in connection with this. Who today can name accurately the amount of funds required to maintain a hired army? So far only conversations are going on. It seems to me that it is already time to create a competent commission to study all aspects of this problem. Or are we lacking in scientific forces?

The author of the article also raises a question about an officer's honor. Here I am not in complete agreement with him. A. Mikhaylov, it seemed to me, was acquainted with military life mainly by hearsay, and from the works of L. Tolstoy and A. Kuprin. Otherwise he would have known that sometimes it takes an officer an hour and a half, or even longer, to get to work. And almost always it is in over-filled transport. At today's prices one cannot cough up the money every day for a "coachman." Moreover, try to stop a taxi while you are in military uniform.

Apparently, A. Mikhaylov also believes the myth about high pay for military people. If this is so, it is too bad. This has already been written about many times in the central press. Nevertheless, I allow myself to cite a few figures. Thus, a major general in the U.S. Army after 16 years of service receives \$5,665 per month; a major—\$3,237; a captain—\$2,877; a sergeant—\$1,343; and a private—\$783. Every month! I think that there is no sense in comparing these wages with ours.

The author is undoubtedly correct in that some officers truly do forget about their outward appearance, appear intoxicated in crowded places, and allow themselves to "loungue about" behind a bottle of beer in the "snack bars." The Officers' Meeting must have its word to say in this regard. It has already waged a struggle for rebirth of the high concept of an "officer's honor." There is a great deal of work ahead here.

I agree with A. Mikhaylov that unification, cheapening, and standardization, of course, do not contribute to inculcating in soldiers pride in their large unit, unit and subunit. Let us take just our glorious Guards Order-Bearing Irkutsk-Pinsk Motorized Rifle Division imeni RSFSR Supreme Soviet. If we had our own emblems, coat of arms, symbol on the uniform, and combat equipment, then I am sure this would have a positive effect on people's attitude toward service. How proud our sailors were in their day that the names of their home ships were written on the sailor's hats!

In my view, the author's remark about the abundance of military personnel on the streets of Moscow is also not without justification. It is necessary to think about this. Really, why does a military academy instructor, or a Ministry of Defense employee, walk about the capital in uniform without any particular need to do so? I think that it is entirely possible to permit them to come to

work in civilian clothing, and change there. As for line units, today's conditions do not yet allow this to be implemented.

I already recalled that our division is one of the oldest and most distinguished in the armed forces. It traversed a glorious combat path. In the Civil War it defeated Kolchak and Wrangel. In the years of the Great Patriotic War its soldiers displayed mass heroism in the defensive battles in the Donbass, the Kuban, the foothills of the Caucasus, during the offensive operations in the Crimea, in Belorussia, in East Prussia, and in the assault on Berlin. It was then that the division became a guards division, and received the honorific title "Pinsk." Twenty-five of its soldiers were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. And, in the postwar service list of the large unit there are many distinctions.

Our Irkutsk-Pinsk Division, like the 13th Gds Tank Div, personified the military valor of our army, and its highest patriotism. And such large units must under no circumstances be disbanded. Here I agree entirely with the author of the article. Otherwise, here as well we may prepare ourselves the fate of "Ivans who do not remember their kinship."

And finally, our civilian newspapers, it seems, are really beginning to turn to the problems of the army. And this has still further strengthened my faith in what I do—a man in military uniform.

* * *

Capt N. Goncharov, Deputy Subunit Commander for Political Affairs:

"Whom is the Colonel in the Metro Bothering?"

Like the author of the article, "Man in Military Uniform," at times I also "become outraged." Only not because I see a "lieutenant with a string bag in his hand." By the way, this is not such a frequent phenomenon. And if it does happen, then, very likely, it is simply dishonest to walk by and point a finger at some faceless young officer. True, it is even awkward to explain to the author of the article what is entirely obvious: That lieutenant, who works from sunrise to sundown, has a family, which is not fed by the Holy Spirit. Discussions about the counters of our stores have already long ago set one's teeth on edge. There are no special provisions for officers. And what if that very lieutenant's wife suddenly became ill, and there was no one to go to the store? And are there really few of these everyday situations!

And I do not become outraged either because I see "a colonel, shouldering his way through a crowd." I think that A. Mikhaylov will agree that military people are not creating the transportation strains. However, I am sure that he would be categorically opposed, say, to granting all officers personal vehicles, or paying them so much that they could take taxis to work, home, and about their business. Personally I would not refuse. Only I am afraid

that such a clamor would then arise of which even the officials of the cooperatives have not dreamed.

It is another thing that causes me to become outraged. Here, let us say, is the photograph that has already raised a commotion in the 6th issue of OGONEK for this year. A crowd of people, bodies. And the inscription: "Baku. Morning of 20 January 1990, after the troops were introduced. Author of photograph unknown." As it is said, simplistic, but for the ordinary citizen very easy to understand. Look, they say, what the army has caused. The photograph "beats" on their feelings—there is nowhere further to go. But, if one thinks for a moment, a number of questions immediately arise. Why is this the introduction of troops, when there is not a single military man in the photograph? Since "the author of the photo is unknown," then how could it be determined that this is Baku, and namely on the morning of 20 January? If there is evidence, it should have been cited. Only OGONEK does not trouble itself with this. For it the main thing, apparently, is not to provide reliable information. It has another objective: to achieve a quite definite public reaction—a negative attitude toward the army.

Why am I talking about this? Because today we are dealing with the purposeful, deliberate formation of anti-army frames of mind in the people. It is being conducted under the screen of the penetration of glasnost into the military field. It seems to me that this is a bit more serious than a lieutenant with a string bag on the street, or a colonel in the crowd in the subway. Here one might even concern himself with, and puzzle over the question: Who needs this, and why? Then he might really become outraged.

The author of the article, "Man in Military Uniform," for some reason does not even say a word about this, although the question of the prestige of serving in the armed forces also seemingly troubles him. But here is what he envied. He says that the Americans have tabs on the soldiers' uniforms, and markings on the vehicles, and emblems, and unit coats of arms. And he concludes that for this reason their military personnel also know the value of "patriotism of the platoon, company, state, and country." We do not have such symbols. So does this mean that the patriotism of our soldiers and officers is also not quite enough?

Yes, a variety of symbols would also not interfere with our large units, units and subunits. But, in my view, this is not the essence. If you want something to envy, do not envy the military appurtenances, but the respect that the American people have for their army. Not even in the most "valorous" times for it, I have in mind Vietnam, Grenada, and Panama, did U. S. citizens call their military command "killers," and "occupiers," nor did the press unleash anti-army campaigns.

Rephrasing A. Mikhaylov, I would like to end in this way. Today two mutually exclusive processes have been

encountered: an anti-army campaign, and the need to raise the prestige of service in the armed forces. Compromise here is impossible!

* * *

Lt Gen V. Plekhanov, military soviet member, chief of the Political Administration, Red Banner Odessa Military District:

"A Tribute to Fashion or Defamation?"

Often I ask the questions: Why has such a storm of criticism today rained down upon the army, which our fatherland has always treated with love? Who is gaining something here? To whom is this advantageous? Perhaps it is merely a tribute to fashion? Everything is being pictured in a bad light, and what better than the armed forces?

I think that the true reason for the attacks on the army have deeper roots. In my view, certain forces are bending over backwards to drive a wedge between it and the people, weaken their unity, and thus clear themselves a path to power.

Last year I met the English journalist [Carolyn Schofield], who was writing a book about the Soviet Army. She visited many military units, meeting with sailors, pilots, missilemen, airborne troops, motorized riflemen. She became familiar with their life through her own eyes, and thoroughly. She took away many impressions, and here is what she said: "To me it seems strange, and I want to emphasize this particularly, to hear the abundance of critical articles in Soviet newspapers and journals directed against their own army. Even I, an outsider, who has just become acquainted with the life of your armed forces, am struck by the clear prejudice of some newspaper articles, which are defamatory in tone."

Of all people, an English journalist cannot be suspected of desiring to protect the honor of our greatcoat. Her view is unbiased. Many press organs truly are guilty of defamation in discussing the life and problems of the army. This is especially true of OGONEK, which curiously gives over its pages to people who are frequently far from the armed forces, and are bitter toward them, to dilettantes such as a certain reserve Private Terekhov, who, judging by the polemic that started up after his article, lost both his principles and his conscience.

It is painful and vexing, but it is a fact that some of our compatriots do not speak about the imperialist hirelings with such malice as they do about the army of their fatherland. It would be useful for them to think a bit: Whom are we beating unmercifully? Whom, excuse me, are we kicking with such satisfaction? It is ourselves. Our sons. Our brothers. Our painful memory. Because all of us, with rare exceptions, are essentially soldiers. Only some are serving today, and others are in the reserves.

One is struck by the fact that the anti-army campaign somewhat ebbs, when some calamity befalls us and it is

necessary to go, at times risking one's life, to the epicenter of danger, whether it be the Chernobyl Atomic Electric Power Plant, the sunken holds of the Admiral Nakhimov, or the ruins of Spitak. Then even the most zealous liberals and pacifists suddenly remember that we have an army that will endure everything. This is correct. And it, without being reminded, takes upon its shoulders the gravity of tragic events.

Or how can they forget about the non-black earth region, where our soldiers and officers, deprived of elementary living conditions, are helping to raise up this region from poverty by building roads? And what about the Transcaucasus republics, where the army has been sent to safeguard that which is most dear, human lives, but is itself suffering losses?

I was able to be present at the ceremonial session dedicated to the 70th Anniversary of the Odessa film studio. And there one of the guests, a producer, stated in an address: "I send you greetings from sunny Yerevan, besieged by Soviet soldiers." And in response—applause. What is this profanation? They, these troops, after the earthquake in Armenia did not see the light of day due to their most difficult work. By day and by night they sorted through the ruins, protected the banks, the savings banks, and other state institutions. That is the kind of siege that took place there.

Recently in Leninakan two schools received students within their walls for the first time following the earthquake. And military construction troops built these buildings.

The article by A. Mikhaylov, "Man in Military Uniform," it seems to me, is not as tendentious as many other articles about the army. But, let its author not be offended, such materials are written by people who do not leave their offices. With the same success he could have told us something about oilfield workers, miners, or construction workers. It is evident that his approach to the problems is based not on deep knowledge of real life, but on information gotten mainly from periodicals and fragmentary observations from the outside.

"Why are we always talking about money and about politics?" Writes the author. "Let us, rather, talk about the soul." Let us. About what is A. Mikhaylov's soul aching? About the fact that even in its outward demeanor the officer corps is beginning to lose its appearance. Just "beginning?" And before, it turns out, everything was all right? To the contrary, quite recently the military uniform has been noticeably improved. It has become more comfortable, more practical, and more attractive. And if someone wears it carelessly, there is no need to equate such people with the entire army. As the saying goes, there is always a black sheep in the family.

"Today we do not distinguish," writes A. Mikhaylov, "a member of the Taman Guards from a military construction soldier." Well, you know, there are people who do not even distinguish a soldier from a sailor. Who is at fault in this? They themselves. If they are interested in

who is who, let them learn about the emblems of distinction that each military person has. Otherwise, it happens that a man cannot distinguish a tank emblem from an artillery one, but takes it upon himself to make judgments about the problems of the army.

The author of the article, you see, terribly dislikes for a colonel to use public transportation. Since when, allow me to ask, have we introduced a caste system in the country? Is it that it is acceptable for some people to ride, say, on the metro, and shameful for others? According to Mikhaylov's logic, it turns out that an officer must return from work in a taxi, and if he does not have the money, then he must walk, but not degrade himself to use public transport. What is this high and mightiness that is being preached? The appearance of a military man is defined, most of all, by how he looks and conducts himself. If he is neatly dressed, smart in appearance, gives up his seat to women, it is to his honor. What is there to become indignant about here?

A. Mikhaylov is also dissatisfied that military personnel walk about in uniform. Citing certain NATO countries, he argues for having military personnel appear as rarely as possible, and within a set radius, or that they change into civilian clothes in general whenever they leave their unit. And why, tell me, are we ashamed of the military uniform? We bring up military personnel in the spirit of love for it, and pride in it, and, I believe, are right in doing so. The army is not guilty of anything before the people and country, so as to hide itself from them.

And I would like to answer one more question. A. Mikhaylov asks: "Where are they, the Akhtyrskiy, Semenovskiy and Preobrazhenskiy regiments, which have gone down in history?" He has in mind our forgetting the glorious combat traditions of the fatherland. The author of the article is not the first to discover this. I have already heard many times: "In the past the regiments bore resonant names, and now the military unit is designated by faceless numbers." I must say that the numbers designate not the name, but rather the address of the military unit. Many regiments, especially those that took part in the Great Patriotic War and were distinguished in battles, have honorary names. Here in our Red Banner Odessa Military District are the Guards Motorized Rifle Nizhnednestrovskiy Regiment, the Vinitskiy Artillery Regiment, and others. Please go ahead, call them such. No one is preventing you. And they sound no worse than, say, that same Akhtyrskiy Regiment.

I am in no way inclined toward embellishing the state of affairs in the army. Many shortcomings, unfortunately, have accumulated. And could it have been otherwise? After all, the armed forces do not exist on an uninhabited island; they are a part of society. The army and the people, like two communicating vessels, are linked to one another. Therefore, what takes place in society also takes place in the army. And it is dishonest to blame only us military people for all sins. Nevertheless, today, at a time of pacifist hysteria, rocks are continuing to "fly" at

the army. It has become not accepted to speak about the valor of our soldier, although he deserves this according to the highest measures.

The army as a state institution is strong, despite all the attacks on it. But it itself also needs protection. It is necessary to halt this flywheel of defamation, or at least to give us the opportunity to stand up for ourselves in these same mass media.

[passages omitted]

Lt Col A. Papakin, Gds Regt Commander:

"Who is Living Well in the Army..."

I read the article, "Man in Military Uniform." Besides a feeling of bitterness in my heart, it had no effect. And this is why. In his last sentence the author calls for raising the prestige of army service, but since the final period then follows, understandably nothing is said about what needs to be done and what is to be undertaken. The article, in my view, is the latest attempt to "take a stroll" through army "sore points."

Of course, today it is popular to write about the armed forces, especially in a negative plane. Everyone who feels like it is discussing both non-regulation relationships, and mistakes in the training of officers and sergeants. They are even talking, as A. Mikhaylov did, about where and when military personnel should go in their uniforms. Yes, everyone is writing. But, L. Tolstoy, the classic world literary figure, has this thought: One can write only about what one has seen, what one knows, and what one has experienced himself, or following one's heroes.

If it had been so with the author of the article, he would have known that we military men do not talk about the problems of the army, and our own problems, "at the table on the occasion of a promotion ceremony," but ourselves bring them to discussion by all the people. The problems of the army are problems of our entire society and all of our people.

Unfortunately, the authors of many articles forget about this. They want to make the problems of the army exclusively problems of the commanders and political workers. Having relished some negative fact, especially the "dedovshchina" [harassment of first year soldiers by second year], they go no further. So one wants to tell them: If you consider yourselves such experts in military matters, and in educating the personnel, propose at least something constructive, and analyze thoroughly the reasons for one or another negative phenomenon.

It is enough to leaf through the files of newspapers for a few days, and a stream of information will rain down on you about the growth of criminality among juveniles and young people, about the wards of childrens homes, about the weakness of some young people for narcotics, the growth of cruelty, the "dedovshchina" in schools and PTU [vocational and technical schools], about single

mothers, and about pacifistic frames of mind among inductees. And what about the figures indicating dysfunctional families, where one or both of the parents are chronic alcoholics? These are problems of our society. I do not want to paint an entirely black picture, but, after all, the inductees come to serve from the "crucible of civilian life."

Let not the impression be created that, having enumerated all of these troubles, I will conclude that we need a professional army. I do understand that creating such an army will help solve urgent problems associated with the low quality of the call-up contingent. Just the same, I am opposed. And this is why.

By going to a professional army, we will remove from the army one of its important functions—that of the bringing up of young people, future members of our society. The family, school, and komsomol have already essentially removed themselves from this. Let parents and teachers not be offended, but my time as a commander has enabled me to compare contingents of inductees of various times, and draw this sad conclusion. What are we to do now, have the army also remove itself?

I recall one instance. One time I was holding a discussion with soldiers and the question of a professional army came up. I inquired of them who would agree to serve if the pay would be 200, 250, 300 and 400 rubles. There did not turn out to be any who so desired. When we got up to 450 rubles, questions followed about the order and conditions of service. As we see, 500 rubles is the approximate minimum that summon in young people an interest in protecting the homeland. The author of the article frequently makes reference to the example of the West. I will also allow myself to do this. In the professional armies of the NATO bloc countries, a soldier is paid separately for his class-qualification, conditions and time of service, armed service, and force component. If we take this same path, I do not believe that even 500 rubles will be enough.

A professional army will require building for the soldiers not only comfortable housing instead of barracks, but also many other facilities, which are called grandly "the services sphere." Are we ready for this? In my opinion, no. After all, so far we cannot even provide housing for officers and warrant officers. Currently in our unit there are 62 families without apartments, half of which are doubling up with other families. And this is despite the fact that we do not have a full complement of officers and warrant officers.

Here is a noteworthy detail. The local authorities have already long owed us military personnel more than 900 square meters of housing, and are not planning to issue it. They explain this by saying: "You are military, solve your own problems yourselves." I cited this example to emphasize again that our press has already manipulated public opinion, if the city authorities have begun to divide the problem of providing housing into a military

problem and a civilian problem. And how is one to judge the long lines of former military personnel near city and rayon ispolkoms, who have given their strength, and frequently also their health, for 25 or more years of service to the homeland, and now have been turned into bomzhi [homeless persons]?

Today it has become "popular" to look in officers' pockets, and to say that they are crammed full. Perhaps this is where the idea about the driver comes from? And if we speak honestly, the officers in the regiment receive only half as much as, say, a bus driver or metro train driver. And the bus driver works 8-10 hours, four days per week, while an officer (almost without days off!) works 12-16 hours per day. They might say that a bus driver is responsible for the life of the passengers. And is a platoon or company officer really not responsible for the life of the soldier? He is responsible. Moreover, he is also responsible for his training, behavior, and for costly weapons and combat equipment. Plus, as a rule, after four or five years the officer, not by his own choice, note, changes his place of service. If we are to believe the popular wisdom, one trip is the equivalent of a fire. Add to this our wives, the majority of whom do not work, although they could, they are not afraid of getting their hands dirty. It is simply that frequently there is no work for them in the garrisons, nowhere to place their children, because there are not enough places in children's institutions. And the average officer's family consists of four or five people. It happens that many families are living below the poverty line.

And so it is necessary for people in military uniform to travel on public transport. For example, my apartment-less officers spend almost two hours on the road, as they live far from the unit station. If they were to take a "driver" every time, "by making a simple calculation we can come to the conclusion" that they will have to spend all of their pay in order not to damage the "honor of the greatcoat." And in the GDR Army the state also is concerned about the honor of the greatcoat. For example, a company commander is authorized an official Trabant, and a battalion commander a Wartburg. Naturally, the officers themselves drive the vehicles. Perhaps we should also try that?

The author of the article supposes that shifting to a professional army "may disturb the peace of a military leader who is invested with power." It is not so, dear A. Mikhaylov. To the contrary, he will begin to feel more calm. You see, then they would stop asking him to collect metal scrap, transport vegetables, carry out construction work, and many other things that the army has to do today. He will only be asked to account for how the soldier fires, drives the combat vehicle, and is prepared physically. And if this soldier is a professional, a system of fines, as is done in the West, to interest him in firing accurately, running swiftly, and driving the vehicle excellently, would not be difficult.

A. Mikhaylov writes that "the idealizing of a professional army by young officers is based on the fact that

competition will help their rapid advancement." But allow me to ask: Is there really no competition today among our officers, or have they already ceased being professionals? After all, as a rule he who recommended himself well, and the quality of whose equipment and training of whose personnel is of the highest quality, receives the higher duty position.

In my view, today it is most important to ensure that the army is not forced to engage in sorting of vegetables at bases, cleaning the streets of cities, unloading cars at train stations, and to ensure a qualitative improvement in the training material base. And then I can boldly guarantee that our "compulsory service" soldier is in no way inferior to a professional. Here are some simple examples. To train a tank gunner-operator we allot six standard rounds. "They" allot 93. We teach a soldier to fire small arms with the aid of "molar forceps" thought up by our great grandfathers, while "they" use the latest technical achievements. Perhaps we do not wish to do so? No, we still do not have everything necessary.

Let me say a couple of words about wearing the military uniform within "a set radius." Soon, apparently, we will also approve this. For example, in Yaroslavl, school cadets, with the authorization of the command, wear civilian clothing on leave, because local hooligan youths are beating those who appear on the streets of the city in military uniform. This is also happening in other cities. A new type of racket has even appeared. For a small star on the epaulet a ransom of 10 rubles is demanded to escape being beaten in the face; for a large star, 25 rubles. Do not the "fans" of the prestige of service in the armed forces take a certain credit for this?

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RSFSR Party Conference Delegates on Party Problems, Solutions

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[Interview with A. Tubyshkin, chief metallurgist of the Rassvet Machine Building Factory; Col Gen Avn V. Kremlev, chief of the Air Force Engineering Academy; and Capt 1st Rank L. Lapshin, chief of a specialized construction administration, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col I. Sas: "Facing the Needs of Russia"]

[Text] Today the Moscow Kremlin receives those whom the communists of Russia delegated to their highest party forum—the Russian Party Conference. Among them are workers and generals, prominent scientists and kolkhoz peasants. A. Tubyshkin, chief metallurgist of the Rassvet Machine Building Factory; Col Gen Avn V. Kremlev, chief of the Air Force Engineering Academy; and Capt 1st Rank L. Lapshin, chief of a specialized construction administration, answer the questions of our correspondent.

[Correspondent] So, the main question is on the agenda: Will there or will there not be a Russian Communist Party?

[Kremlev] I believe there will be. Today Russia has very many problems, which are grave and have been neglected. The RKP [Russian Communist Party] will help Russian communists organize themselves, unite ranks, and gather their forces into a single fist.

[Tubyshkin] It seems to me that this will also help unite the entire party.

[Lapshin] I am for the RKP. But, in my view, there is also a danger here. If implementation of the ideas of the RKP will hold us back merely to creating additional apparat structures, think about it, we have achieved nothing. I am very afraid about how this splintering cannot but help reinforce in the party the already tangible separatist tendencies.

[Correspondent] Other fears are also being expressed: How is the RKP that has been created not to become the possessor, if it can be so expressed, of the controlling block of shares in the CPSU, owing to its numerical strength?

[Tubyshkin] There is, obviously, a problem here, but, after all, it is always possible to create mechanisms that guarantee the equality of the republic communist parties. It is necessary already today to put this into drafts of the CPSU Platform and Charter.

[Kremlev] Many people love to expound on the "dictatorship" of Russia within the union. But look at what position Russia has found herself in. I think that the myth about the "dictatorship" of the Russian communists in the CPSU is needed by those who would like to sow the seeds of discord in the party as well.

[Lapshin] I would call upon all to be realists. I believe that many harbor illusions that it is necessary merely to create the RKP, and the party will transform itself and live a different life. Independent communist parties can also be created in the autonomous oblasts, but where is the good sense here? In and of itself the creation of the RKP will give little. Fundamental transformations in the entire party are needed. They have been outlined in the pre-Congress documents of the Central Committee. But, in my view, radicalization of party economic and social policy is required.

[Correspondent] Today it is very important to assess the situation in the party objectively. Assessments at times sound diametrically opposed. Some say that the CPSU has ended up in the role of a practically "dying party," while others believe that there is no crisis, and all of this amounts to provocative inventions. What is your opinion?

[Tubyshkin] I think that only someone who is burying his head in the sand can fail to notice such extremely alarming phenomena as the drop in party authority

(sociological studies confirm this), mass exits from the CPSU, decline in trust in the leadership, and the danger of a split that has arisen.

[Kremlev] The authority of the ruling party has always depended on how the people were living. If the living standard is high, the honor and praise go solely to the party. If it is low, faith in it drops. And at this time life is difficult for our people. Myself I am from Vologda, and, frankly speaking, my heart bleeds when I look at our Russian hinterland. And here we must seek not justification, but ways out of the crisis. Mistakes in party policy are extremely costly.

[Lapshin] Stratification of the party, and alienation of it from the people, have taken place. The apparatus has taken the actual power into its hands, and the voice of the lower ranks of the party is of interest to few.

[Correspondent] What ways out of this situation do you see?

[Tubyshkin] The main thing, I think, is to turn the party into a truly democratic organization, where suppression of thinking and separation of the leadership from the party masses are impossible, and where the primary party organizations determine the strategy and tactics of party politics.

We have already gotten away from the old practice of holding party forums, when the general secretary uttered the truth, and the hall greeted him with tempestuous ovations. But, the spiritual life of the party is only beginning to be reborn. I believe that such a rebirth is impossible without an atmosphere of free thinking, and respect for a different point of view and position. It is necessary to break the cult of all manner of ideological cliches, and affirm the cult of good sense.

I believe that for these purposes it is necessary to completely rework the principle of democratic centralism toward democratization. We should also concern ourselves about protecting the rights of the minority. After all, history has shown all of us that the majority does not always possess the truth.

[Kremlev] It is possible to arrive at a humane, democratic socialism only following implementation of major social programs, which should be based on swiftly developing scientific and technical progress, which in turn depends on the intellectualization of society, and the level of education and culture.

At the same time, it is known that our system of education is in a state of crisis, especially in terms of the quality of training of specialists, and that state large-scale education policy and strategy have not been worked out, and the potential needs for cadres for a society that is being renewed are not being studied and analyzed as they should be. Financing of education is based on what is left over. All of this may lead not to a raising, but to a decline

in the intellectualization of our society, and, as a consequence, to a further lag behind the highly-developed states.

In connection with this, fundamental improvement of the education system must be a priority, as one of the strategic avenues for building a humane, democratic socialism.

[Lapshin] Perestroyka in the party, and also largely in society, is skidding, in my deep conviction, also because discipline in the party has fallen catastrophically. I know that many will react negatively to this assertion. Today it is popular to assert the opposite. But, let us look at the situation realistically.

The party has taken up a new economic policy. It has been approved by the highest party organs. But look how just this same local leasing is slowing it down. And not by just anybody, but by many leaders. It is frankly a kind of "sabotage." One can, of course, disagree with certain decisions, but since it has been approved, and since the party is fighting for it, obey. And what is most outrageous is that rarely is anyone punished.

I will stand for not allowing (and there will undoubtedly be such attempts) everything on which party discipline is buttressed to be emasculated from the draft new CPSU Charter. We are, of course, not speaking about some barracks regime, but about strict fulfillment of what the Charter requires.

[Correspondent] More and more often the problem of depolitization, and "departization" of state institutions, including the army and navy, is being debated.

[Kremlev] No one has yet succeeded in excommunicating the army from politics. It is simply impossible. After all, as is known, any war is a continuation of politics by other, forcible, means.

As concerns departization, in my view it is not without danger to perestroyka to force the pace of this process artificially. After all, today the CPSU is the single real consolidating power.

[Tubyshekin] I also believe that here great balance is truly needed.

[Lapshin] These questions, undoubtedly, will arise both at the conference and the congress. Let us see where the balance of the scales is inclining.

[Correspondent] Let us imagine a situation. You are given ten minutes for a speech. You cannot talk about all the defects. Which problem would you discuss?

[Tubyshekin] I would like to talk about many things. Take just this phenomenon. Actually two disciplines exist in the party; one for the rank and file, and the other for the higher ups. They flay three skins, excuse the expression, from the rank and file communist, and the higher up you go the freer you are. The highest levels seem to be

entirely out of the zone of responsibility. Take the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. Whom do they report to?

I would propose eliminating the apparat primary party organizations, and making all communist leaders accountable to the primary party organizations of the production collectives. There will be found both demands and exactingness.

Or take this problem. The party possesses a huge ideological apparatus. The Academy of Social Sciences at the CPSU Central Committee, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, and the Institute of Party History exist in Moscow alone. Scientific works are written, and doctoral and candidates' dissertations defended. And when a critical moment came, it turned out that there was no one to go and speak on the square, or at the meeting or demonstration. We cannot even gain a clear understanding of what kind of society it is we are building. Do we need such an apparatus?

[Kremlev] Based on the instructions of my voters, I would introduce for discussion certain major problems of military policy in the light of the new thinking. The fact is that many invest such concepts as strategic military parity and reasonable sufficiency with very unrestricted meaning. And all of this could be based on strictly scientific calculation, and scientific justification.

[Lapshin] To turn the entire party to face the needs of the people—that, in my view, is the main thing. And the paramount question is how do we, in the shortest possible amount of time, place the new economic mechanisms into effect? Intense organizational work in the local areas is needed, from which the party moved away from prematurely. But, political debates will hardly change the situation.

[Correspondent] It remains for me simply to wish you, comrade delegates, successful and fruitful work.

Army Komsomol Council Chairman Lt Col A. Reshetnikov Interviewed

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[Interview with Lt Col Aleksey Leonidovich Reshetnikov, deputy chief for political work in the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "I Am Not Blowing My Own Horn"; on the occasion of completion of the Army Council of Komsomol Organizations Congress; place not given; first three paragraphs are KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL introduction]

[Text] The following is a conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Aleksey Leonidovich Reshetnikov, who is the chairman of the Army Council of Komsomol Organizations, and also deputy chief for political work in the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

Aleksey Leonidovich Reshetnikov has been a member of the Armed Forces since 1975. He is a 1981 graduate of the Novosibirsk Higher Military Political Combined Arms School. His first position was as deputy company commander for political affairs. He subsequently served as unit VLKSM [All-Union Lenin Young Communist League] committee secretary; school political section deputy chief for Komsomol work; senior instructor in the Komsomol Work Section of the Political Department, Airborne Troops; senior instructor and deputy chief, Komsomol Work Department, Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

Questions asked in the interview were drawn from letters to us from the following readers: Reserve Major I. Konyayev, Captains A. Bruma and O. Nekrylov, Senior Lieutenants Yu. Pavlyuk and Yu. Shkaranda, Warrant Officer N. Kazmin, Cadet A. Bagdasaryan, and others.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] The 21st Congress of the VLKSM was held in an atmosphere of sharp discussions. Did they lose sight of the main purpose, which was to determine the purpose of the VLKSM? Do you think that the Congress made that determination? Which of the resolutions that were passed would you single out?

[Reshetnikov] The Congress did of course have its share of demagogic and populist speeches and remarks and extreme assessments of the youth movement going on in the country. I was dismayed by the drawn-out arguments about procedural matters. Nevertheless, I believe that we were successful in hammering out a general concept of the league. The VLKSM's fundamental priorities are now freedom and justice; humanism and human solidarity; and a striving to produce a society in which free development of each person is a precondition of free development of everyone, with the person being held in the highest regard relative to political and economic changes. The resulting policy document sets down the principal conditions for Komsomol renewal: unconditional rejection of dogma and stereotypes, which for years have molded our philosophy; of blind copying of party structures and methods of operation; of nurturing as a principal function; and of rendering the Komsomol a state instrument, a practice which made our league into a tool for controlling youth. The future will tell to what extent this reflects reality. Of the resolutions passed by the Congress, I would single out those that define the status of the Armed Forces Komsomol, which has been accorded the same rights as republic youth leagues.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] More than 150 service personnel were elected delegates to the 21st VLKSM Congress. How productive do you think their work was?

[Reshetnikov] The Armed Forces delegation generally accomplished its mission at the Congress. The resolutions and delegates' platform passed by the 1st Plenum of the Army Council of Komsomol Organizations have been implemented. The position of the service personnel

at the Congress was active and forthright. It is sufficient to recall the speeches of Captain 3rd Rank Aleksandr Baturin, Cadet Yevgeniy Kelpsha, and others. Six of our delegates participated in the plenary sessions. The voices of the youth wearing the uniform were clear and convincing, including those in all the discussion groups of the Congress, one being the Civic Motivation and Patriotism group that was organized on our initiative. A result was formulation of the resolution "The Komsomol and Protection of the Fatherland."

However, there is another side to the coin. Some of our delegates were lacking in political culture, skill in deciphering the mosaic of opinions, and firmness in defending their views.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] Will there be any major changes in activity of the Army and Navy Komsomol as a result of the resolutions passed by the 21st VLKSM Congress? The Komsomol does have its peculiarities.

[Reshetnikov] The Army Komsomol was undergoing changes long before the 21st VLKSM Congress took place. I will mention a few: creation of councils of Komsomol organizations in elements - from large units to the Main Political Directorate inclusively; granting our organizations the privilege of furnishing candidates to congress; expansion of independence for primary organizations. The process of renewing the organization of the Armed Forces VLKSM will continue, of course. I would say that the purpose here is to reposition the Army and Navy Komsomol in the social structures of military collectives. By that I mean that the Army and Navy Komsomol organizations are to become promoters of youth policy; develop and maintain skill in political leadership under conditions of broad pluralism of youth movements; and clearly delineate their areas of responsibility in political, military, and moral nurturing of servicemen. It seems to me that in this way the 21st VLKSM Congress' resolutions will also play a positive role.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] In past years, adjournment of a VLKSM congress was immediately followed by a torrent of directives issued to military units giving them instructions and suggestions for interpreting, studying, and accomplishing resolutions. What about now, with the 21st Komsomol Congress completed?

[Reshetnikov] After the 21st Congress was adjourned, a brief information telegram was dispatched to political directorates of the branches of the service and the branches of the Army. There were no directives or instructions. However, there is much to be done to bring the normative base of the Army Komsomol into conformity with the resolutions passed by the Congress. Apparently needed is a document that will "legalize" all the changes. Otherwise, I believe that everything else will be handled on a local basis.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] Do you, as Army Komsomol Council chairman, have your own program for bringing the Army Komsomol out of the crisis? Do you experience any moments of despair?

[Reshetnikov] First, about the crisis. To tell you the truth, I find the word "crisis" revolting. It smacks of panic and confusion. I am not rejoicing and blowing my own horn, either. Many people are using the "crisis" as an excuse not to do substantive work; they cite it in listing all our shortcomings and failures and keep thinking up all kinds of models, concepts, structures, as it were. There is much advice from the sidelines on what to do, but almost none on how to do it. If there is a crisis in the Komsomol, it must be one of quality, in skill required to work under the new conditions.

My own program? I would say that I have my own approaches. They have to do with recognizing the actual situation, various opinions, postures, considerations, and collectiveness in selecting the ways and means of doing work, with a constant search, with doubts. What I like to do is grasp an idea, so to speak, and pass it to my colleagues. When I take another look, it is shared by all. This does not absolve me of responsibility, however. If anything, it means the opposite.

I am quite successful, but would like to be more so. I have never experienced despair, but I came close to it, when I was faced with endless daily routine and a mass of details. And - strange as it may seem - there is more of that than ever. It is like a kind of time trouble, as they say in chess.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] In various publications there is no end to articles advocating prohibition of all political parties and organizations in the Army. Also, during the 21st VLKSM Congress some delegates proposed dissolution of the "silent" Army Komsomol, which would be replaced by something on the order of a trade union or association whose purpose would be to protect the rights and interests of young servicemen. What do you think about this kind of development?

[Reshetnikov] People who say that the Army Komsomol is silent apparently are the kind that shout into an empty cave just to hear their own echo. Regardless of how critical the "liquidators" say the Armed Forces Komsomol's activity and existence may be, to this day this is still the only socio-political organization that represents youth under conditions of military service. Trying to decide the kind of organization it should be without considering the opinions of more than the two million Komsomol members in the Army and Navy would be undemocratic, to say the least. I believe that all the changes that occur in this area should keep pace with political and military reform, in conformity with the actual situation in the country. There is no room for haste here.

Suggestions pertaining to creating in the Armed Forces so-called depoliticized structures are being scrutinized

for the purpose of extracting whatever grain of merit there may be. This requires a constructive and measured approach. However, in the final analysis it is the military Komsomol members and their primary organizations that will decide the fate of the Army Komsomol.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] In the Komsomol today there are many persons who not only are quite concerned about its future, but also attempt to find an alternative basis for influencing various factors in the VLKSM. I have in mind participants in the Surgut, Novosibirsk, and Volzhskiy meetings. Representatives of the Army Komsomol also attended. In a meeting held in Arkhangelsk there were only Army and Navy Komsomol members in attendance. They presented highly original ideas—ones that differ from the official ones. What are they—an opposition?

[Reshetnikov] I believe that the persons whose ideas on development of the VLKSM you say differ from the official position would not agree with the statement that they are an opposition. I also would not call them that. The lads are searching, trying to understand the situation, looking at this and that. Incidentally, the ideas advanced by the participants in the Arkhangelsk meeting did not differ very widely from those previously expressed at the Army and Navy aktiv's conference. Senior Warrant Officer Vladimir Shamshin, one of the conference organizers, expressed himself quite clearly on this topic. Whenever I could, I always supported people whose position serves the cause. It is unfortunate that a fine phrase or catchy idea pronounced by some persons are often a mask for arrogance, ulterior motives, and isolation from the life and opinions of people. This kind of person is simply not the type to suffer over the Komsomol's future. That is another variety of suffering, one that can be cured if it is not chronic.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] As declared at the 21st VLKSM Congress, the Komsomol has the function of representing the interests of youth. In a civilian environment, for example, the Komsomol committee has the opportunity of extending financial support to a member, paying his way to international youth camps, etc. However, when it comes to VLKSM committees of military units and ships, the possibilities are considerably more modest. The Komsomol organization is in no position to serve social protection functions for Army youth, regardless of how much we would like to see that kind of change. Can you say something about that?

[Reshetnikov] Indeed, one of the Komsomol's policy goals announced at the 21st Congress is the creation of conditions conducive to the free development of the young person, development of his creative potential, protection and implementation of interests and rights of young people. You will agree that functions of social protection of youth, including servicemen, properly belong to the respective state structures, which in the Army are commanders, chiefs, and law enforcement organs. This is where the Komsomol steps into a less than pleasant situation in taking on this task. Society has

yet to work out a reliable mechanism for protecting the rights and interests of youth in general. Should we expect great things from the Komsomol in this regard? This may be a topic for discussion as a future area of activity.

As far as the Army Komsomol's financial capabilities are concerned, there unfortunately still are severe limitations. Nevertheless, even now primary organizations do have some means to motivate excellence and extend material assistance. Thus, in 1989 VLKSM committees spent about 2 million rubles to fill these needs. Attaining popularity in Komsomol organizations are youth recreational centers that operate on the basis of cost recovery and economic accountability. For example, this kind of center has been set up in virtually all large Airborne Troop units.

Local capabilities have also come to the fore. For example, the Army Council of Komsomol Organizations has approved sending two groups of young servicemen on tourist trips to Yugoslavia and the GDR. The trips will be financed by the Army Council of Komsomol Organizations.

New possibilities were opened up by the 21st VLKSM Congress by its adoption of the resolution "Assistance Funds for Komsomol Organizations," the purpose of which is to offer financial support to Armed Forces VLKSM organizations.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] In the latest party documents, a number of times the statement is made that the CPSU builds its relations with the Komsomol on the basis of ideological unity, comradesly cooperation, and interaction. Nevertheless, not clear in this regard is how Armed Forces Komsomol organizations are to set up relations with political organs and party organizations. In the draft "Armed Forces VLKSM Organization Regulations," it is stated that they are to operate under the supervision of political organs. It would appear that there can be no thought of independence for Army Komsomol organizations.

[Reshetnikov] Keep in mind that the document was prepared and submitted to the 1st VSKO [Army Komsomol Organization Council] in February. Now, after the Komsomol Congress, with military reform under way and political organs undergoing reorganization, the situation is different. Under these circumstances, changes will be made in certain sections of the draft regulations, which will be submitted to the Army Komsomol conference for examination. It is premature to speak of details, but the final version of the regulations will certainly include our norms that will make it possible to build between the VLKSM on the one hand, and political organs and party organizations on the other, interrelationships on a more democratic footing than at present.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] How many areas of responsibility does the Army Komsomol hope to cover? You have the struggle being waged by Komsomol

members for quality in combat training, discipline, nurturing of personnel, a healthy moral atmosphere in youth collectives. Is it not clear that in accepting responsibility for everything, the Komsomol actually accepts responsibility for nothing?

[Reshetnikov] In the new VLKSM Rules there are two fairly clear statements relating to the principal tasks and priorities of the Komsomol. They are dictated by our present conditions. We have long abandoned the approach of compiling lists of tasks to be performed by all organizations. Priorities are arrived at collectively. Each primary organization has the right to decide for itself which tasks are to be accorded priority status at any particular time. Also, you will agree that such things as preparing graphic materials or wasting time on questions of recreation in a unit in which there is a problem with combat training or discipline are equivalent to standing on the sidelines, to say the least. This is an area where the Komsomol should come into its own: molding a positive public opinion; creating a favorable climate in military collectives and a spirit of healthy competition and interaction; and conducting political and nurturing work.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] Army Komsomol delegates to the 21st VLKSM Congress issued words of alarm on the growing number of young people in units and subunits that have become infected with the virus of nationalism. What in your opinion can Army and Navy Komsomol organizations do to cure this disease?

[Reshetnikov] I gained fairly good experience in interethnic relations during my compulsory tour as commander of a detachment that included Privates Pechukonis from Lithuania; Chibalashvili from Georgia; Saliyev from Tadjikistan; Fazletdinov from Tataria; Vartanov from Armenia; Kazakov from Kazakhstan; Kurbanov from Turkmenia; Demidenko from the Ukraine; Oleshnevich from Belorussia; and Yeregin from Gorky. It made no difference to us who you were: a Russian or an Armenian; a Kazakh or a Belorussian; a Lithuanian or a Georgian. We lived and worked as one happy family. What has to be done so that our youth collectives would enjoy an atmosphere of friendship, unity, and mutual respect? I am not about to write some kind of prescription. However, it seems to me that Komsomol organizations should make greater use of the experience of war veterans and veterans of Afghanistan, of their friendship as sealed with blood; they should attempt to popularize this friendship. Komsomol workers and activists could do much good by studying history, customs, and traditions of our country's peoples.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] We know more about the VLKSM Central Committee and its secretaries than we do about the Komsomol Work Department of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate and its personnel. Do you consider this to be a common situation? Is this a military secret?

[Reshetnikov] It is definitely not a common situation if many people know virtually nothing about the officers of the Komsomol Work Department of the Main Political Directorate. In our country it has somehow become customary for only leading persons to enjoy the public light. This is less than desirable. It is done all over. This has nothing to do with military secrets, of course. The department I head is small. We are a staff of 10 officers. Each one has experience in political and Komsomol work in districts and fleets to offer. We visit line units often, studying the state of affairs in youth collectives and helping to resolve whatever problems there may be at the place of occurrence. Our department's main function is to serve as a coordinating center for Army and Navy Komsomol organizations.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] In the last two years, units and subunits have been joined by large numbers of incidental type persons: pacifists, anarchists, greens. It is no secret that Komsomol workers and activists were not quite prepared to deal with these kinds of recruits.

[Reshetnikov] I myself would not go so far as to make such an absolute statement about all Komsomol workers and activists. In addition, I feel that they always have been and remain as the most qualified to work with incidental type people. They exhibit this in practice, by their skill in carrying on a dialogue and by interesting such persons in collective matters. There are also those who still pronounce the term "incidental type people" with trepidation, of course. However, believe me when I say that they are not the ones in the driver's seat.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] VLKSM membership has dropped by more than 10 million in the last five years. The Army Komsomol's ranks have also thinned noticeably. Komsomol members are already a minority in a number of units and subunits. The trend continues. This places Komsomol leaders into a fairly strange situation. They are still Komsomol leaders and must take on the problems facing all youths. How do you feel about creating the position of deputy or assistant unit commander for work with youth?

[Reshetnikov] This question has been around for a long time. I believe the time has come to deal with it. With the intensification of political reform in society and separation of functions carried out by political organs and party committees of the Armed Forces, there apparently is a need for taking up questions of setting up in the Army and Navy an institution of officers and the associated organizational structures whose purpose would be to work with youth.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] It is a fact that the 21st Lithuanian Komsomol Congress announced both the creation of an independent organization known as the Communist Youth League and the departure of this organization from the VLKSM proper.

Now how will you relate to Komsomol members who are not VLKSM members that enter the Army and Navy as draftees?

[Reshetnikov] How to relate to them? The same as to other servicemen that are not VLKSM members. I am not in favor of placing youth into categories, of turning Komsomol organizations into clubs for the few. It is desirable to interest in the work of VLKSM organizations as many servicemen as possible that are not members of our league. This can only be to our benefit.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] Are you alarmed by the young officers—the hope of the Armed Forces—that are taking a discharge from the Army and Navy? Last year more than 17,000 young officers, many of them Komsomol members, decided to leave the Armed Forces. Even a deputy chief of the Political Directorate for Komsomol Work in the Siberian Military District decided to join a cooperative. How do you assess this development, and what do Komsomol workers intend to do to retain intelligent and competent officers in the Army and Navy?

[Reshetnikov] I will not list all the causes motivating young officers to take a discharge from the Armed Forces. They are common knowledge. They include poor living conditions; insufficient compensation; disappointment with choice of profession; vulnerability to arbitrariness on the part of commanders and chiefs. Cases of discharge of Komsomol workers are a rarity. There are instances of personnel taking a vacant Komsomol position in a territorial VLKSM organization. For example, Dmitriy Plagov was selected to fill the position of VLKSM raykom secretary in the city of Ivanovo; Mikhail Goryunov, the same in Sverdlovsk. Regarding Political Department Deputy Chief for Komsomol Work Yu. Mashinskiy of the Siberian Military District, the situation was not as simple as many believe. I am not trying to defend Yuriy, but I can tell you that he was experiencing a difficult family situation and other problems.

I feel that the resolution of this most troublesome problem requires more than anything else a state-run social program and a mechanism that would offer social and legal protection and rectification of conditions that exert a negative influence on service. We brought up these problems at the 1st VSKO Plenum and the 21st VLKSM Congress. This resulted in action. A first reading of the bill "Law on the General Principles of State Youth Policy in the USSR" was submitted to a USSR Supreme Soviet session; our suggestions have been taken into account in the Law on Defense under development and in other normative documents.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] The Komsomol is becoming more involved in politics. Its authorized representatives in this regard are the people's deputies. What can you say about the activity of USSR

people's deputies from the Army Komsomol? Not everyone is satisfied with their work, judging by readers' letters.

[Reshetnikov] The Armed Forces Komsomol is represented in the USSR Supreme Soviet by Captain-Lieutenant I. Shulgin, Senior Lieutenant A. Uvarov, and Cadet Yu. Shatrovenko. I cannot say anything bad about their parliamentary activity, but I can say that they could do better. I must admit that I do not interact with them sufficiently; I still do not take advantage of all my opportunities in this regard.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] Readers also send in questions such as the following: "Our district Komsomol organization council representative left for the 21st VLKSM Congress a major and returned wearing the shoulder boards of a lieutenant colonel. Why was he promoted in such a short period of time?" Others also were accorded this kind of honor. Some military delegates that were not promoted were rewarded with medals and valuable gifts. Strange that leaders are being rewarded, with this not the best of times for the Komsomol. Pardon me for drawing a crude comparison, but this seems to be reminiscent of a feast during the plague.

[Reshetnikov] We in our country have become accustomed to making extreme statements. It was not long ago that people were showered with awards whether they deserved it or not. Now we have swung over to asceticism. I do not think this is proper. If a man is doing a good job and producing results, he should be rewarded for his labor. You hear statements to the effect that the Armed Forces Komsomol cannot resolve anything. However, motivation of Komsomol Congress delegates is nothing more than making Komsomol initiative a reality. I also believe that the lads deserved to be rewarded for their work. You see, they were elected to go to the Congress on an alternative basis, survived the preelection struggle in military collectives, and were handed the trust of Komsomol members. The times certainly have not improved, but people have not become any worse, either.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] Why has the authority of many district element Komsomol workers foundered? Because, to many rank-and-file Komsomol members, they act like bureaucrats. They walk around with an inflated sense of self-importance, carrying their thick briefcases. Their visits are reminiscent of an official inspection, mandatorily including a tour of the kitchen facilities, mess hall, supply room. Is this all there is to the functions of a Komsomol worker?

[Reshetnikov] There has been an almost 50-percent turnover in Komsomol worker personnel in the last six months. To me, this category of officers are literate, conscientious, hard-working, and respected by military collectives. It is possible that some of them do not relate well to people in their dealings with subordinates and chiefs. That is not a reason to be afraid of a person. Criticism can do much in this kind of situation. In my

view, a Komsomol worker's authority should rest on the three whales of trust, respect, and love. Trust is won by exhibiting professional qualities, knowledge, and decisiveness. Respect is gained by honesty and a high degree of conscientiousness. Love is earned by showing concern for people and protecting their interests. Also, keep in mind that Army and Navy Komsomol worker positions are now elective. The people who do the electing can also recall their man if his performance falls below expectations.

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Kazakhstan's War Veterans Accorded New Privileges

90UM0831A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 3 Jul 90 p 2

[Kazakh News Agency report: "New Veterans' Benefits"]

[Text] On the eve of the 45th anniversary of the Great Victory, the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers has issued Decree No 168, which spells out the provisions of the presidential ukase. For whom are the privileges intended? For persons who served in units, staffs, and installations of the army in the field during the Civil War, Great Patriotic War, and other combat operations in defense of the USSR and the partisans of those wars; internationalist servicemen; and families of men killed in action that have been receiving benefits on the basis of existing legislation.

The presidential ukase and republic government's decree require that disabled war veterans who were on the waiting list as of 1 January 1990 are to be provided with housing before the end of this year; other war veterans and persons assessed to be of equivalent status and families of men killed in action are to be so provided sometime in the year 1991.

In this connection, Article 30 of the Kazakh SSR Housing Code states that war veterans, Heroes of the Soviet Union and Socialist Labor, full bearers of the Order of Glory and Labor Glory and of the order For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces who do not have a separate apartment that satisfies their needs and who wish to live separately from their children are hereby recognized to be in need of improved housing, even if the quarters occupied by them and their dependents meet the established norms.

The ukase introduces changes into amounts of rental payments. As of the present, war veterans, internationalist servicemen, and families of men killed in action are entitled to occupy their quarters rent-free, if the total amount of floor space does not exceed the established norm, which is 12 square meters per person. They are to pay for any living space above this amount, with a limit of up to six square meters, at the established rate of normal payment effective at the present time (13.2 kopeks per square meter). In the case of disabled war

veterans, other war veterans with non-service connected disability, widows of disabled war veterans, families of men killed in action that have not remarried, and pensioned parents of men killed in action, the amount of space authorized is increased to 15 square meters. Floor space larger than the aforementioned amount will be paid for at three times the normal rate of rental payment.

Veterans of the Great Patriotic War and internationalist servicemen are hereby extended public utility payment benefits previously available to war veterans: a 50-percent discount on utility bills for heat, water, gas, and electricity. Applicants must apply to housing and public utility organizations located in their area for adjustments of payments for all public utility services.

The ukase states that war veterans are entitled to assume cost-free ownership of state- and department-owned houses and apartments in which they currently reside. In addition, the republic Council of Ministers confirms that this entitlement is extended to those persons who are occupying houses and apartments that come under public housing, that is, dwellings that belong to kolkhozes and organizations of a trade union, creative, or other public nature.

An exception to the above are housing construction cooperatives, since they erect and operate residential facilities on the basis of shares, with each cooperative's board and share holder group managing the housing in accordance with their rules. Since no other organs, including ispolkoms of local soviets, have the authority to act in place of the ZhSK [housing construction cooperative] with respect to operation and management, all problems, including those of this nature, are to be resolved by the members proper.

To acquire cost-free ownership of occupied premises, the war veteran must submit an application with accompanying written agreement on the part of all adult family members and other persons to whom the residence is registered to the ispolkom of the local soviet or head of the enterprise or organization that holds the particular residence's account. They are to make the decision, after which the transfer is made by deed. The decision and deed are forwarded to the technical inventory office, which in turn issues a registration certificate to the new owner of the house or apartment.

From that time onward, the abovementioned person has the right to give away his property, sell it, bequeath it to someone, rent it out, or invite other citizens to settle therein. This kind of residence is to be serviced by housing and public utility and repair organizations on the basis of contracts - the same as in the case of privately-owned homes - in accordance with existing legislation.

The new normative legislation seeks to effect significant acceleration of telephone installation for citizens who are entitled to the additional benefits. In the case of disabled war veterans who were on the waiting list as of 1 May 1990, families of men killed in action and of

persons assessed to be in an equivalent status, this is to be accomplished at the present time. In the case of other veterans and internationalist soldiers, this will be accomplished sometime during 1991.

The abovelisted benefits are available to the entire family of a citizen so entitled, regardless of whether he is renting the residence or a family member of the renter.

The ukase's provisions are also extended to war veterans and internationalist servicemen who are still on active duty in the USSR Armed Forces and occupying state housing.

To comply with the presidential ukase, the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers has made available 3,210 passenger cars for disabled veterans, other veterans of the Great Patriotic War, and internationalist soldiers. Of this total, 950 ZAZ 968-M cars and 150 cars model ZAZ 968-M005 are to be made available free of charge to disabled veterans; 340 VAZ-21063 Zhigulis and 270 Moskvich-412s are to be sold to war veterans and internationalist soldiers; 1,500 cars of models to be determined by the republic's Mintorg [Ministry of Trade] will be provided on the basis of availability on the market.

Since all the above automobiles are distributed according to oblast, all questions regarding their acquisition should be directed to the ispolkoms of soviets of people's deputies at the applicant's place of residence. Ispolkoms are authorized - within the limits of stocks allotted annually - to sell disabled veterans, if the latter so desire, other model cars, on the basis of the normal price charged for the cost-free Zaporozhets.

There is another important provision. Veterans of the Great Patriotic War and internationalist servicemen are now eligible to receive, under existing legislation covering war veterans, increased daily food allowances and medicines in hospitals, branches and sections of medical care facilities and dispensaries, regular experimental enterprises producing prosthetic devices, and homes for the aged and disabled.

Complete information on the additional benefits made available by the presidential ukase and government decree can be obtained in rayon and municipal military commissariats, finance and pension branches of republic and oblast military commissariats, and in social security organs.

To assure thorough implementation of the new legislation and prevent any possible degree of failure to honor the rights of disabled and other war veterans, internationalist soldiers, and families of men killed in action, ispolkoms of local soviets are to work with councils of war and labor veterans to carry out the necessary organizational work to the greatest possible extent.

Creation of United Military Trade Union Organization Proposed

90UM0735B Moscow TRUD in Russian 4 Jul 90 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Unification of Army Trade Unions"; first paragraph is TRUD introduction]

[Text] Formed on 20 June, by resolution of the Secretariat of the VTsSPS [All-Union Central Trade-Union Council], was an organizational committee with the purpose of preparing and conducting a congress of trade union organizations for laborers and white collar workers employed by the Soviet Army and Navy.

The organizational committee issued an appeal to trade union members working for military units, military organizations, and Army and Navy enterprises, pointing out that the disconnected nature of the military trade union effort, spread out among 18 trade unions, is not conducive to effective resolution of problems relating to protecting the rights and interests of workers.

The trade union movement in the Army and Navy has no central organ that would speak for all laborers and white collar workers; represent and protect their rights and interests in higher organs of state authority and military leadership; interact with other social organizations; participate directly in USSR Ministry of Defense preparation of plans for socio-economic development and drafting of normative documents dealing with the most important aspects of production, labor, wages, housing, and culture.

In this connection, many trade union organizations have suggested that a single independent trade union organization be set up in the Army and Navy to represent the country's trade union movement, one that would have its own organs, from the lowest to the highest echelons. This would promote protection of the economic, social and legal rights of laborers and white collar workers, strengthen their unity and solidarity, and further the country's defensive capability.

The VTsSPS announced its support of the above suggestions.

During the congress, which in the opinion of the organizational committee could be held in the first half of October of this year, it will be necessary to convene trade union conferences to elect the congress' delegates.

Each primary organization is to retain the right to decide for itself whether it wishes to remain a part of the branch trade union or join the united Army and Navy trade union.

The organizational committee requested primary organizations to consider the issue of uniting the Soviet Army and Navy trade union organizations, so as to work collectively in the search for the most advantageous and suitable solution to promoting the future of the trade union movement in the Army and Navy and devise a

method for setting up elective organs. Readers' suggestions and remarks can be addressed to: Moscow, 117119, Leninskiy Prospekt, 42, VTsSPS.

Journalist Attacks Views of Writer K. Rash on Army Discipline

90UM0764A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 28, Jul 90 p 11

[Article by IZVESTIYA special correspondent Igor Korolkov: "Who Needs an Iron Fist?"]

[Text] One hears more and more talk about the chaos existing in the country and the need for applying a firm hand. People who have a thirst for that apparently believe that the introduction of soldierly procedures will somehow cause groceries to appear on store shelves, resolve interethnic conflicts, and reduce social tensions. That is wishful thinking. The administrative command system set the country up for disaster and never—under any circumstances—can it rectify the situation. It is possible to apply repressive measures to improve production discipline (to a certain extent) and cut down conflicts for a period of time, but to render society economically developed and civilized - definitely not.

Nevertheless, there are many persons who, having absorbed the psychology of people surrounding them, feel that they would fight to the bitter end against descending enemies, and, to survive, must have an iron order. They cannot imagine any way of organizing life other than along army lines.

I felt the full force of the many persons supporting these views by reading the letters I received in response to my short article published in IZVESTIYA (No 346, 1989). The letters informed me that I am an "ideological saboteur." And that I am someone who "slanders the Soviet Army, one whose purpose is to cause deterioration in the country's defensive capability." I had merely suggested that we do away with basic military training, since I am sure that NVP [basic military training] is a holdover from the administrative command system. The purpose of the training is not so much to prepare a person for army service as it is to condition him for submission to a bureaucratic society. I am not alone in feeling this way, judging from the large number of supporting letters.

This subject of six months ago is something I could let pass, if this aggressively promoted view held by some readers, who have a sacred conviction that only the army is in a position to produce a worthy person, were not so dangerous.

My opponents, heaping verbal abuse on the "mediocre writer" that is "free to say whatever he wishes in this time of glasnost," are convinced that they are defending the Army and the Fatherland's defensive capability. What they are really doing is defending the administrative command system and attempting to set up roadblocks for perestroika in the Army. This is an issue of

substantive items, one of principles that constitute the basis of economic interrelationships in society and that form the building blocks for state structures, which include the military.

In a 1926 speech to the Leningrad aktiv of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)], party theoretician Burkharin openly, concisely, and clearly stated the principle that became the basis of economic relationships under socialism: "Every monopoly harbors a certain germ, a danger of decay, of resting on laurels... If we have what amounts to total control of all large industries, if we have a state monopoly, with control of all the basics, and if we do not push, squeeze, and shove our cadres, compelling them to lower the costs of production and do a better job of production management, then we should not be overly surprised if we have all the makings of decay of the monopoly. That which was brought about by competition in capitalist society—something that no longer exists—should here be replaced by deliberate pressure..."

That is the essence of the matter. "There" the economy is fueled by personal interest, a competition between these interests, while here the competition was replaced by a principle as simple as the swish of a whip: "push, squeeze, and shove." It is natural that a state that has an economy resting on compulsion—"of the less aware by the more aware"—will unfailingly pick the repressive approach as its first choice. This kind of state needs a special type of person, one who is obedient, unquestioning, and wholeheartedly devoted to those who make "such a wonderful idea" a reality.

For this reason, the entire system of state and public institutions is programmed to produce this kind of person. By means of the "short course," the paramilitary principle of party and Komsomol regulations, Pioneer parades, criminal code, and ideologized army.

The basic military training administered in schools is merely one of the elements used to mold the mind and psychology of a person preparatory to his accepting the administrative command system.

I believe that no sober-minded person will argue against the need for an army today. It is a question of the position in society it occupies, the importance in which it is held, and the degree to which its methods and structures are borrowed for application to routine civilian life. In one of my articles I made the point that its methods and structures must not be permitted to seep into civilian life under any circumstances. I was accused of failure to understand the purpose of the army. Reader A. Petryakov advised me to read a cycle of articles by writer, teacher, and Laureate of Leninist Komsomol Prize Karem Rash entitled "The Army and Culture," which was published in eight issues of last year's VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL. I am grateful to him for this advice. Rash is indeed amazing in his frankness as he sheds light on this stratum of social consciousness, in so doing sending chills up and down

the reader's spine. Brute force and the parade ground—that is what he believes constitutes the basis of progress.

Consider the following quotes:

"The newspapers, television screen, radio broadcasts are full of dissatisfaction, ambiguous disclosures, hasty presentation of problems, mindless opinions, one-sided advice, and slanted views of writers, and all this with a background of pseudorevolutions—'sexual,' 'scientific,' 'green,' and 'technical'..."

"... All of our public life is presently nothing more than a breeding-ground for sexual temptations and irritations. Just look at what is presented in our cinemas ... and theaters, and then you will not be able to deny that all this is definitely not the kind of nourishment our young people need..."

"Discipline is order. Order creates rhythm, and rhythm gives rise to freedom. Without discipline there is no freedom. Disorder is chaos. Chaos is oppression. Disorder is slavery."

"The army is discipline."

"...And if one is to take 100 journalists, 100 scientists, 100 engineers, 100 artists, 100 drivers, and 100 physicians, or 100 of anyone at all, then 100 of any officers will always be better than all of them."

"The army, in which the healthiest forces of the people gather, should be the school for the nation."

"The army taught that any kind of order is always better than no direction at all."

"This was something that occurred at a time when persons of questionable mental ability set the fashion. This is one example of a grain of healthy popular wisdom, which would have disappeared completely if the army were not a constant source of health."

"Our soldiers, who for two years were accustomed to obey orders, were also able to give orders after leaving the service..."

"That was the best school in the nation."

"The majority of those whom complete accusers call bureaucrats are unknowingly in their small ways and capabilities servants of the idea that took hold in our state system, the idea that is more than a match for those who bow before changes more than anyone else, those who are actually winking at the West."

"Was it not our press that in peacetime filled the people with doubt about the kind of government it had, thus suggesting that in the coming struggle it will be necessary to limit ourselves to a defensive posture? Was it not our press that painted the people a picture of the charms offered by 'Western democracy'...?"

"Having lost common sense at a time when we should make decisions with our whole body, we seek the advice of

specialists, professionals, and academics, that is, the kind of people that spend a lifetime doing nothing more than looking at details, and then we become hopelessly confused, forgetting that the Nobel Prize winner may know how to split an atom, for example, but at the same time he can be a complete dolt in life and politics, two items that cannot be taken apart and examined."

"However, the most important of the positive factors of that time, when the people as a whole were undergoing a slow deterioration, was of course the Army..."

"Our Army nurtured a sense of responsibility at a time when this quality had become quite rare, a time when everyone tried to shed responsibility, being guided primarily by parliament, which is an example of a complete absence of responsibility. Our Army nurtured a sense of personal courage when cowardice reigned everywhere..."

"Tomorrow a group of 'innovators' will set up a 'commission' of highly respected academicians, actors, and writers, and will try to tell everyone that we are now ready to vote for party leaders on a democratic basis... All this will eventually inexorably lead to 'disaster, chaos, panic, multiple authority, defeat.'

"When simple people speak respectfully of a dictator, this has nothing to do with a longing for the whip, camp, or shouted order. This is the age-old longing for a master and order."

"We should carry into state life the fundamental principle which was applied at one time to build an entire army and which was the reason that army was able to become an amazing instrument of all the people: authority of each leader from top to bottom, and responsibility to the leader from bottom to top."

The above are excerpts from the works of two writers. The quotes printed in bold type are from Karem Rash's "The Army and Culture," while those in italics are from Adolf Hitler's "Mein Kampf." I removed from the quotes of both writers only those words that name the particular country involved, substituted the word "dictator" for the name "Stalin," and made similar changes that do not alter the meaning. Both of them consider the time they wrote their "works" one of decay and deterioration; both look upon the army as a healthy body in society.

Hitler subjected the mass media to severe criticism. Rash expresses severe criticism of—for the time being—the country's leadership, for its seeking of advice from scholars. The first Congress of USSR People's Deputies had not been held when his manuscript was submitted to the editors. One can only imagine what Rash would produce if he were doing the writing today. However, there are persons other than Karem Bagirovich who are shaking their fist at the press, deputies, and the President. Speeches being delivered under various circumstances are calling for "bringing in order," "improving discipline," and "restoring the values that were fought for."

Hitler built national socialism under the banner of national unity. He said that the country should not have any classes. Every German should live in dignity. To achieve this end, he created a barracks-like state by sentencing to confinement in a camp all those who did not agree with this doctrine. Our experimenters of the recent past based their actions on a different theory, one of class values, but they also created barracks and camps.

Hitler's ideas relative to lifting a humiliated Germany from her knees were quickly assimilated by a shaken people. The ideas were simple and understandable. However, not everything that is simple is good. Today in our shaken society, one that is weary of promises, one that has been dulled by economic shortcomings and interethnic problems, seemingly extremely clear ideas and programs can be dangerous. Some involve consolidation on an ethnic basis; others, bringing Jews to trial. Still others demand that we return to class values. The promoters of "equality for all," acting as if there were no memory of the fact that the very principles being defended so vociferously by the promoters of "equality for all" are the ones that caused the country to become poor in the first place, are now shouting about their readiness to "save the Fatherland." Speculating on difficulties, both groups are hungry for a strong hand. But that is something that has existed in the past. "There" and "here." The outcome has been disastrous in both cases.

Being taken away with the power of an army does not lead to any good, as shown by history. The idea that only the march step can produce discipline in people and raise labor productivity is equivalent to turning a person into a mere cog on a gear, a slave, pushing him to meekly carry out any venture under the guise of interests of the nation, Fatherland, and socialism on the one hand, and producing a despot on the other.

Those who advocate a return to the principles by which armies permeated society and constituted the most important tool for carrying out a policy "by other means" act as if they do not understand that this kind of policy is ruinous. At this time of interrelationships between worlds, with our survival depending upon how civilized we are, to drag into our electronic age a large primitive stick with its outmoded philosophy of resolving differences is criminal.

A reader was enthusiastic in his letter: "May Pioneers never cease marching to the bugle and drum on parade grounds with their banners, while pupils from senior classes sing marching songs as they pass in review..." Does that not remind you of something familiar from the Germany of the 1930s? Does the last quote from "Mein Kampf" not remind you of the principle that guided us: "Authority of each leader from top to bottom, responsibility to the leader from bottom to top?"

Today, people like Rash demand that PTU's [vocational and technical schools] be converted into a kind of

military lyceum; tomorrow, they will announce something similar to the following: "We must carry into state life the fundamental principle which at one time was used as the basis for building the entire Prussian Army."

That is where the danger lies. It stands the same chances as taking the high road to the development of mankind

Postscript: After reading the above article, a colleague of mine said, "Do you not have the feeling that you are insulting Karem Bagirovich by comparing his statements with those of Hitler?"

No, I do not feel like that. I am comparing patterns of thought, not physical shortcomings. And it is not my fault that the thinking of a Soviet teacher and writer coincides with that of the departed fascist Führer. That is why I am drawing the comparison: to make it perfectly clear that history is repeating itself, and that the ideas which we thought were buried forever under the ashes of a tormented people are on the rise again, falling onto favorable soil.

One could take Karem Rash's views with a grain of salt if only he were to voice them in a narrow circle of friends. But he was invited to use a vehicle of the USSR Ministry of Defense. The cycle of articles is introduced by a quote written by the Military Academy Scientific Council of the General Staff giving its opinion on Karem Rash's writings: "K. Rash is known for his breadth of vision, in addition to his deep understanding of the strategic intentions of opposing sides. As a result, his books on war are full of fresh thoughts, unexpected comparisons, and mature military-scientific assessments..."

Oh! How much these fresh thoughts have in common with the even fresher thoughts that Colonel General Albert Makashov, commander of the Volga-Ural Military District, expressed in a speech at the 28th CPSU Congress. That is what calls to mind the words of Julius Fucik: "People, be vigilant!"

Col Ye Yelmanov Explains Disposition of Party Dues

90UM0764B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 Jul 90 p 4

[Article by Major A. Vorobyev and Yu. Samsonov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents: "Disposition of Party Dues"]

[Text] *The communists of our party organization are of various opinions as to what happens to party dues, which we pay in foreign currency (Czech crowns). We asked the political department of our Group of Forces for an explanation, only to receive various replies there, also.*

*Major V. Agafonov, party bureau secretary,
Motor Transport Battalion*

Central Group of Forces

Colonel Ye. Yelmanov, chief of Financial Service, Main Political Directorate, Soviet Army and Navy:

The Main Political Directorate, the same as the CPSU Central Committee, does not have a foreign currency account. For this reason, crowns received in payment of party dues are placed into the state's coffers. The money is converted into rubles in USSR Gosbank field offices located in groups of forces, transferred to the Main Political Directorate, then deposited into the party's account. The USSR Gosbank field offices retain the foreign currency for circulation within the group of forces.

A portion of the party dues is not converted into rubles; it is turned over to various political organs and primary organizations to be used in various ways. For example, support personnel working for large party organizations are paid with party funds. Such personnel include persons in charge of education, typists in Marxism-Leninism universities, and bookkeeper-auditors.

Also financed by foreign currency is the conduct of party measures, assemblies, and seminars, and the printing of party disposition sheets, etc.

The above "Briefing for Readers" was conducted by Major A. Vorobyev and Yu. Samsonov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents.

Col Gen N. Gryaznov on Military Housing Difficulties in Moscow

90UM0845A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Aug 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Col Gen N. Gryaznov, chief, Main Billeting Directorate, USSR Ministry of Defense, by Maj A. Ivanov, in response to remark made in television program "Good Evening, Moscow!" of 31 July: "Will the Promised Apartments Be Delivered?"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Passions have not abated relative to the Mossovet [Moscow City Soviet] 25 June resolution to halt the assignment of living quarters to military personnel and cease residential registration of officers and their dependents in response to orders issued by the Minister of Defense, chairman of the KGB [Committee for State Security], and USSR Minister of Internal Affairs. The situation has not been defused by the answers given by Moscow City Soviet Chairman G. Popov to questions asked on the television program "Good Evening, Moscow!" of 31 July. He made the remark that military personnel are being provided more apartments in the capital than anyone else. He cited a definite figure: This year, 3,000 families of servicemen will be settled in their new residences.

Nevertheless, there are as many phone calls and inquiries now as there were before. The question asked is always the same: When will the promised apartments be made available? To clarify the situation, the editorial

office turned to Colonel General N. Gryaznov, chief of the Main Billeting Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

[Gryaznov] The housing problem in the Moscow garrison has become even more acute. This, in spite of the strict limitation imposed on assignment of military personnel to the capital. As of today, more than 10,000 families of generals, officers, and warrant officers do not have their own apartment. Most of them receive a small allowance and are paying 200 and more rubles a month rental fee. This kind of situation can hardly be considered normal.

Authorities in the Ministry of Defense, Committee for State Security, and Ministry of Internal Affairs have requested the Mossovet chairman to review the decision.

Now about the 3,000 apartments mentioned by G. Popov in the television program. Frankly speaking, I do not know where that figure came from. The Mossovet ispolkom is in arrears to the Ministry of Defense for 78,100 square meters of living space. This does not include the 65,000 square feet that are supposed to be handed over to us this year in compliance with Government Decree No 958-222 of 1984. Nevertheless, of this amount, the Mossovet ispolkom has delivered only 560 square feet since 1 January 1990. In addition, housing construction cooperatives and housing cooperatives have provided the Moscow garrison with 18,200 square meters of space.

It is generally known that the Ministry of Defense has mounted its own housing effort in the capital. Plans call for providing a total of 162,000 square feet of space by the end of the year. It is unfortunate that Gavriil Kharitonovich Popov did not specify which apartments he had in mind when he cited the 3,000 figure. Most likely, the ones the Ministry of Defense is building.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How is it that the ispolkom is so much in arrears with respect to living space? It is a fact that the Mossovet chairman assured the viewers that military personnel were provided more living quarters on a percentage basis than that assigned to rayon soviets.

[Gryaznov] That does not agree with the information I have. The 1989 Moscow housing introduction plan was accomplished in the amount of 83 percent. This information is supplied by the USSR Gosplan. We were not provided with only 27 percent of the goal, amounting to 29,400 square meters.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The Mossovet presidium's resolution, judging by what its chairman said, was dictated by an attempt to achieve complete social justice in housing distribution and preclude departmental bias. Is the present procedure for registering and offering housing to military personnel in Moscow not the same as that followed throughout the country?

[Gryaznov] Nothing of the sort. Allegations to the effect that the military distribute and register apartments to

whomever they wish are made to appeal to uninformed people. Registrations are issued in the capital on the basis of normative documents approved by the USSR Council of Ministers. Excerpts from minister of defense orders - the same as other essential documents - are presented to rayon ispolkoms, where deputies' commissions review each offer of housing. Only after the commission makes a decision in the positive do rayon housing distribution branches fill out the housing order. The Ministry of Defense does not issue housing orders for any quarters in Moscow. Thus, the Mossovet exercises close supervision over assignment of apartments to all military personnel - from the warrant officer to the general - from the standpoint of compliance with law.

I am at a loss to explain the Mossovet presidium's position. This creates the impression that the new leadership has not studied the problem through to its conclusion, that it is acting on information that is less than accurate.

Reasons for Draft Evasion Probed: Col A. Rybchinskiy Comments

90UM0847B Moscow TRUD in Russian 9 Aug 90 p 2

[Article by TRUD correspondent G. Konchyus: "Driven by Fear: Draft-Age Youths on the Run;" comments by Col. A. Rybchinskiy]

[Text] I met them in a half-empty car on the Druskininkay - Vilnius train. This pair of lads boarded the train at the Martsinkonis Station, which is located in an area that is heavily forested, with small villages and khutors dispersed here and there. With their wrinkled trousers, uncombed hair, and guarded looks, it was easy to guess that they were of draft age. They were two out of several thousand Lithuanian youths which the succession of political events had confused and forced to make a decision they were ill-equipped to make.

I sat down next to them and introduced myself. It appeared that my profession predisposed them to converse; the anonymity—I did not ask them their names—was conducive to their opening up to me. Perhaps they simply had wearied of being alone. In a word, they turned out to be quite talkative.

"It all started on 11 March, when the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet adopted the Act of Independence. The first thing we did when we entered our classroom in the morning was to sing the anthem: 'Lithuania, My Homeland.' After that we decided that we would not serve in an army belonging to another country."

"That was the start of the nightmare, which still continues. We started to hear warnings from military commissariat personnel: 'Anyone who refuses to respond to the call-up will have to answer to the law!' 'We will go after them!' threatened Republic Commissar Bisotskis, while his deputy Golubev said that we will not be accepted by VUZ's. Some schools, fearing that there would be a roundup, had students take their finals at

home. Letters from rayon military commissariats commenced arriving at the homes of our parents."

"What about the deputies of our Supreme Soviet? Some of them advised us to throw our draft notices into trash cans; others, that we hide. However, none of them ever said: 'Go to school. Work. We guarantee your safety!' Then they devised the 'Citizen's Certificate of the Lithuanian Republic.' As if this 'crumb' could protect us from the soldiers if they were to come to take us to the induction station."

"Then we read in the newspaper about the temporary Law of Protection of the Territory passed by the Supreme Soviet. Once more we were to face compulsory military service! It was just prior to that that a deputy exclaimed: 'Lithuania will be a demilitarized country. Professional soldiers are all that will be required to protect the borders.' Our guess was that this law was intended to keep us from serving in the Soviet Army. However, this form of protection is as illusory as the citizen's certificate. Thankfully, a call-up had not yet been announced. Otherwise, the same thing would have happened as in Novay Vilnya: They assembled the boys in a hospital, put up a flag bearing a red cross, and announced: 'You are safe.' However, the soldiers did not notice the flag. Where are those boys now?"

"I believe that no one from our class has yet gone into service. Some of them are hiding in cities; others, at their parents' homes in villages. We have just spent an entire month at my aunt's khutor. But how long can you hide? Idleness can drive you out of your mind. We would like to go to the discotheque, see our friends. Yesterday a group of mushroom gatherers came to the khutor. As soon as we caught sight of them, we ran into a cellar. We will soon turn completely wild."

"We fear there may be negotiations between the government of Lithuania and the USSR. A moratorium on the Act of Independence will be declared. What if the military commissariats decide to come after us on that very day? They have enough resources to figure out where we are 'holed up.'"

"To be honest, if many boys of our own age were to decide to serve in the Soviet Army, we would go, too. Against our will, but to obey the law. The Lithuanian government cannot protect us from forced recruitment, in the final analysis. But the thought of entering the Army is frightening. We know some boys that are victims of hazing of new recruits by older soldiers. We heard that mothers of boys that lost their lives in the Army pressed tablets bearing their sons' names into the ground in front of the Supreme Soviet. Can you imagine that! An entire cemetery!"

"Generals say that an army suffers the same ills as society. Nevertheless, may we not demand that officers become healers? I simply cannot understand why it is impossible to form ethnic military units and let us serve on home territory."

"We have burned our bridges behind us. Where is the guarantee that we will not be prosecuted for hiding even if we do show up at the military commissariat? We no longer believe verbal promises. Everyone remembers how officers would appear on television to explain that those persons who dodged the draft and later returned on their own will not be punished. Several days later, procurators in military uniform said the opposite: 'Nothing of the sort! We will apply the full force of the law!'"

The train arrived at Vilnius. As requested by the boys, I waited on the platform five minutes until they melted into the crowd. They planned to visit their old teacher. That is where they will meet their mothers, who will have gotten there via circuitous routes through the city, bringing food items, clean clothing, and radio batteries. There will be crying and whispering: "God of Mercy, when will all this come to an end?"

G. Konchyus

TRUD correspondent

**Comments by Colonel of Justice A. Rybchinskiy,
Department Senior Military Procurator, Main Military
Procuracy**

The statements made by these frightened and uncombed boys reflect—as does a drop of water—the confusion in the minds not only of youths, but also of wizened people of Lithuania. Indeed, what we have here is the influence not of some kind of unofficial organizations, but of—alas!—insufficiently weighed decisions made by republic organs of authority without regard for the defensive capability of the USSR.

What is the best solution to this situation? In my view, none other than strict compliance with the military obligation based on the union law.

Unfortunately, in this area there is a decided ignorance of some of the law's requirements. To be more specific: In the case of persons who are already in military service and who have committed illegal acts, decisions regarding their responsibility will be made by military procuracy organs. Here there can be no doubt: The law must be applied and obeyed. Draft-age citizens who refuse to respond to the call-up, such as the boys discussed in the report from Vilnius, come under the jurisdiction of local law enforcement organs.

In this connection, it should be noted that, in the case of persons who failed to appear for military service at call-up time but who are willing to fulfill their military obligation, local law enforcement organs are authorized to extend to them the opportunity of entering the service on the basis of consideration of the situation that has come about in the republic. However, draft-age youths are placed into an untenable position by the republic organs of authority. On the one hand, many youths admit to having the obligation to serve in the USSR Armed Forces (which is clear from the conversation the boys had with the correspondent), while they on the other hand either feel

the pressure of the one-sided decisions made by the republic organs, which reject the idea of Lithuanian citizens serving in the Soviet Army, or they cannot overcome public opinion negatively predisposed relative to the Soviet Army. Hence the unworthy and—I would say—unnatural situation many young men find themselves in: hiding in cellars, running away from people, living in fear.

It is difficult for eighteen-year-old boys to make sense of what at times are contradictions contrived by republic and union acts of legislation and of a complex array of political forces. Nevertheless, they should know that **they cannot set aside on their own** the union Law on Universal Military Obligation in force in the republic.

Military Members of RSFSR CP Leadership Organizations

90SV0092A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Sep 90 First Edition p 4

[Unattributed article: "Members of the Armed Forces in RSFSR CP Leadership Organizations"]

[Text] *The Constituent Congress of the Communist Party of Russia met recently. Who from the military became members of its leadership organizations?*

G. Svidrigaylov.
Lipetsk.

Military personnel who are members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the RSFSR:

Lt Colonel BOLSHAKOV, Sergey Vladimirovich, chief of the Construction and Repair sector of the Military Construction Directorate.

Lt General GREBENYUK, Vladimir Ivanovich, deputy chief, Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

Col General KALININ, Nikolay Vasilyevich, commander of forces of the Moscow Military District. Elected member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the RSFSR.

Maj General LEBED, Aleksandr Ivanovich, formation commander.

Col General MAKASHOV, Albert Mikhaylovich, commander of forces of the Volga-Ural Military District.

Col General NOVOZHILOV, Viktor Ivanovich, Commander of Forces of the Far Eastern Military District.

Col General OMELICHEV, Bronislav Aleksandrovich, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

Lt Colonel OSINKIN, Aleksey Valentinovich, secretary of the party committee of a tank regiment (Western Group of Forces).

Col General PLOTNIKOV, Yuriy Ivanovich, chief of the Military Academy imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy.

Col RUTSKOY, Aleksandr Vladimirovich (Moscow Military District).

Lt General BOYKO, Nikolay Makarovich, member of the military council and chief of the Political Directorate of the PVO Forces.

Lt Colonel ORLOV, Fyodor Ivanovich, secretary of the party committee of a student aviation regiment.

Military personnel who are members of the Central Control Commission of the Communist Party of the RSFSR:

Col BYKOV, Nikolay Fomich, secretary of a Party commission of the political section of a division (Moscow Military District).

Captain First Rank STEPANOV, Aleksey Mikhaylovich, member of the military council and chief of the political section of a flotilla (Northern Fleet).

Col STOLYAROV, Nikolay Sergeyevich, senior instructor in the Department of Marxism-Leninism of the Air Force Academy imeni Yu.A. Gagarin.

Elected Chairman of the Central Control Commission of the Communist Party of the RSFSR.

Information received in the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

In addition, elected as members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the RSFSR were:

Col General AGEYEV, Geniy Yevgenyevich, first deputy chairman of the KGB of the USSR.

Lt General BRITVIN, Nikolay Vasilyevich, member of the military council and chief of the Military Directorate of Border Troops of the KGB of the USSR.

Colonel KAVUN, Stanislav Fyodorovich, chief of the Political Section of the Volga Directorate of the Internal Troops of the MVD of the USSR.

Col General of the Internal Service TRUSHIN, Vasiliy Petrovich, deputy minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

Among those elected as members of the Central Control Commission of the Communist Party of the RSFSR were:

Lt General SAVVIN, Vasiliy Nesterovich, chief of the Directorate of Internal Troops of the MVD of the USSR in the Northwest and Baltic areas.

Lt Colonel ROGOZHNIKIN, Vladimir Ilich, deputy chief of a political section of a border guard detachment.

Col Gen Burlakov on Military Reform

90SV0093A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Sep 90 First Edition p 2

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA interview with Colonel General M. Burlakov, commander, Southern Group of Forces: "Three Questions for the Commander"; date, place, and occasion not given]

[Text]

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] 1. What changes have taken place in the life and activity of the troops under your command as a result of military reform?

[Burlakov] Transformation processes are taking place in the Southern Group of Forces in the environment of the group's withdrawal from Hungary. The group is on the march, in the true sense of the term. Maintaining troop combat readiness; compliance with the troop withdrawal schedule; coordination of our actions with the main and central directorates of the USSR Ministry of Defense and with Hungarian organizations; stressing of the human factor; all the foregoing problems can be successfully resolved only by applying new approaches as provided by the Military Council, commanders, political workers, and staffs.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] 2. What in your opinion should be the ultimate goal of Armed Forces reform?

[Burlakov] I believe that we should proceed from the need to have an Army structure such that the composition of the district or group of forces, the quantity of armaments and equipment would be in definite proportion to the actual level of military danger existing in their zone of responsibility and would assure certain repulse of aggression.

I would envision troops under my command as professional in their training, recruited in the first phase of reform by means of a combination of the draft and a competitive volunteer basis to fill specialties relevant to combat readiness of units and subunits. The second phase would constitute a progressive shift to restructuring the Army on an all-volunteer basis.

It is necessary to examine the organizational and equipment aspects of units and combined units for the purpose of enhancing their defensive potential. In this connection, they should be fully active and, in peacetime, restrict their activity to combat training. Their routine functioning would be supported by specialized subunits that would provide the support and services they would require.

Officers and specialists highly trained in the professional sense so as to be critical to the combat capability of units would constitute the backbone of the Army. In this

regard, reform should include the training of cadres in military schools and academies. To advance the professional level of all categories of servicemen, it is necessary to provide for mandatory attendance of a course in their particular specialty (every two or three years), to be offered at military VUZ's and district qualification enhancement schools. Reserve officers would be trained in specialized territorial centers.

In my opinion, the final goal of reform would be to produce troops that would restrict their activities to improving their combat readiness and combat training, with units and subunits no longer required to participate in efforts that are unrelated to their primary functions.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] 3. What do you believe are the principal obstacles standing in the way of major changes in the Army and Navy demanded by the times?

[Burlakov] I believe that everything in the final analysis turns on the continuing economic problems our country is experiencing. In the purely military aspect, much is due to the inadequacies of the approaches used to resolve conversion problems relating to manufacturing. Another source of contention is the attempt on the part of certain political forces to put the Army into nationalistic corners, introduce the territorial principle of replenishing the ranks, and depoliticize the Armed Forces. Their actions, combined with a patently anti-Army campaign waged by a segment of the mass media, present a serious complication to the transformation processes in the Army and Navy and undermine the people's trust in the Soviet Armed Forces.

I cannot fail to mention the negative effect the interethnic conflicts occurring in areas of the country exert on Army collectives. Worsening of the situation would give rise to a real threat of eroding the unity of the Armed Forces, of the Army and people in general. That I believe is one of the major obstacles standing in the way of improving the Army's readiness to repel aggression and carry out military reform.

There is today as never before a need for a reasoned and effective approach to resolving problems of defense construction. We unfortunately have cases where legislators of the country and of certain republics take actions that do nothing to promote the strengthening of the Armed Forces. An example is discharging from the Army and Navy former students, many of which do not continue to pursue an education after their discharge. Personnel have been adversely affected by resolutions passed by Supreme Soviets of a number of republics calling for the cancellation of union legislation relating to the Armed Forces. This kind of approach is not beneficial to creating in the Army and Navy conditions that foster favorable changes and undoubtedly constitutes an obstacle to military reform.

Problems With Military-Scientific Research

90UM0705A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Jul 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Maj Gen Yuriy V. Kryuchkov by M. Rebrov: "Don't Steer the Ship of Science Into the Shallow Waters"]

[Text] Today we are beginning more and more keenly to feel our lag in fundamental research and in development of new progressive technologies, and our need for restructuring of science over the widest front. But what is the situation in military-technical science, and in particular, in VUZ science? What is slowing its development?

Our correspondent talks about these problems with the Deputy Chief of the Military Academy imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, Dr. of Technical Sciences and professor, Maj Gen Yuriy Vasilyevich Kryuchkov.

[Rebrov] Yuriy Vasilyevich, Professor S. Goldin of the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences expressed what I believe to be a very correct idea: "Our main ailment is bureaucratization of science, its excessive centralization, and as a consequence, an inadequate level of democratization and internal creative freedom." This was said of civilian science. What do military men think?

[Kryuchkov] I would not strictly divide science into "civilian" and "military," although the latter does have its specifics. But our troubles are the same. These include the substantial skewing in the direction of applied research that has occurred in the last decades, to the detriment of fundamental research, the residual principle of financing of fundamental and research work, the excessive regulation, and the detailed planning of scientific research, which often deprives the scientist of creative freedom.

But the cost of this includes significant overloads of science teachers and a reduction in their general and professional culture, a continuing lag in the field of computer technology, an unacceptably low level of the scientific experimental base, and indeed much else.

[Rebrov] Which of these most slows the development of military-technical research?

[Kryuchkov] The first and basic reason is perhaps the fact that recently science as a whole has been equated with applied science, demanding an immediate return from it. The creative potential of science collectives has been measured by the number of projects introduced into the domestic economy, and by the number and the strength of ties with branch enterprises and organizations. The scientists have been bogged down in papers on realization, conclusions about utility, and questions of economic effect.

Meanwhile the main task of present-day military-scientific research is to develop new concepts of military art in accordance with the defensive nature of our

military doctrine, and to search for effective resolution of the problems of qualitative improvement of weapons systems. I would especially like to focus on the latter point. Without new military equipment, military reform is inconceivable.

The role of the academies in this process? I will explain. Participation in the development of basic military-technical scientific trends and priority development of fundamental research (they are precisely the foundation of further applied solutions) and projects on a conceptual level which are associated with a large share of research risk (basic research programs). The academies have roughly 50 percent of the scientific potential of the Armed Forces, and therefore they can and should ensure the transition of development of arms and methods of their combat application from the extensive path to the intensive.

[Rebrov] But Yuriy Vasilyevich, surely the Armed Forces are intended to accomplish quite specific practical tasks, and use the corresponding equipment and arms for this purpose. Does it not seem to you that science should help the troops in realization of these goals?

[Kryuchkov] Yes the troops accomplish specific practical tasks and possess specific arms. And yes, they require sophisticated, reliable and survivable equipment, and effective methods of their utilization. Yes, the experience of combat training and utilization reveals the specific flaws of this equipment, and they must be modified. But these are today's concerns. Their resolution is the job first of all of the directorate of combat training, which it should accomplish in close contact with the corresponding scientific research institutions. Naturally the academy is also involved in such work, but not with its basic forces.

However, in the interests of continuous support of the national defense capability we cannot forget about research aimed at the near and long term. And precisely here is where the strength of fundamental science is manifested, creating the basic foundation for fundamentally new solutions of military-applied problems under the conditions of constant development of military affairs.

[Rebrov] Do you believe that a vital part of the difficulties in military researches are due to the financial expenses?

[Kryuchkov] Let's look at the all-union indices. The academy and VUZ science sectors have 73.7 percent of the doctors and 61.5 percent of the candidates of science. At the same time the share of appropriations from the state budget for these sectors is only 13.7 percent (and to the VUZ sector only two percent!) while branch science receives 86.3 percent of all resources.

The picture is analogous in military science. Thus for example, at our academy, besides staff wages only around 40 rubles a year are provided for equipment,

materials, travel, and training of the scientific teaching personnel, for one scientific associate or teacher.

[Rebrov] The faculties and the scientific subdivisions of the academy are in the state budget. Proposals are being made that scientific research laboratories be changed over to cost accountability. What is the attitude of the scientists to these proposals?

[Kryuchkov] Forcing cost accountability models of branch science on the VUZ may bring about negative processes involving reduction in fundamental and research studies, growth in the number of projects not requiring high scientific qualification, and migration of specialists into "profitable" science. In other words, orientation of researchers toward immediate gain in cost-accountability laboratories will lead to a weakening or breaking of the strong creative ties between the faculty and the scientific subdivision, a reduction in the effectiveness of science at the VUZ, loss of quality specialist training, and decline of science schools.

[Rebrov] Is there a way out of this situation?

[Kryuchkov] Indisputably. It is in a reasonable combination of state budgetary financing and new management methods. Appropriations for fundamental, basic research, including a hefty share of risk, should come from the state budget. Here the distribution among the VUZ should be proportional to scientific potential. At the same time, it is necessary actively to form and develop flexible organizational structures and progressive forms of accomplishment of scientific research and projects, primarily on an agreed or contractual basis. The practical assimilation of a new system of administration will allow us to increase the funding of scientific associates and teachers, and to create conditions for equipping the VUZ with custom-made scientific apparatus, computers, and equipment. And most importantly, it will allow us not to steer the ship of science into shallow waters.

[Rebrov] Yuriy Vasilyevich, what is your understanding of science "regulation"? Can it be that planning and predicting of results are foreign to its nature?...

[Kryuchkov] I would answer this question with the words of Niels Bohr: "In science work we cannot make confident prognoses of the future, since obstacles always arise which may be overcome only with the appearance of new ideas. Therefore it is important to rely on the capabilities and strength of a specific group of scientists." We should understand such groups to be science schools run by highly qualified leaders and specialists who themselves generate scientific ideas, who not only manage but also work directly in science.

But even such collectives need coordination of work, they need an exchange of ideas and scientific attainments between schools. Expensive scientific equipment and software cannot be acquired unsystematically. And here planning is a guarantee of success, a necessary condition for the realization of our scientific potential.

However this should not be planning of each result, even the most minor, on the principle of "one achievement to the next." Coordination, expenses, and general state priorities in science must be planned. All other questions may and should be entrusted to the VUZ themselves.

And another thing. The basic nature of science demands that the teacher be first of all a scientist. Only this proves his right to teach. But the time problem is an urgent one. Commander's training and other types of service activity of the professors and teachers should be planned at five hours a week, i.e. 260-275 hours a year. But if we add up the time directly prescribed for the year in accordance with this division of activity, it turns out to be 562 hours. It is expected that the missing 300 hours will be made up for through methodological and scientific work (the annual budget for the latter is 300 hours). It is not hard to calculate what remains to the teacher for scientific work...

I will name another circumstance which is also closely related to planning questions. I have in mind the leadership, or more precisely, the command of military science. Here a vivid trait of the administrative-command, bureaucratic machine has been manifested: the strict, self-confident, absolutely obedient functionary has become the best type of leader, and it was thought that such a person could direct anything he pleased, if there was the corresponding order from above. Unfortunately many such persons have gotten into managing posts in science.

[Rebrov] How do you feel about this: a person becomes a manager of a science collective of a faculty or department, and then does the first scientific work of his life, or writes his candidate's dissertation?

[Kryuchkov] One can hardly give an unequivocal answer. It is not rare for generals and officers to arrive at scientific and pedagogical work from line units who are capable of creative work and possess a great volume of informal military knowledge, which can hardly be acquired by studying the training literature. In addition, they understand that the fundamentally new in science cannot be profoundly understood and explained only from positions of line unit experience. In a relatively short period at the academy they develop topics of candidate's and even doctoral dissertations, and successfully defend them. And as a rule they do not lack organizational qualities. But unfortunately there are still cases when unpromising persons are appointed to managing scientific teaching positions, who are disinclined toward creativity or scientific research and teaching work. Here the harm (and I do mean harm!) inflicted on science is directly proportional to the level of the service position occupied by such specialists.

[Rebrov] If I understand correctly, you are a convinced proponent of priority and immediate development precisely of VUZ science. What characteristic features distinguish it from the rest?

[Kryuchkov] Without minimizing the merit of the other VUZ, I would dwell on the characteristic features of the academies, the strongest, base military-science institutions, which generally possess rich historical traditions and have accumulated enormous experience in scientific teaching activity.

Among such characteristics I would include: a unique concentration of highly qualified specialists of various scientific schools, encompassing practically all areas of military science; the capacity to conduct profound, fundamental studies, in many cases vitally outstripping the level of development of the Armed Forces; the accumulation of knowledge in various fields of military affairs and their synthesis on the basis of new concepts of development of the Armed Forces.

The traditions of Russian and Soviet military thought preserved and developed in our academies, which are singular military-technical universities, and their intellectual potential will allow us to resolve one of the main tasks of scientific-technical progress, the uniting of science and education. This alliance will enrich the training process, will give an opportunity both to the teacher and to the student actively to participate in the formation and accumulation of knowledge, which in the future will determine the fate of our military science.

[Rebrov] One cannot help but agree with this. Herein lies the logic of perestroika of VUZ science, and indeed of reform as a whole...

[Kryuchkov] More than that, it demands that in the shortest possible time we arrive at advanced positions in the most important areas of fundamental research, and on this basis realize the program of qualitative improvement of arms and promising methods of their utilization, and of the training of scientific-pedagogical command and engineer cadres.

'Non-Offensive Defense' Vs. NATO Doctrinal Thinking

90UM0793A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Aug 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lt Col S. Pechorov, candidate of economic sciences, under the rubric "Military Problems in Foreign Periodicals": "'Non-Offensive' Defense"]

[Text] At first glance this combination of words seems unusual, something like "oily oil." And in fact it is clear to a person familiar with military affairs that a defense is called that because it implies protective, defensive actions in contrast to an offensive and particularly, to aggression. Nonetheless, this "paradoxical" term has taken its place in Western military publications in the past year or two, including such respectable publications as NATO's 16 NATIONS, EUROPAISCHE WEHRKUNDE and others. We shall attempt to explain why.

First of all, it should be pointed out that the turn from confrontation in the international arena toward the

strengthening of trust and security and toward the development of cooperation, which has taken shape as a result of the Soviet Union's active foreign policy, has increased public interest in unconventional means and methods of resolving military-political problems in the new situation. As confirmation of its adherence to the principle of reasonable defense adequacy, the Soviet Union has advanced a number of initiatives aimed at limiting the possibilities of the sides for a surprise attack.

In response to these initiatives a process of seeking alternatives to NATO's "flexible response" strategy—a process not sanctioned "at the top, to be sure—was also begun in the West European nations and the USA. The strategy's offensive nature has even been intensified of late as a result of the army's continuing receipt of long-range, highly accurate weapons certainly not designed for executing defensive "deep strikes."

As of today this quest has resulted in the advancement of a number of concepts and theories varying in substance and form by Western nongovernmental research organizations and a number of political scientists. They include a "nonprovocative defense," a "nonaggressive defense," an "equitable defense" and even a "defensive defense." Despite certain differences—and not just in name—all of them are unified by a common concept of preventing the danger of an armed conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The term "non-offensive defense," which most fully reflects the essence of all these theories and concepts, has become established in political parlance.

As defined by British scholar F. Barnaby, one of the theoreticians behind this concept, a "non-offensive defense" is a system under which "the organizational development, training, logistic support and the military doctrine itself are directed not toward aggression but toward absolute adequacy for reliable defense. Nuclear weapons are to be used only for a retaliatory strike—and even then, only in an extreme case." It follows from this that a "non-offensive defense" should meet two basic demands: that it be nonaggressive but at the same time ensure the security of a nation selecting one of its versions as the basis for the organizational development of its armed forces. How can this be achieved?

The developers of the new theory call for abandoning the traditional scenarios for defensive battles: repelling attacks, containment, a switch to a counteroffensive, pursuit, a rout. They propose removing the rout phase from these scenarios and limiting pursuit to one's own territory (if, of course, the enemy succeeds in breaking through the defending forces' forward edge). A simultaneous restructuring of the armed forces of the two opposing coalitions, NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization, is put forth as an absolute condition for this, however.

In addition, in the opinion of the authors, the army should be deprived of so-called strategic mobility, which can be accomplished by removing from the arsenal long-range weapons, military equipment with a large

operating range and assault river-crossing equipment, and reducing the number of mobile formations, as well as units and rear service agencies capable of supporting troop operations to great depth.

In addition, in accordance with the new concepts, it is proposed that the concentration of the main forces at the forward edge be abandoned and the territorial defense principle be the guideline. For this purpose it is proposed that various kinds of so-called "fire barriers" and defense lines be set up in the border zone. Well-known West German political scientist A. von Bulow, for example, has suggested the establishment of an antitank ditch of enormous length along the border of the NATO nations, which, in his opinion, would rule out "the possibility of a large-scale tank attack from the east." In certain versions of the "non-offensive defense," a forward zone several kilometers in depth would not contain any troops, making it possible to inflict massive strikes upon an attacker in that area.

It is also proposed that zones and corridors free of the "most destabilizing" weapons such as tanks, armored combat vehicles, self-propelled artillery, chemical and nuclear weapons be set up in Europe. There are also versions of the concept which would place corresponding restrictions on the use of air and naval forces, the two branches of armed forces most fully designated for conducting offensive operations and executing surprise attacks.

Such projects advanced in the West unquestionably contain much which is naive from the standpoint of a military man (the idea of a giant antitank ditch, for example, or an enormous pipe filled with a flammable mixture, which would be ignited in case of an enemy offensive). There are a number of imperfections and imprecisions in the definitions and concepts. For one thing, it is not clear from the substances of all these concepts what principle should be used for classifying weapons systems as offensive and destabilizing or defensive and stabilizing. There are also some openly unscrupulous points which amount to an attempt to pass the Soviet Union off as the aggressor.

It should nonetheless be stated that the very fact of the emergence and extensive discussion of defensive concepts in the foreign press are proof of advances in the attitudes of the Western public and a desire to reject aggressiveness and "offensiveness" in their thinking. These advances are still reflected only theoretically in the projects advanced by a relatively small group of politicians and scholars, to be sure.

ABM System's Role in Deterrence Viewed

*91UM0009A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Oct 90 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel A. Dokuchayev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "A Bridle for the Nuclear 'Racers,' or What the Antiballistic Missile Defense System Represents"]

[Text] On 27 September, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA acquainted readers with the missile attack warning system (SPURN) that is available in the USSR Armed Forces. We continue to inform our readers about strategic deterrence weapons. Today's article is about the ABM [Antiballistic Missile] system.

It is the summer of 1953. The Soviet Union learns that the United States is testing a ballistic missile that will deliver a nuclear weapon to a target. If the testing is successful, the USSR will be defenseless in face of the American military machine. And, in August, seven marshals of the Soviet Union, headed by Chief of the General Staff Vasilii Danilovich Sokolovskiy, sent a letter to the CPSU Central Committee with a request to examine the question of creating an antimissile defense system.

Scientific authorities greeted the idea with a considerable share of skepticism. One academician said outright: "To hit a bullet with a bullet and a needle with a needle in outer space is simply impossible, and only eccentrics could undertake the resolution of such a task. The eccentrics were found—young scientists—the developers of surface-to-air missile systems and, first and foremost, the 35-year old Doctor of Technical Sciences Grigoriy Kisunko. They were so bold as to substantiate the principles of antimissile defense: How to find a small speeding target in outer space, how to track it effectively, and, finally, how to guide the antimissile missile. A resolution appeared in a letter of the seven marshals: "The problem is complex, and a task has been given to begin its study."

Three years of intensive work by the scientists, headed by Grigoriy Kisunko, gave such results that a decision followed to create a test range. The first detachment of military builders headed by Colonel A. Gubenko—he managed construction until 1962—landed in the rocky, waterless desert of Betpak-Dana on 8 July 1956. There was intensive work by industrial scientists and by leaders of the Ministry of Defense who were charged with working on the antimissile defense program. And so it is 4 March 1961.

An antimissile missile with a nonnuclear (high explosive fragmentation) warhead destroyed the nose cone of the R-12 ballistic missile. At one of the press conferences, N.S. Khrushchev, who liked to use figurative expressions, informed the journalists: "Our missile, it can be said, will hit a fly in outer space."

For soldiers of antimissile defense, that day was historic. It was tense and nerve-racking. The equipment was checked, starting in the morning, and the missile launch command was given to Kapustin Yar. But there and then there was a stand down—there was a prohibition on all types of radiation. Counterintelligence reported: There are foreigners in a train on a nearby railroad, and electronic surveillance is possible. Agonizing hours of waiting. Finally, the R-12 was launched in the second half of the day. Its blip could be seen on the screen

clearly. And suddenly there is interference on the radar screen. However, the operational team was able to finish the job. The target was destroyed. This was a great success—the Americans conducted the first nonnuclear destruction of a ballistic missile 23 years later.

The further development of U.S. nuclear forces and the appearance of ballistic missiles with multiple warheads required the creation of a multichannel ABM system with the employment of more effective antimissile missiles. Such a system was created in 1972.

A powerful breakthrough in equipment and in the creation of antimissile defense systems compelled the leadership of the United States to seek ways to conclude a Treaty on Limitations on Antimissile Defense. Of course, there were also other weighty reasons for this.

"The ABM system was established in the 1950's and the 1960's at the very height of the 'cold war,'" says Colonel General V. Kraskovskiy, one of the leaders of the Air Defense Troops. Catching our breath from the race and getting our bearings, both we and the Americans realized that the establishment of an antimissile defense system, even if not for the entire country but only for the main strategic areas, is an expensive and ineffective undertaking. Why? Let us suppose that for the destruction of a nominal area the Americans plan to launch 10 ballistic missiles. We cover this with 50-60 antimissile missiles. Tomorrow, the Americans then aim 20 missiles at it. We would again have to increase the number of antimissile missiles, and so on, ad infinitum—a classic model of the arms race. Both sides came to realize that it was necessary to sit behind a negotiating table. In 1972, a treaty was signed between the USSR and the United States, under which each side was permitted to have only one area on its territory that has an ABM defense. The radius of the area of deployment of the ABM system must not exceed 150 kilometers. The Americans decided to cover the strategic missile base at Grand Forks in the north of the country, and we—our capital.

The Americans mothballed their "Safeguard" system, but its main link—the "PAR" [phased array radar] was kept to stand watch in the interests of their nuclear missile strike warning system. Moreover, they are continuously improving ABM equipment and are conducting scientific research and test design work, and they are acting in a way that, should it become necessary, they would be able to deploy their combat complexes in a short time.

Our system is operational. It was decided that it was not economical to toss away that which was created with enormous effort. Organizationally, it is part of the Air Defense Troops of the country. It consists of a command post and a powerful multi functional detection and guidance radar system and units of firing complexes with antimissile missiles.

I am standing at the edge of a silo.

There it is, a cone-shaped cigar that is many meters long.

"In some ways it is like a ballistic missile," says Lieutenant Colonel V. Syzov, the commander of the firing complex.

He entered the time in his notebook—1736 hours, and the date, 17 July 1990. A small historical fact—the first journalist to descend into a silo of the ABM system. Senior Lieutenant Timchenko talked about the instruments that control the missile. They report all of the data about it to the command post, about "how it feels," about what the humidity and temperature are in the end section. Why? So that no complications would occur during launch. It will take seconds for everything. A solid propellant engine will begin to work, it will suddenly remove the cover, and a powerful thrust will hurl the missile out of the silo. The radar site will take over guidance of the missile to the target.

"We have full confidence, corroborated by range tests and a long period of operations, in the technical reliability of the system and in the execution of its task to destroy unsanctioned and single ballistic missiles whose employment could be used to provoke a nuclear missile war," says Colonel V. Malikov, who has devoted more than 20 years to the development and formation of the ABM system.

How does the antimissile defense system work? Now, in peacetime, it is in a state of continuous readiness, it "listens" and "looks over" outer space with the help of the multi functional station. If an aggressor undertakes a missile attack, the ABM system, with the help of the missile attack warning system, or independently, is capable of determining the fact of aggression and going over to automatic tracking of ballistic targets. The electronic brain of the system (a super computer) selects nuclear warheads from simulators, and it indicates the dangerous ones. At the same time, in an automatic mode, it brings the antimissile missiles to a readiness stage, distributes them according to targets, calculates the predicted point of destruction, and gives the launch command at the most favorable moment. At first, antimissile missiles of the first intercept level speed upward, and then interceptors of the second level will strike the warheads of those ballistic missiles that were not destroyed by the first. And during the entire time of flight of the antimissile missile, the electronic brain will direct them through a powerful radar to engage the target.

And what role in this fast-acting process (an antimissile battle lasts minutes) does the human being play? Will he not get lost in the functionally interconnected world of automation and electronics?

"No," V. Malikov answers firmly. "The more complicated the equipment, the more it requires attention on the part of a human being, because it cannot function by itself. And if a malfunction occurs... The human being is the most reliable backup system."

After completing my official trip, I tried to sketch a typical portrait of an officer of antimissile defense. I was

unable to do it. There are those at the sites who are approaching 50 years of age. They have a lot of work and responsibility, but the younger people also do not yield in this. For example, the deputy chief of one of the weapons centers went on leave—Captain V. Yakovlev took over. About a hundred officers came under his supervision. He handled it.

There are people who heard about the ABM system for the first time when they became officers, and there are... During a visit to a firing subunit of the complex, I became acquainted with V. Vlasov. His great-grandfather defended Port Arthur as an artillery man in the Russo-Japanese War, his grandfather fought in the Great Patriotic War, and his father died in 1966 during a missile launch at Baykonur.

Families also serve in the system (more accurately, serve the system). Lieutenant Colonel V. Novikov, the radar facility deputy chief engineer, began his working life in the city of Dubno of Rovno Oblast as a lathe operator, and he learned about the ABM as a cadet in a military academy. Now his wife and son can also consider themselves in some measure as antimissile personnel. Yelena Alekseyevna—a corporal—is a system operator, and Aleksey, after graduating from a professional technical school, works as an equipment repair expert. In short, an entire dynasty is projected, if "daughter Natasha, our youngest, a schoolgirl, does not let us down." The head of the family is one of the experienced specialists. He graduated from a military school and an academy in his professional field, and he took part in operational antimissile launches on a state test range.

Lieutenant Colonel V. Belov—who gave 18 years of service to it—can also be categorized as a real student of the ABM system. Now the deputy chief of the radar site—the most powerful facility in the ABM system—his

military career, it can be said, has advanced. Smart, strict, sharp, and modern in his opinions, he is up to the job he is in.

There are all kinds of people... Colonel N. Parshin, as an engineer, very positively assessed the activity of enterprises of the Ministry of Radio Industry, and at the same time he spoke with state concern about the low reliability of individual types of products and equipment that are produced by its enterprises. As corroboration, he demonstrated gears and bushings, and other parts for pumps and for cooling assemblies that arrived with plant defects. But political worker Viktor Grebenshchikov has other concerns that are no less important. People come to him who are tired of waiting for an apartment, for a place in a kindergarten for a child... But how can you help when to meet the needs it is necessary to build two dwellings, a school, a kindergarten-nursery, a communications center, a motor pool, and many other things. The building plan that was approved in April 1987 is being fulfilled with delays.

Yes, a backward social and everyday living sphere exists alongside modern electronic equipment. Why? Priority was given and is being given now to combat equipment. Specialists told me that system facilities cost millions of rubles. Colonel N. Parshin answered my question this way: "Yes, the system has cost the country a lot. What had an effect here is that almost every item is unique. But, as the saying goes, the game is worth the candle. Across the ocean, the production line is putting out increasingly improved ballistic missiles—MX, 'Trident-2,' 'Midget Man.' But are not the missiles of other Western countries also aimed at our country? Of course, there must be a shield. We are not immune from a provocative launch of a missile, either, at least judging from the development of the situation in the Near East. We eliminate one such mad missile—all expenditures will pay for themselves..."

Disposal of Military Property in Czechoslovakia

90UM0814A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Aug 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Mikhail Fedotovitch Zubkov, a representative of the USSR GTU MVES, by correspondent Col P. Chernenko, under the rubric: "Armed Forces Reductions—Extent of the Problem": "Who Will Buy the Property?"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] A commission made up of experts and representatives of the USSR and CSFR [Czechoslovak Federated Republic] authorized to discuss the settlement of property and financial issues associated with the withdrawal of Soviet troops has designated the bodies that will be responsible for the sale of facilities and property belonging to the Central Group of Forces. Those so designated are the Sroyeksport foreign trade association on the Czechoslovak side, and, from the Soviet side, the USSR Main Technical Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Relations and the Soyuzvneshstroyimport association. Below is the text of a conversation between KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's Central Group of Forces permanent correspondent and Mikhail Fedotovitch Zubkov, a representative of the USSR GTU MVES [Main Technical Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Relations].

"We are facing a formidable task," said Mikhail Fedotovitch. "We are leaving behind on Czechoslovak soil 168 military installations that contain a total of 5,408 facilities of various kinds. Their sale presents a problem, in that the structures involved belong to different owners. Some of them were erected by us using our own funds; some, under contract by the Czechoslovak side; still others are under lease to us. There is also the land - that is the property of the CSFR Ministry of Defense. There can be no discussion of selling military installations until it is turned over to the local organs of authority, with the latter agreeing to the sale. So far we are selling only individual facilities—depots, garages, storage buildings. Our buyers are mostly cooperatives. However, residential buildings, cultural, recreational, and other facilities are another matter. We have already turned over 25 military installations to the Czechoslovak side but have not received anything in return."

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What will happen to them?

[Zubkov] We will sell or offer them under lease. We unfortunately still have not come to any agreement relative to the sale of facilities that belong to the Soviet side. The obstacles here are lack of agreement on evaluating the structures and arriving at a selling price. Thus, the Czechoslovak side proposes that evaluation of facilities erected under contract be made in terms of rubles; in crowns for the remaining facilities. Our view is to evaluate all facilities in terms of equivalent rubles and crowns and in convertible foreign exchange, depending upon mutual agreement.

We still have not received a response to our proposal that Soviet organizations and Third World firms be permitted to handle the sale of buildings and other structures erected by the Soviet side, to include scrap metal, fuels, lubricants and other property. We would be willing to acquire construction materials from the CSFR on a barter basis.

I wish to stress that we intend to do more than sell our facilities. We are also willing to lease them to cooperatives, various organizations, and joint enterprises. We recently met with representatives of the CSFR Union of Cooperatives, who made many proposals relative to combined use of our facilities. We believe that we can arrive at a meeting of the minds. We are ready to cooperate in all respects. We would even go so far as to accept cost-free leases on our depots and warehouses, which at several locations have already been turned over to Czechoslovak cooperatives on this basis.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] In the beginning of July there was a meeting held by a commission consisting of Soviet and Czechoslovak experts, with representatives of the USSR and CSFR governments authorized to discuss the settlement of property and financial issues. What was accomplished?

[Zubkov] Not as much as we would wish, but it was a start. The two sides finally came to an agreement relative to the sale of so-called "gray" facilities (those we erected without coordinating with the Czechoslovak side). They will be sold to Czechoslovak judicial and natural persons as materials or "as is." If the facilities are not sold, they will be eliminated by the Soviet side.

The issue of leasing of facilities also enjoyed a positive outcome. Lease conditions will be drawn up and agreed upon by the lessor and lessee, in accordance with Czechoslovak law.

Thus, the views held by both parties come closer together with each passing day; existing differences are being resolved. The developing business contacts enjoy a background of good will. We entertain hopes that this will culminate in tangible results in the near future.

Tempo of Polish Military Reform Questioned

90UM0814B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 2 Aug 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lt Col F. Martinkevich, Northern Group of Forces: "Tempo of Reform Discussed"]

[Text] A meeting was held in Warsaw between a group of Sejm deputies and senators from the citizens' parliamentary club Solidarity on the one hand, and representatives of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Poland on the other. The topic of discussion was problems associated with the reforms taking place in the Polish Army. A number of the participants expressed a negative opinion of the changes the Army is experiencing, pointing out that the reforms often pursue short-term goals, thus

undercutting long-term prospects. It was explained that plans call for reducing the Polish Army by a factor of two or three by the year 2000, with the aim of arriving at a manpower figure of 100,000 to 150,000 men. It was also proposed to set up the Army on an essentially all-volunteer basis and make a change from the regimental-divisional structure to the battalion-brigade type. To render the Polish Army entirely defensive in nature, the meeting's participants proposed abandonment of the use of heavy weapons—tanks and missiles—in favor of light and mobile weapons and equipment, such as helicopters, antitank weapons, etc.

Cost of Withdrawal of Troops from Czechoslovakia

90UM0814C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Aug 90 First Edition p 3

[Article: "Who Pays for Troop Withdrawal?"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] N. Melnichenko of Bakhchisaray in Crimean Oblast asks the question: Who pays the cost of withdrawing Soviet troops from the CSFR [Czechoslovak Federated Republic], Hungary, Poland, and Mongolia?

All expenses associated with the withdrawal of our troops from foreign countries are paid out of a fund estimated by the USSR Ministry of Defense. The amounts involved are substantial. This year we have withdrawn from Eastern European countries over 53,000 men, more than 900 tanks, and about 900 artillery systems. More than 28,000 men, over 500 tanks, and 400 artillery systems have left Mongolia.

The principal mode of transportation used is rail. The cost of hauling military freight by railroads belonging to foreign countries is exceedingly high; the use of our rails also cannot be said to be inexpensive. For example, the cost of moving a single troop serial consisting of 30 cars from Prague to Chop amounts to about 19,000 rubles; from Chop to Kiev, almost 5,500 rubles. Some sections travel even further, to Kemerovo, for instance. Add to this the expenses necessarily associated with preparing the equipment for travel, acquiring tie-down materials, and disbursement of travel allowances for personnel.

All the above expenses were not foreseen when this year's estimate was being prepared, since the estimate was approved long before the question of withdrawing our troops became a practical reality. That is why it is necessary to seek internal resources at the present time, a task that is far from simple.

In a word, the costs of troop withdrawal are substantial. Nevertheless, even greater are the amounts of funds required to resettle the personnel on our soil. The Ministry of Defense clearly does not possess sufficient financial and other capabilities in this regard. This is a matter for the state as a whole; it must be resolved by applying the efforts of the entire state, not of any single department. This is why great importance is attached to adoption of a special program to provide social security for servicemen, their dependents, and persons being discharged from military service. A draft version of this program prepared in April of this year has been submitted for approval to the USSR Council of Ministers.

(The above information was provided by the USSR Ministry of Defense Press Center.)

Discussion of Financial Costs of Professional Service

90UM0725A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 6, Jun 1990 (Signed to press 16 Jun 90)
pp 8-12

[Article by Colonel N. Karasev, doctor of economic sciences: "Continuation of the Discussion: 'What Kind of Army Do We Need?' How Much Does a Professional Cost?"]

[Text] The principle of volunteer manning of the Armed Forces of the USSR has both its advocates and opponents. And both present weighty arguments. MORSKOY SBORNIK in No. 10 1989 and in No. 3 1990 offered its pages for discussion to authors who have opposing views on this score. They analyzed various aspects of the problem first of all from the political and military professional point of view. In returning to this theme and fulfilling the promise given to our readers, the editors direct their attention to this article by a military economist.

Advocates of the immediate transition of the Army and Navy to the professional track have quite a few advantages. They have such trumps in their hands as the increase of combat readiness, reduction of accident rates, and reinforcement of discipline. While proving what is essentially obvious, they look like professional reformers and people who manifest concern about the Homeland. Their opponents are correspondingly presented as those reactionaries who are concerned about the "stability" of the foundations and who are unwilling to resort to any changes whatsoever to the existing manning system. As we all know, the USSR Ministry of Defense leadership has also turned out to be among the latter.

For example, the General Staff is using the following as a counter-argument: Hiring compulsory service servicemen will increase state expenditures for their maintenance by at least 5-8 times. It is easy to come to the conclusion—the country does not currently have the resources to do this. Some commentators think that the General Staff's calculations are not very convincing. They point out that even if the increase of assets for maintaining the Army actually exceeded that, this is still not proof that the proposed measure is unsuitable for the entire society. Their primary arguments are as follows: Additional expenditures will be covered by the fact that hundreds of thousands of young people of draft age will continue to be engaged in productive labor in the national economy thereby multiplying social wealth; new military expenditures will be reduced since the demand for soldier's blouses and field jackets will be reduced, the number of military posts and barracks will be reduced, and weapons and military equipment production will subside.

So, whose calculations are more accurate? As an economist, I dare to assert: Both. The fact is that the time factor has great significance in economic calculations.

Thus, if the General Staff is talking about the situation that will develop at the very beginning of reform, its opponents are looking ahead to the relatively remote future and are describing a situation that may develop not during the first, but during the second or even third stage of reform.

It would seem that they are correct in seeing the future as precisely the consequence of their own opinions.

However, the General Staff's calculations nevertheless appear to be more realistic to me. The initiation of reform must have a durable economic base without which the new cause will simply get bogged down.

That is why the State is conducting a quite well considered defense policy. Due to reduction of the Armed Forces while preserving its manning principle, the country immediately obtains a definite savings of financial resources, a part of which has been directed toward improvement of the material position of servicemen.

However, let us return to the calculations that cause not only objections of individual "organic" commentators but also of certain military personnel. The question arises over and over again: "Will State expenditures for maintenance of Army and Navy personnel in fact substantially increase if its strength is significantly reduced at the same time?" Some people propose considering the U.S. Army's experience when it transitioned to a volunteer manning principle.

In 1973, a decision was made in the U.S. to abandon the draft and to create a hired Army. On one hand, highly skilled officers were replaced by experienced sergeants in many positions. The sergeants were earmarked to receive less monetary compensation in comparison with officers and the strength of support forces that were engaged in individual training of servicemen, medical services, conscript enlistment, transportation, and housing support, etc. was reduced. As a result of the reorganization, total armed forces strength was reduced from 3.5 million men at the beginning of the 1970's to 2.1 million men in 1976.

On the other hand, basic pay increases for soldiers, sailors, sergeants, and officers occurred as a result of which an annual growth of expenditures for maintenance of the Army and Navy has been noted from the middle 1970's. This indicator increased from 30.4 billion dollars in the 1974 fiscal year to 165.2 billion dollars in the 1990 fiscal year under a relatively stable total strength of the U.S. Armed Forces.

I foresee the objection: "What does the experience on the other side of the ocean provide us? Why in fact must we proceed from American standards during wage calculations for the Soviet professional soldier or sailor?"

It is a logical observation. Let us also consider it. But at the same time we will constantly keep "in mind" one more fundamental economic thought: The salaries of servicemen enlisted on a volunteer basis must definitely

ensure the competitiveness of military service in comparison with other spheres of labor activities. Really not everyone is capable of permanent internal mobilization readiness which is required by Army or Navy service. Not everyone is prone to deny himself much for the sake of unquestioning subordination to an order.

Let us point out that even those who are inclined toward this sort of self-sacrifice will hardly refuse the appropriate monetary compensation for their own discomforts. Rarely does someone who travels "beyond the fog and beyond the smell of the tayga" forget that all of these charms of nature are accompanied by the so-called "long ruble."

In short, it is necessary to ensure the competitiveness, also including financial, of military duty. Otherwise it will generally be impossible to enlist anyone into the service as a soldier, sailor, or ranking NCO under volunteer hiring. They understand this very well in the U.S. Therefore, here in accordance with the laws from 1967 and 1970, the amount of personnel monetary salaries corresponds to the salaries of those employed in the private sector of the economy and who work in positions with similar specialties. For example, basic pay of a U.S. Army private first class is comparable with the salary of a worker with average skills. A corporal's pay is comparable with a stomatologist technician's salary.

Let us compare them with our standards. Salaries of ship and unit compulsory service personnel will vary from seven to 20 rubles per month but the average worker and employee salary reaches 250 rubles. A stomatologist technician's salary at a State out-patient clinic is nearly 200 rubles. This means that to provide them the minimum competitiveness of volunteer hiring, for example, of "sky-blue collars" in the ranks of the Navy, their salary must be increased two to three dozen times. For comparison, let us say that during introduction of the volunteer principle under American Army manning in 1973, the basic pay of private new recruits was increased by a factor of two, corporals by 13.7 percent, and main sergeants by 4 percent. This differentiation is explained by the fact that corporals and sergeants salaries were also previously quite decent.

The level of base pay—is the initial base for ensuring the suitability and competitiveness of volunteer military hiring. The experience of countries that have this armed forces manning system demonstrates that aggressive and expensive advertising and effective measures of personnel material incentives are needed to increase the prestige of army duty.

For example, U.S. servicemen, along with a monthly salary and basic housing and rations allowances, receive various incentive premiums and other additions to them. I will name the primary ones: for voluntary entry into military service, for extending the armed forces service contract, for service in contact with nuclear energy, for an incentive for engineering and technical

personnel and scientific workers, for service in military medicine, for initiative in service, and for professionalism....

In order to insure voluntary recruitment into the Army, we also need to examine these additional state expenditures.

During the 1990 fiscal year, of a total American military budget of 305.5 billion dollars, 165.2 billion dollars, that is over 54 percent, is being expended just for the maintenance of professional Army personnel. Let us compare—personnel salaries of the Soviet Armed Forces that are manned based on the existing system are a total of 27.2 percent—19.3 billion of the 70.9 billion ruble USSR military budget. Pension support of veterans of the Armed Forces of the USSR is 3.5 percent of the budget, in the U.S.—nearly six percent. The figures demonstrate that significantly greater expenditures are required for maintenance of a professional army.

At the beginning of 1990, the USSR Ministry of Defense Central Finance Directorate jointly with the Center for Research of Social and Psychological Problems under the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy calculated economic expenditures for maintenance of the Armed Forces while manning them with personnel on the volunteer hiring system.

Thus, monetary compensation amounts for private and sergeant (ranking NCO) personnel was determined: First of all, taking into account worker and employee average monthly wage by region and coefficient so that it is not only commensurate with the salary of appropriate categories of workers in various spheres of activity but also substantially exceeds its average levels; second, based on the data and conclusions obtained from analysis of public opinion of various categories of Army and Navy servicemen on the outlook for structural development, Armed Forces manning methods, and the amount of their salaries. Thus, 13.9 percent of the officers polled expressed a desire to receive 400-500 rubles per month as the minimum necessary condition for their decision to conclude a contract for military service on the volunteer hiring principle. Nearly 80 percent demanded more than 500 rubles. Furthermore, 89.4 percent of the officers wished to have as a minimum a separate service apartment in accordance with prescribed models of average housing space standards in the country; 1.9 percent—free family dormitories; and 1.5 percent of those polled agreed to reside in bachelor officer dormitories with the appropriate payment.

Of 1,642 soldiers, sailors, sergeants, and ranking NCO's, more than 60 percent expressed a desire to receive 350-450 rubles per month, 34.2 percent expressed the desire to reside in separate service rooms, and 19.7 percent—in family dormitories free of charge.

Of 205 warrant officers, naval warrant officers, and extended service servicemen polled, nearly 70 percent want to receive from 400-500 rubles or more per month.

As for housing conditions, servicemen of this category expressed demands identical to those of officers.

Calculations were made taking into account the existing and presumed strength of the Armed Forces of the USSR: a) 3,993,000 men (based on the state as of January 1, 1990); b) 3,760,000 (based on the state as of January 1, 1991); c) 2,500,000 men (taking into account talks in Vienna and Geneva and a possible significant reduction of USSR Armed Forces in the near future).

The results obtained are evidence that economic expenditures for maintenance of the Soviet Armed Forces will sharply increase under personnel manning according to the volunteer principle.

For example, average monthly salary amounts of Navy professionals with "sky blue collars" will total from 350 to 500 rubles per month. Annual expenditures will increase: With an Armed Forces strength of 3,993,000 men—by 3.7 times; 3,760,000 men—by 3.6 times; and, 2,500,000 men—by 3.3 times.

Furthermore, significant additional one-time expenditures for capital construction and reconstruction of social and everyday services facilities—are approximately more than 10 billion rubles with an Armed Forces strength of 3,993,000 men. Up to 6.5 billion rubles—with a strength of 2,500,000 men.

Let us return to one of the arguments of reform advocates: Maintenance of a smaller professional Army will permit a sharp increase in the size of work resources used in the national economy. Unfortunately, this assertion appears to be indisputable only at first glance. Let us imagine the first stage of reform. Where will yesterday's school boys who are freed from service in the Army go? Many of them will first of all have to acquire a specialty.

Therefore, we should not expect productive labor from them for a period from one year to three to four years. But then additional places will be required in technicums, PTU's [Vocational and Technical Schools], and various schools.

Incidentally, about those billions of rubles that will allegedly appear as a result of the already announced 500,000 man Armed Forces reduction and implementation of conversion of military production. The fact is that with our State Budget deficit, any savings of assets is not additional income but only a corresponding reduction of deficit expenditures. In other words, this amount is subtracted from expenditures but is not added to income.

Let us also examine this argument of the advocates of immediate professionalization of the Armed Forces, as anticipation of receipt of assets from reduction of arms and military equipment production and conversion of the defense industry. For example, it is quite clear to me that this anticipation does not have any real foundation. How can the curtailment of production of anything

result in a profit? On the contrary, if lathes are stopped and people are dismissed, it will result in large material and social losses.

Conversion signifies not only reduction of output of arms and military equipment but also the simultaneous initiation of production of civilian products. And really do the latter not require suitable appropriations?

I will remind you of what is common knowledge: In order to retool military production, we need to resolve many complicated tasks that frequently require additional expenditures. We need to think about the people whose hands, knowledge, and talent created the country's defensive might. Many of them will obviously have to be retrained which understandably will also not occur at no cost to society. This requires restructuring and retooling production areas and organizing the output of new types of raw materials and materials that were not previously output by the defense industry. And time and money are required to do all of this. It is understandable that a return on this process will not be immediately possible. Therefore, we cannot anticipate any released monetary resources from conversion to maintenance of military professionals during the first years.

For us, the military, it is incomparably more profitable in the socio-economic context if the state begins to completely support a professional army. Really this is associated with a sharp increase of salaries and many other widely disseminated material benefits that are lacking in the majority of cases today. It is no wonder, according to data of the sociological poll conducted among officers, that preference is given to manning the Army and the Navy according to volunteer hiring principles (89.4 percent of commanders, 75 percent of political workers, 89.7 percent of engineering and technical specialists, and 61 percent of rear services workers advocated this). And nevertheless it is precisely the military that persistently warns about the fact that the country's economic capabilities at the present time do not allow us to implement such significant changes. In my opinion, the consciousness of their political responsibility for the cause of reliable security of our Homeland is convincingly manifested in this.

While considering the socio-political, psychological, and economic factors and also the actual processes that are occurring in our country, this author suggests that it will be more advisable, based on the existing system of universal military obligation, to already now deepen the actually existing mixed method of manning the Armed Forces of the USSR with a future gradual increase of the number of professionals—leading specialists in the branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms who provide key sectors of support of military readiness and the combat capability of units and large units and a gradual reduction of the number of positions occupied by conscripts.

The achievements of world and Soviet military science, the rich historical experience of our Army, and our

country's limited capabilities to satisfy its needs may be optimally used in the Armed Forces of the USSR (under conditions of more complete implementation of the advantage of manning according to the draft and the volunteer principle).

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Development of Armaments 'Storage Base' in Ukraine

90UM0710A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Jun 90 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col A. Polyakov in the column: "Combat Readiness—Quality Parameters": "A Storage Base for Scrap? Something New Associated with Armed Forces Reductions"]

[Text] Squat windowless buildings hug the gentle slopes of a ravine located on the outskirts of a small Ukrainian town. It would be difficult to determine the purpose of the buildings were it not for the enormous metal gates and rows of barbed wire, indications that the area is restricted.

Furthermore, to tell the full truth, there was something else even more indicative of the military nature—and it certainly is military—of the site: hundreds of vehicles whose colors blended with the green of the grasses. They constituted ample evidence that this is a BKhVT [armaments and equipment storage base].

It is generally known that storage bases are a new structure in our Army, one associated with the reductions in the Armed Forces. The need for this kind of structure was dictated by a vital necessity: to maintain military equipment in serviceable condition and assure combat readiness with a reduced number of specialists. Just how successfully is this work being carried out?

I, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel S. Kulyayev, an armor specialist, went on a walking tour around the barbed wire encircling the equipment storage area. Engineer, transport, and other vehicles, and artillery pieces were standing out in the open. Some of the items had slipped off their special storage blocks; others had their wheels sinking into the ground; still others seemed to cry out in protest of their dingy look and cracked, peeling paint.

"We are hopelessly short of personnel. We cannot cope with scheduled maintenance," said the officer about the sad picture. "That is why we have no choice but to call up personnel from the reserves."

There was an unpleasant metallic scraping noise coming from the even rows of storage buildings—the low ones mentioned above. It was due to the wind opening and closing doors of the unfinished constructions. Work had been started and then abandoned.

"Construction financing was cut by a factor of 20," explained Major General V. Osokin, the district deputy

commander for armaments. "There is a need to economize, of course, but how can we benefit with the prevailing attitude toward storage of expensive equipment?"

Indeed. What kind of economy can there be if the number of maintenance operations is cut in half, according to estimates made by specialists, with the equipment lying out in the open? This means that there will be a doubling in expenditure of materials and spare parts, to say nothing about the greater personnel requirement.

As we entered an open area on the base we came across a group of soldiers who did not look like regular duty personnel. They were workers from a neighboring plant that had been called up for several days of active duty. They were replacing rubber wheels that were enormous in size—almost as tall as a man—of KrAZ's [automobile] that were supporting a mechanized bridge. They were obviously unhappy about something.

"Just look at the hydraulic components," said Reserve Private V. Bozhko, a backhoe operator. "All the rubber hoses have been dried by the sun and have cracked. If the hydraulic system is turned on, the hoses would not withstand the pressure and would burst."

It is not only the essentially civilian personnel who cannot accept the fact of storing equipment in the open, of course; this includes regular service personnel. They have their own ideas in this regard. For example, many of them feel that it would be best to bring equipment only when shelter is provided. This, however, is only a dream. Another suggestion is turning general equipment, such as transport vehicles, truck-mounted cranes, and gasoline tanker trucks, over to the national economy on a transfer or sale basis.

An especially sore point is the manning level. That was a shortcoming that was brought up by everyone with whom I spoke. They specifically mentioned maintenance subunits and RKhOs [equipment storage and maintenance companies]. In the first place, they are few in number. In the second place, there is a decided lack of specialists. And another trouble. We tried to find RKhO commander Captain S. Kushnir for a long time. When he finally appeared, he explained that he had been traveling around, using his own vehicle (there are no official vehicles), contacting local enterprises in search of angle iron for mounting purposes in the PTOR [maintenance point].

The company commander, company Senior Warrant Officer N. Bilyk, and I made a rapid count of how many personnel were available. Only 60 percent of authorized slots were filled, with 24 percent actually present for duty. The others were serving in a communications center, working on private farms, confined to the hospital, or away on temporary duty. There was virtually no one available to take care of the equipment.

"I have the feeling that we are a third-rate organization," heatedly said normally calm base commander Colonel Ya. Suprunyuk. "How can we in all seriousness speak of quality servicing of equipment if we lack 13 noncommissioned repair personnel? What kind of planning is that?"

On the whole, storage bases were conceived to be structures that would be manned by small but experienced complements of professionals provided with modern repair tools and mechanization facilities. This could be seen at a training session held some time ago on one of these bases located in the Moscow Military District. Many officers and generals can recall the event. They saw that a small number of specialists could accomplish a substantial amount of high quality work. However, this was done for show, so to speak. What is the state of affairs when it comes to reality?

I heard a story that was circulating in the missile and artillery service of the district. Sometime after the above event, a group of officers from superior headquarters arrived at the same "exemplary" base in the MVO [Moscow Military District] and ordered a repeat performance of the equipment maintenance operations cycle that had been presented at the above session. This time the specialists fell far short of the standard performance requirements. It was a case of personnel straining at the limits of their abilities and capabilities.

What does the above suggest? Many persons with whom I spoke said that we cannot apply to future structures discredited principles—working at maximum potential, receiving help from all sides—and on that kind of basis make the desirable appear to be reality.

Also deserving of criticism is a temporary regulation currently hamstringing BKhVT personnel. It is causing a great deal of misunderstanding. For example, it requires that base officers acquire the same proficiency in driving and firing from combat vehicles as line officers. The subunits are assigned the same kinds of missions as combat units. This is an absolute absurdity, considering that the former officers are placed into entirely different circumstances.

There is no doubt that the officers have a good understanding of the complexities of perestroyka processes that pertain to society as well as the Army. They are patient in the face of completely unexpected duties, such as performing as driver-mechanics, repair personnel, etc. How long can this go on? How long can they remain patient? Will the 14 cases of base officer requests for transfer into the reserves be the last?

Another upcoming problem is safeguarding of equipment and weapons. This is especially important at the present time, when certain groups of persons intend to misuse weapons and even military equipment. Also demonstrated in the above session held in the Moscow Military District was guard service based on the use of modern technical equipment, whereby there are no guard personnel as such. This function is fulfilled by television cameras. Located in a guard room monitor

screen are the guard commander and the guard detail. It was wonderful. But who can say how long it will be before guard service can be so organized?

In the meantime, I made several attempts to strike up a conversation with guard commander Senior Lieutenant V. Kazarov and his subordinates, Privates B. Bekhiyev and M. Avdolyan, who were about to go on guard duty. All my attempts to get the soldiers to speak were unsuccessful. Shifting from one foot to another, they would answer me in only two or three words. They knew very little Russian, even though they had already served four months and performed guard duty a number of times.

"They are good soldiers; they follow orders," said Senior Lieutenant Kazarov in defense of his subordinates. "The only trouble is that they cannot remember what to do after they shout the command 'Stop! Who goes there?'"

The officers and warrant officers were not free of other troubles—the kind we may say military men must live with.

There was no room for me in the small hotel in town. Political worker Lieutenant Colonel N. Bilyk invited me to stay in his quarters, which consisted of a small apartment for two in the officers' dormitory. Having developed a strong thirst after my long trip, I thrust a cup under the water tap in anticipation of the pleasure of slaking my thirst, and, without noticing a warning look on my host's face, raised the cup to drink and almost burned my lips.

"In our military quarters there is no cold water," explained Nikolay Mikhaylovich. "We boil the hot water, then cool it. We have complained up the line, but to no avail. This is larger than the water problem."

I could see at the next party conference that this indeed was larger than the water problem. The statements, behavior, and replies by some communists made it clear that people have grown weary of excuses. In 1989 a military builder erected a 13-apartment residential building on base.

"This meant that almost 100 officers and warrant officers still had no living quarters," said Colonel P. Semivolov, who at that time was carrying out duties ordinarily assigned to several official capacities, one of which was chairman of the quarters commission. "How long are they to wait? It is difficult to say, considering that 500 officers and warrant officers assigned to the base have no living quarters. On top of that, plans call for bringing in personnel from groups of forces."

Problems, problems. Perestroyka as applied to the Army and Navy has uncovered many of them. If we intend to prevent their becoming entrenched in the new structures after the Army reductions are completed, now is the time to speak up loudly and clearly. The new structures should represent a new nature to reflect the spirit of the times. Otherwise, the base will become a storage place for old thinking, all the former habits, and for scrap.

Kiev MD Prepares to Receive Troops From East Europe

90UM0776A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Jul 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel N. Motorin, chief of the Kiev Military District Housing Operations Directorate, by an unidentified KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "A Return to Communal Housing"]

[Text] Soviet troop withdrawals from the countries of Eastern Europe are continuing. Some of these troops will be quartered on the territory of the Kiev Military District. Our correspondent talked with Colonel N. Motorin, chief of the Kiev Military District Housing Operations Directorate, about how we are preparing to greet and house them.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Nikolay Petrovich, we all know that the first large unit "is coming" to the district from the Southern Group of Forces. When will its subunits begin to arrive? How ready are you to receive them?

[Motorin] Actually, we will already be greeting the first echelons of this large unit at the end of August. Several cities of the Donbass are already awaiting them—at locations of two units that have already been disbanded. The availability of training facilities will permit us to begin combat training with few obstacles. The main problem is providing servicemen with housing. We have already begun constructing barracks, quarters, and apartment building—the district's KEU [Housing Operations Directorate] itself is erecting 24 facilities.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] This is somewhat surprising, really KEU is an operating organ. What caused your participation in construction and will this not impact on the quality of the housing and other facilities?

[Motorin] You see I served in Afghanistan as deputy commander of the 40th Army for Construction and Troop Quartering and I am familiar with and understand the direction of the current work. However, it seems to me that far from personal motives dictated our participation in the construction. As they say, the need compelled us to. The military district's construction directorate has a very intense plan to commission facilities including in Armenia. It has already accomplished the assigned task for construction of housing but the task has been increased once again. That is why we are erecting 24 of the 28 facilities. We have two adequately strong UNR's [Office of the Work Supervisor] in the KEU that Soviet Army Employees V. Vaygant and A. Fursa head. These organizations are manned with experienced specialists and are each capable of obligating 2-3 million rubles per year.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How realistic do matters stand today? As far as I know, you prepared an anxious telegram to higher headquarters. What troubles you most of all right now?

[Motorin] Foundations have been laid for all facilities, 14 quarters and barracks have been erected, but they stand without "stuffing"—the construction directorate headed by Colonel M. Gromenko is lagging behind with installation of sanitary engineering equipment. This has already placed us several weeks behind [schedule]. Deliveries of construction materials have also been uneven. But nevertheless, we hope that the first families that arrive will get apartments immediately. We plan to complete their construction by October.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Tell me in more detail, what are these apartment buildings like? Where will officers and warrant officers who are leaving behind well-appointed apartments in Hungary be forced to live?

[Motorin] Unfortunately, we cannot offer them apartments like the ones they have been living in. We are building pre-fabricated panel-board quarters. Seventeen families will be housed in each of them—one room per family. There is only a washbasin in each room—and common use areas—there is one kitchen per building. There are four gas or electric stoves per kitchen. Bachelors will also be housed in these quarters, only they will live approximately 60 men per building.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] And so, is this a return to communal housing and furthermore are these quite crowded? Is there really not any vacant housing available after the units have been disbanded?

[Motorin] The fact is that no more than 50 apartments will be vacated during that process. There is a vacant 70 apartment building at one of the garrisons and we plan to house 90 families in it. Actually, several hundred apartments are required and so we are unfortunately being forced to proceed along the path of maximum density when allocating housing....

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What resources are being used for the construction? Are local Soviets and Party organs helping you?

[Motorin] The Ministry of Defense has allocated nearly nine million rubles that are provided from [its] resources. But for the time being regular deliveries have not been set up and we are using all district resources. We are short everything: From floor boards to glass and roofing. Local Soviets have a great deal of their own problems with commissioning housing, we are getting along with our own resources for now, but we cannot continue for that long. At the same time, ispolkoms understand our problems. For example, they are building an 820 pupil kindergarten for us in Dnepropetrovsk. We ourselves are also not building schools. Right now we are gathering information about the number of arriving children to resolve all problems with the local authorities.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] And just when will people be able to leave the communal housing? I know that nearly 700 servicemen are standing in line to receive housing at

just one Kiev Oblast garrison and other garrisons have enough of "their own" lines.

[Motorin] As for the division that we talked about at the beginning, we propose moving families into well-appointed apartments by 1994 and we are already laying the foundations for and erecting several apartment buildings. But, well frankly speaking, it is frightening to look ahead and to consider the accelerating withdrawals of our troops. According to initial estimates, the military district must spend already not tens but hundreds of millions of rubles in capital investment in subsequent years. It is clear that these plans will not be fulfilled without expansion of the construction industry, establishment of new military construction organizations, and the assistance of the entire country. We need a real state-wide program to provide housing to servicemen. As we all know, a plan has been developed.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Many people, especially parents of servicemen, are worried that units will be deployed to areas that have been excessively contaminated after the Chernobyl disaster.

[Motorin] I have already stated that units will arrive at locations where subunits have been deployed—in southwestern Ukraine, so such fears do not have any basis.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] And the last question. Appeals to ban troop access to the Republic's territory were heard at a Ukrainian Supreme Soviet session. Are some types of barriers not being erected for you during construction of facilities for the arriving units?

[Motorin] Of course, we know about these demands. I think that more emotion than reason is speaking here. Officers, warrant officers, and soldiers cannot be outcasts of society. With time, they will join workers collectives and VUZ lecture audiences and they will help carry out renewal plans for the republic and the entire country. Locally, we are not yet encountering any opposition, on the contrary, we have been encountering mutual understanding. People realize that the redeployment will be a difficult ordeal for many servicemen. Our common task is to help them feel the warmth of their native soil, to overcome housing difficulties, and to withstand the desire to leave the Armed Forces.

Housing, Social Problems Facing Returning Servicemen

90UM0783A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Jul 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Special Correspondent Colonel A. Belousov: "A Sad Homecoming Awaits Officers and Warrant Officers Returning to the Homeland from the Groups of Forces"]

[Text] Soviet troop withdrawals from Czechoslovakia and Hungary have been going on for five months and must be completed by the middle of 1991. Our troops are withdrawing from Mongolia. Today we must already begin

thinking about the fates of those who are serving on the territory of the GDR and Poland....

Such a major act as the redeployment of units and large units that is being conducted gives rise to quite a few acute problems that require immediate solutions. Thus, 25,000 apartment-less officers and warrant officers are arriving from Czechoslovakia and Hungary alone. This is in addition to those 173,000 servicemen in our country who do not have housing today. The situation in new deployment locations practically everywhere is poor with regard to nurseries, kindergartens, and schools.

In order to study the situation on-site, a group of USSR people's deputies and members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security Issues headed by Deputy Committee Chairman Colonel V. Ochirov completed a trip to a number of military districts where troops are being relocated and also visited Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic. Our special correspondent participated in the work of the group of parliamentarians and we are publishing his notes.

Troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary are arriving on the territory of 12 military districts. We visited four military districts—Moscow, Kiev, Belorussian, and Baltic. Everywhere the picture is about the same. Store rooms are being repaired and vehicle storage areas and motor pools are being prepared. We are laying the foundations or already constructing apartment buildings, barracks, and [officers] quarters.... In short, no one will be left without a roof over his head. But what kind of housing are we talking about for officers and warrant officers, for example? In the majority of cases, we are talking about temporary housing. It was a three story barracks. We removed the soldiers' cots from it, installed particle board partitions, equipped a kitchen and men's and women's bathrooms, and one can drive in and celebrate the homecoming. And is this all that people deserve who have served in the Army for 10-15 years or more?

Captain Yu. Okoshkin painfully talked about his existence at a Moscow Military District garrison where pilots are arriving from Czechoslovakia. He is here and his wife and son are living with his parents. They are promising him a room in a pre-fabricated apartment building. "Obviously, I will have to leave the Army," Yuriy said. He is 30 years old, a crew commander, he served in Afghanistan, and thinks that he has become a professional—and now he is planning to leave....

Does the leadership of Moscow Military District know about such attitudes?

"Of course, we know," said Deputy Commander for Construction and Troop Quartering Major General A. Groshev in a conversation with the people's deputies. "But you cannot reduce stress with words. We will complete construction of three apartment buildings at that garrison next year...."

"The Gorispolkom is helping," said the commander of the unit that had arrived. "It is allocating nine apartments."

Nine apartments.... Of course, they are also a help for the military district that is receiving nearly 4,500 officers and warrant officers, many of whom do not have housing and furthermore where they have approximately 11,000 of their own apartment-less servicemen. But obviously both Moscow and other military districts where the troops are arriving have a right to count on more serious assistance from the local authorities even if it were only to pay off that enormous housing debt which they are not hurrying to return to military units. Thus, considering the debt of previous years, Moscow Military District should have received 88,800 square meters of housing from local Soviets and has received just 7,520 [square meters] in 1990. Kiev Military District has received nearly 35,000 square meters less housing, the Baltic—more than 28,000 [square meters less], and Belorussia—17,000 [square meters less].

It is difficult to explain local authorities' cool attitude to the needs of the Army that is its own people's flesh and blood. Perhaps the Army will never again be as socially tense as it is right now. You need to drive through the garrisons and see how a combat officer chokes up when he talks about his family's unsettled state in order to understand: The very defenders of the Homeland need social protection.

However, the government's resolutions on allocation of housing to regular servicemen and servicemen released into the reserve are frequently not being carried out. In the Baltic Republics, they have even taken away building sites previously allocated to the district for construction of apartment buildings.

While working in the Belorussian Military District, committee members met with Belorussian Supreme Soviet First Deputy Chairman S. Shushkevich and BSSR Council of Ministers First Deputy Chairman V. Yevtukh. We need to frankly state that we received a cold reception. Having listened to the USSR people's deputies, Republic leaders posed a counter question: But who will help us? More than 119,000 people who are victims of the Chernobyl AES disaster are awaiting resettlement from the disaster zone and we need to construct 40,000 apartments for them.

It is turning out to be a closed circle. The Ministry of Defense simply cannot provide housing to officers and warrant officers in an extremely short period of time. Local authorities are engaged in solving their own problems: Some have a difficult internal political situation, others have the aftermath of the [Chernobyl] disaster.... And no one knows how we can construct 1.5 million square meters of housing for 25,000 apartment-less people (nearly 600 million rubles of capital investment is required to do this). But the heads of the Ministry of Defense representatives are throbbing over this most of all. They have begun looking for resources. This year

they found 30 million rubles by freezing a number of construction sites and by reallocating work (this means that someone in line at a different garrison will not receive an apartment). They have appealed to the USSR Council of Ministers for the remainder.

The Council of Ministers made a decision on June 16th: To increase the 1990 limit on state centralized capital investments by 70 million rubles for the Ministry of Defense. But they still need to provide the material technical resources which is also a problem. A decision has not been made to allocate 400 million rubles for 1991-1992.

This situation is at an impasse. First nothing is being done since there is no decision or they did not have time to make an appropriate decision, then there is a decision (as, for example, on local ispolkoms allocating housing to servicemen) but no one is carrying it out.

USSR People's Deputies and Committee Members V. Vare, S. Golovin, M. Zokirov, V. Lukin, Ye. Nemtsev, V. Opolinskiy, and Colonel V. Podziruk having seen and heard, as they say, to their hearts' content, have increasingly been inclined toward the conclusion that: Political decisions made on Soviet troop withdrawals from the territory of the Hungarian Republic and Czech and Slovak Federated Republic are compelling us to hastily carry out the redeployment. Disorder, lack of ordinary medical and trade services, and unemployment among wives is having a negative impact on officer and warrant officer morale and this could ultimately result in a reduction of troop combat readiness.

But, maybe, funds received from sales of properties of the Central and Southern Groups of Forces will help [create] the infrastructure for the units and large units being withdrawn? Really rough cost estimate of Southern Group of Forces real estate total more than 2.5 billion rubles and the Central Group of Forces—1.6 billion rubles.

Our military posts look quite good both in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia. No, naturally they cannot be compared with Budapest's fashionable quarters, for example, where the streets are quiet and clean like park avenues and where luxurious private residences are bathed in greenery and flowers beyond delicate ornamental fences. But there are residential areas in that same Budapest to which the cozy military posts concede little. At one time, it seemed that no problems would occur transferring them. They are cropping up, however.

The fact is that when the agreements on Soviet troop withdrawals were signed between the USSR, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, the circumstances associated with the sale of Southern and Central Group of Forces property were never specified. And now, regardless of whether property and finance issues are being resolved or not, military troop echelons are taking their normal course to the East.

The Hungarian and Czech sides insist that calculations on property left behind be carried out after the total withdrawal of our troops. In their opinion, the Soviet side should also compensate them for expenses associated with alleged Soviet caused ecological damage. In other words, a goal has been set, reduce the total balance on accounts to "zero." It would also be good if they stopped at this. And then we can really withdraw having transferred everything—quality apartment buildings, first class airports, depots, yes and at the same time reply in kind.

At a meeting with the USSR people's deputies, Southern Group of Forces Commander Colonel General M. Burlakov talked about the difficulties during calculations with the Hungarian side as it is—neither dramatizing nor alleviating the situation. Thus, according to conditions on June 15th, 26 military posts and areas were transferred to the Hungarian Republic Ministry of Defense. The cost of the buildings constructed using Soviet Troop assets totals 213 million rubles. But not even a kopek has been received for them for the time being. Colonel General M. Burlakov stated in this regard that he sees one of the possible ways to resolve the outstanding issues is to cease troop withdrawals until the payments have been made. Some of the Hungarian mass media have begun a real campaign to place the commander in a compromising position.

Obviously, we should not plan on the rapid receipt of assets from property sales. It is true that one more possibility exists to remove the urgency from the housing problem. Immediately after signing the agreement between the USSR and the Czechoslovakian Federated Republic on Soviet troop withdrawals, trading firms expressed their willingness to deliver small houses for nearly 100,000 people in the USSR. How do matters stand right now?

On July 16th, a whole series of problems associated with Soviet troop withdrawals from the countries of Eastern Europe were discussed at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security Issues. Central Group of Forces Commander Colonel General E. Vorobyev, having touched upon the issue on storage houses, cited a document of Stroyeksport Foreign Trade Association which is responsible for selling Central Group of Forces facilities and property from the Czech side. The document does not talk about housing for 100,000 people but about the possibility of providing the Soviet side 1,198 small houses of various types with a 10,193 person [capacity]. This is approximately 2,500-3,000 apartments. The small houses cost 60 million rubles. You can erect almost 5,000 apartments if you

erect the apartment buildings yourself. "Well, is it worth coming to an agreement?" this question followed. The commander thinks that experts need to nevertheless carefully weigh everything. Really, we can gain time while losing a quantity of housing.

At first, it seemed that military personnel generally would not only answer all of the questions that came up at the committee's session but that they would also be generally responsible for the unsatisfactory state of affairs in troop infrastructure. After a report made by Colonel V. Ochirov, one more speech was required by representatives of the Ministry of Defense and committee members so that the conversation took on a constructive nature and senior officials of other ministries and departments began to make their own suggestions. As a result, the committee decided: To consider it advisable to examine the most important political issues that affect the interests of the Armed Forces at USSR Supreme Soviet sessions. It was recommended that the USSR Council of Ministers develop and adopt a state program to support Soviet troop withdrawals from Hungary and Czechoslovakia and their infrastructure on the territory of the USSR and also resolve property sales issues and determine ecological damage.

"Now, in my opinion, everyone understands that the troop withdrawal is not only a military-political problem but also a social [problem]," said USSR People's Deputy V. Lukin. "We need to do everything so that our officers and warrant officers do not feel destitute...."

I will add from me: And so that we journalists do not end up writing bitter words in our articles about the need to protect the protectors.

Effects of Certain Chemical Weapons

91UM0002A Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK in
Russian No 8, Aug 90 (Signed to press 24 Jul 90)
pp 67-68

[Unattributed article: "The Commander's Notebook: What One Must Know About Strong Toxic Substances"]

[Text] Toxic substances [toksichnyye veshchestva] used in the civilian economy are customarily called strong toxic substances (SDYaV) [silnodeystvuyushchiye yadovityye veshchestva]. Approximately 500 chemicals of this class are widely used throughout the world.

The most widespread SDYaV include ammonia, chloride, hydrogen cyanide (hydrocyanic acid), hydrogen sulphide, carbonyl chloride (phosgene), and sulfur dioxide. Their individual characteristics are shown in Table 1.

Table 1

Strong Toxic Substances	Density, gr/l	Boiling point, °C	Concentration, mg/l		Detection	
			Harmful/exposure time	Fatal/exposure time	Organoleptic by odor	with use of troop gas detection device by color of indicator tube (IT) filler
Ammonia	0.6	-33.4	0.2/6 hours	7.0/30 min.	ammonium chloride	IT with yellow ring; light green
Hydrogen sulphide	1.5	-00.4	0.006/4 hours	1.0/1 min.	rotten eggs	brown
Phosgene	1.4	8.2	0.05/30 min.	0.45/10 min.	decayed fruit	IT with three green rings: green
Chloride	3.2	-34.1	0.01/1 hour	0.15/1 hour	pronounced specific odor	yellow to orange
Hydrocyanic acid	0.7	25.6	0.03/30 min.	0.15/15 min.	bitter almond	red-violet
Sulfur dioxide	2.9	-10	0.45/50 min.	1.55/15 min.	pronounced specific odor	IT with red ring and point: yellow if it appeared earlier than in test IT

The majority of SDYaV are gases or highly volatile liquids. Therefore, when containers of SDYaV are destroyed high air concentrations quickly result. Insulating gas masks are used in such instances to protect respiratory organs. Filtering gas masks may also be used for smaller amounts of harmful impurities over a short period of time. Personnel of subunits involved in eliminating the consequences of accidents are provided with industrial gas masks for the respective SDYaV's. Insulating-type means of protecting the skin are also mandatory: L-1 light suit or OZK combined arms protective set.

Many SDYaV are heavier than air. Due to this they may stagnate in woods, low lying areas, ravines and underground excavations. It is desirable not to occupy such places in combat, if the use of SDYaV in the subunit zone of operations is likely.

The surface of equipment, terrain, and individual articles are not contaminated by gaseous SDYaV. However, in closed fortifications, rooms, and inside of equipment, harmful impurities will accumulate. These objects must be periodically ventilated. Food products and sources of drinking water (wells, open reservoirs) also must be continuously covered.

Compared with contaminants [otravyayushchiye veshchestva] the toxicity of SDYaV is relatively low. Nevertheless they are dangerous to humans. Most are strong irritants, even in small amounts. Air with an elevated SDYaV content sometimes causes burns on sweaty areas of the skin. Characteristic harmful symptoms and first aid in the event of contamination are shown in Table 2.

Table 2

SDYaV	Harmful Symptoms	First Aid
Ammonia	sneezing, sharp pain in eyes, tickling in throat, cough, loss of voice, chest pain	fresh air, breathing warm water vapors, complete rest. If eyes are contaminated flush immediately with water.
Hydrogen sulphide	photophobia, tearing, head cold, tightness in chest, nausea, fatigue	fresh air, rest, heat. If breathing disrupted administer protracted artificial respiration with oxygen.
Phosgene	Sweet taste in mouth, cough, dizziness, general weakness	fresh air, rest, hot liquid, oxygen if possible. Do not administer artificial respiration.
Chloride	irritation of nasopharynx, acutely painful dry cough, conjunctivitis, shallow breathing	fresh air, inhaling ammonium hydroxide, flushing eyes, nose and mouth with 2% soda solution
Hydrocyanic acid	widening of pupils, bitter and metallic taste in mouth, dizziness, feeling of fear, cramps	antidote—amyl nitrite. Fresh air, heat, artificial respiration
Sulfur dioxide	cough, hampered speech and swallowing, shortness of breath, confusion, worsened sense of smell	fresh air, flushing eyes and nose, rinsing with 2% soda solution

In assessing the chemical situation the following are to be determined:

—Dimensions of the zone of contaminated air with harmful concentrations. Its depth (km) on open terrain in event of destruction of unbanked containers with SDYaV is shown in Table 3. Width is as follows: for thermal inversion—0.03%; isotherm—0.15%; convection—0.8% of depth.

—Arrival time of contaminated air. Distance from point of spill to given line (object) is divided by average speed of movement of SDYaV. It may be assumed with sufficient accuracy that it will be twice the wind speed, measured at 1 meter altitude.

—Duration of effect of SDYaV. It is roughly equal the time of evaporation of the SDYaV at the point of spill.

Table 3. Strong Toxic Substances

Atmospheric Condition	Name of Chemical	Quantity, tons					
		5	10	25	50	75	100
Inversion	chloride, phosgene	23	49	80	more than 80		
Inversion	hydrocyanic acid	16	24	53	80	more than 80	
Inversion	hydrogen sulphide	5.5	7.5	12.5	20	25	62
Inversion	sulfur dioxide, ammonia	4	4.5	7	10	12.5	17.5
Isotherm	chloride, phosgene	4.6	7	11.5	16	19	21
Isotherm	hydrocyanic acid	3.2	4.8	7.9	12	14.5	16.5
Isotherm	hydrogen sulphide	1.1	1.5	2.5	4	5	8.8
Isotherm	sulfur dioxide, ammonia	0.8	0.9	1.4	2	2.5	3.5
Convection	chloride, phosgene	1	1.4	2	2.4	2.9	3.2
Convection	hydrocyanic acid	0.7	1.1	1.6	1.8	2.2	2.5
Convection	hydrogen sulphide	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.9	1.1	1.5
Convection	sulfur dioxide, ammonia	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.8

Remark: Data shown in the table are: reduced by 1.5 times for banked containers; reduced by an average of 3.5 times for terrain with forested mountain ranges, developments and hills; and multiplied times the following for wind speeds greater than 1 m/sec.: 0.7 (2 m/sec.); 0.5 (3-5 m/sec.); 0.4 (6 m/sec.).

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Cases of 'Extortion' Reported in Transbaykal MD 90UM0845A Moscow TRUD in Russian 5 Aug 90 p 2

[Article by TRUD special correspondent Yu. Dmitriyev: "Racketeers in Uniform: Ghastly Phenomenon Infects Barracks"]

[Text] The other day I entertained an old friend, an officer serving in the Transbaykal. He said he does not know what to do about the situation. He was talking about undercover acts of extortion being committed by persons wearing an NCO's or other uniform, acts of exacting "tribute" from soldiers. This tribute takes the form of money, electric shavers, and gifts and food items sent from home.

How base!—I thought. This is the same kind of racket being carried on in our capital cities, involving millions of rubles, not the petty items here. For that matter, the Transbaykal Military District is the oldest and best known, one of only two honored by the term "Order of Lenin" in their title.

I was acquainted with its previous long-time commander—Army General Peter Alekseyevich Belik, a Hero of the Soviet Union, about whom I had written a documentary. A man of pure character and bravest of front-line soldiers, the motorcycle reconnaissance regiment he commanded near Stalingrad pounded the fascist rear. His first commendation, which he was awarded in June of 1941, mentioned that he "received a chest wound on the Western Front."

So, gray-haired General Belik would turn over in his grave if he found out that the district he so carefully nourished under severe natural conditions is suffering a disease such as extortion.

Here is some information recently published in the military press. Three fellow countrymen serving on a distant Transbaykal post decided to "earn some extra money" before being demobilized. They selected Private S. Lebedev as their victim. They started out by threatening to beat him, then made good on their threat by using their fists. They forced the soldier to send a telegram home asking for 50 rubles, which he received and handed over to the extortionists.

The same crooks attempted to squeeze 300 rubles out of Private O. Murza. The matter came to an end when a

court-martial sentenced each criminal to serve up to two years in prison. Those are the facts. We spoke about this with Colonel of Justice A. P. Korotkov, deputy chief of the Main Military Procuracy's Investigations Directorate. His comments follow.

[Korotkov] Since the Army is an integral part of our society, both positive and negative phenomena occurring in society are unfortunately reflected. The Army has not been immune to the unpleasant and ghastly phenomenon of extortion. Such cases were rare as recently as five years ago, a time when they would arouse indignation, censure, and active measures on the part of both commanders and servicemen themselves. These phenomena have become more frequent.

In the Army, this kind of violation has not acquired the scope and refinement typical of the racket as practiced in civilian life, to be sure. Even the term itself as commonly understood is not totally applicable to the military. Rather, what we have is on the order of hazing of new recruits by older men, the only difference being in details. However, regardless of how it is clothed, service personnel who are affected suffer just as much.

[TRUD] What is being done to prevent and combat this type of crime?

[Korotkov] Each incidence of "barracks extortion" is thoroughly investigated. The actions of such criminals are categorized either as extortion per Article 148 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, which provides for punishment of up to 10 years' confinement, or as larceny per Article 145 of the same Criminal Code, which sets the punishment at up to 7 years' confinement.

[TRUD] The editors frequently receive letters from parents of servicemen complaining of various abuses of their sons in their units. What does the Military Procuracy do about those letters?

[Korotkov] Indeed, parents of service personnel help us quite a bit by informing us of incidents related to them by their sons. Editorial offices forward such letters to us for investigation. The Investigations Directorate of the GVP [Main Military Procuracy] in turn sees to it that each incident is investigated and acted upon.

It sometimes happens that soldiers' parents make the accusation that commanders are attempting to conceal rights violations to create the picture that all is well in a military unit. There are such cases. However, the law requires that military procurators in such cases take action to bring criminal charges against commanders guilty of concealing a crime.

Lt Gen Nadolskiy on Military Aid to Harvest

*90UM0822A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Aug 90 First Edition p 1*

[Interview with Lieutenant General A. Nadolskiy, chief of staff, Motor Transport Battalion Control, USSR Ministry of Defense, by Yu. Samsonov: "Eighty Motor

Transport Battalions on Harvest Routes"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Lieutenant General A. Nadolskiy, chief of staff, Motor Transport Battalion Control, USSR Ministry of Defense, replies to questions put by a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent.

[Correspondent] Anton Kononovich, this is the third decree issued by the USSR Council of Ministers that obligates the Ministry of Defense to provide 10,000 vehicles to aid in the harvest. The two previous requests were for, respectively, 30,000 and 5,000 trucks. How much of the task has been accomplished?

[Nadolskiy] A decree issued by the government is for us a law. At the present time there are 58 motor transport battalions at work. Of that total, 55 are located in Russia, three in Kazakhstan. Eight battalions are en route, three are awaiting loading, one is being loaded. This is in response to the first two requests.

Twenty battalions are in process of formation in response to the Council of Ministers decree of 3 August. Loading is to commence today. The battalions will be dispersed as follows: 6 to the RSFSR, 14 to the Kazakh SSR. There will be a total of 66 battalions working in Russia, 14 in Kazakhstan.

[Correspondent] How difficult is it for the Armed Forces to provide 10,000 trucks?

[Nadolskiy] What we are taking now from the units may be among the last of their vehicles. This means that they will experience great difficulties in their normal operations. In addition, in complying with the first two decrees, the vehicles we assigned were merely delivered to their destination by drivers; now we are providing both trucks and drivers.

[Correspondent] Anton Kononovich, do the local authorities realize the sacrifices the Army is making to help the crop growers?

[Nadolskiy] Not everywhere, apparently. How else can one explain the fact that every day over 3,000 vehicles assigned by the Ministry of Defense stand empty. This is especially true in Saratov Oblast. There, on 4 August, 896 vehicles stood idle; on 5 August, 900.

Also, about 1,000 trucks are without drivers in the oblast. A call-up cannot be organized. Nevertheless, in the Saratov area there are 8,846 drivers driving nothing less than personal cars. Why can't some of them be called to the harvest? The main causes of this situation are lack of organization and an absence of concern on the part of local authorities.

[Correspondent] How much have servicemen contributed so far to the 1990 harvest?

[Nadolskiy] As of 7 August, military drivers transported 1.8 million tons of crops. Of this total, grain accounts for 1.35 million tons.

(The newspaper was represented by Yu. Samsonov.)

* * *

Trains carrying motor vehicles continue to arrive in the Volga and Orenburg areas. Harvest battalions from the Western Group of Forces, the Far Eastern and Volga-Ural military districts are to "mount their assault" in Tataria, the Orenburg steppes, and Kuybyshev Oblast. Nevertheless, an abundance of military trucks in the kolkhoz fields does not necessarily mean full granaries. Is it possible that the motor transport battalions will be laid up due to a shortage of drivers called up from the reserves? Will there be a repeat of the situation that still plagues local authorities in Saratov Oblast?

"That question was resolved previously," said Lieutenant Colonel A. Semenov, a senior officer serving in a directorate of the Volga-Ural Military District. "Local authorities in Tataria and Kuybyshev Oblast gave a firm guarantee that they would call up the necessary number of drivers. The labor situation is more difficult in agricultural Orenburg Oblast, where two battalions from the Western Group of Forces and one battalion from the Volga-Ural Military District will operate with full complements of drivers in compulsory service."

Lieutenant Colonel O. Bedula

Problems of Military Construction in Areas of Seismic Danger

90UM0822B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 8 Aug 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Major I. Ivanyuk: "Elimination of Earthquake Threat to Military Posts"]

[Text] This is a problem that is on the minds of everyone who was in any way involved in the tragic consequences of the earthquake in Armenia.

The information given below, which can only be described as depressing, was related to me in a conversation I had with Colonel General K. Vertelov, who is chief of the State Evaluation and Inspection of the USSR Ministry of Defense. He was deputy of the state commission that investigated the causes of the disaster that was so destructive to the Armenian cities.

It is generally known that the commission in the course of its work discovered numerous instances of low-quality construction and failure to follow building plans. It was determined that certain series of residential buildings possess serious construction shortcomings and are not suitable to areas of seismic danger. Although not a single life was lost in buildings erected by military builders, many of them were found to be unsuitable for habitation.

As a result, thousands of officers, warrant officers, and extended-duty servicemen and their dependents found themselves without a roof over their heads. Additional

capital investments required to accomplish the urgent repairs in military units and subunits exceeded 50 million rubles last year alone.

The consequences could have been much worse. Many military facilities present an explosion hazard. What can be done to prevent tragic consequences due to the vagaries of a terrestrial calamity, not only there, but also in other areas of the country?

The state commission developed a set of recommendations to deal with just this possibility. Unfortunately, putting them into practice is another matter. It is gratifying that it is the Ministry of Defense that has enjoyed success in one activity. The story is as follows. The commission saw the need for organizing an all-union scientific research center for earthquake-proof construction, with regional branches located in various areas of the country and associated subbranches in a number of ministries and departments.

The Office of Earthquake-Proof Construction was set up last year at the Central Planning Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which is headed by Colonel P. Pospelov. The first task to come up before Lieutenant Colonel O. Kabantsev—the chief—and his subordinates was to study past experience and incorporate as much of it as possible in the planning of new buildings in Armenia.

There was more than enough to study there, since military planners were on the scene literally one day after the occurrence. They were a group of specialists from a military design office headed by Colonel Yu. Abramov; they were joined by personnel from central planning institutes. An immediate requirement was the issuance of recommendations for restoration of damaged buildings, a task that was accomplished in a matter of days as early as December of 1988. The next urgent task was the planning of residential buildings, barracks, eating facilities, schools, and engineering networks. It was necessary to start from the beginning in all cases, since there were no ready solutions to handle another earthquake situation in Armenia; it was a case where they had to be found by taking into account both the preventive conclusions reached by the state commission and possibilities of a reoccurrence. A positive development was that as early as January of 1989 all the solutions proposed for new construction were adopted and coordinated with a USSR Gosstroy operations group, with actual construction starting in March.

Analysis indicated that large-panel buildings, not only the cast-in-place type, offer seismic stability. The first report issued by the USSR Goskomarkhitektura immediately after the earthquake occurred recommended the erection of buildings having cast-in-place floors and ceilings and cast-in-place foundation slabs, something that is associated with considerable and unjustifiable expenditure of time and materials, whereas the work accomplished by the military investigators resulted in recommending the application of pre-cast foundations in

the form of intersecting beams. This solution was coordinated with the USSR Gosstroy commission, with the result that a considerable simplification of foundation laying was effected.

For use in high-density residential buildings in areas of Armenia that suffered the earthquake, it was decided to erect large-panel buildings of the so-called series 101 type. What was the reasoning behind that?

"The building design developed by a design team headed by Lieutenant Colonel N. Staroverov in a period of 52 days makes it possible to achieve a high level of quality," explained Lieutenant Colonel O. Kabantsev. "In addition, erection of this kind of building makes moderate manpower demands: A five-man team can put one up in a week. The structure is completely prefabricated; the elements are joined by welding."

The first building was ready for occupancy on time - in June of 1989. By September, several more buildings and the first series of schools were opened in Leninakan and Stepanavan. The year's program was essentially accomplished. All this was achieved while other departments were exhibiting little construction activity.

I cannot fail to mention that the building plan and its architectural solution was approved by the Armenian SSR Gosstroy, which insists on the satisfaction of strict requirements relative to conformity with national town planning traditions. At the end of last year it was awarded an approval rating by an UNESCO seminar dealing with the problem of construction under extreme conditions.

If this is the case, then why is there no more progress? We must get things moving and work on other military installations. The trouble here is that a building designed for conditions peculiar to Armenia is unsuitable for, say, the Crimea or Black Sea coast of the Caucasus.

"The Office of Earthquake-Proof Construction is faced with an enormous amount of research," said Colonel S. Altgauzen, deputy chief of the Central Planning Institute. "Of course it is unrealistic to organize a large group of specialists in Moscow and travel all over the country. What we must do is coordinate the efforts of regional planning organizations."

Even a nonspecialist can understand that there is an enormous amount of work to be done. In some locations it cannot be put off even another day. As reported in many publications, including KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, scientists of the Volcanology Institute have predicted that a powerful earthquake may occur on Kamchatka in the near future. There is also concern for other areas. Indeed, what has been done to prevent another Spitak?

Due largely to the enthusiasm of workers of the local military planning office headed by Lieutenant Colonel A. Aseyev, and of course with the assistance of colleagues from Moscow, Leningrad, and Khabarovsk, an amount

of work has been accomplished on the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy military post. It consisted mainly of investigating structures for their resistance to earthquakes, compiling the respective certificates, and developing definite solutions for each building. The results obtained so far - to put it bluntly - are less than satisfactory.

Millions of rubles, additional manpower and construction are required to render military installations resistant to earthquakes. In general, approximately a third of residential buildings are subject to danger.

The USSR Ministry of Defense at the end of April issued an order citing specific measures to be taken to determine the seismic stability of military facilities and residential quarters located within the confines of Kamchatka Oblast. Incidentally, a decree in the same vein was signed by the USSR Council of Ministers as early as December of last year. Major General I. Chernyshov, organization and planning chief in the Ministry of Defense's Capital Construction Directorate, told me that, in compliance with this order, housing will be erected in the next two years to resettle persons vacating buildings slated for destruction. This year will see the accomplishment of work intended to improve the earthquake resistance of children's preschool institutions and reinforcement of structures housing manufacturing facilities.

Let us consider some more figures. This year's plan calls for reinforcing: residential quarters totalling 3,000 square meters in the Far Eastern Military District; 200 square meters in the Pacific Ocean Fleet; kindergartens for 50 and 40 children, respectively. Without forcing the issue, one could say that, even if there were no earthquake threat, it would be necessary to go beyond these few buildings and repair other structures on a priority basis.

Something else must be taken into account. The cost of repairing one building amounts to 800,000 rubles, which is not much less than that required to erect a new building. It may not be too late to devise a more productive solution to the Kamchatka problems than the one that has been incorporated into the plans of both civilian and military builders.

Terms of Pension Entitlement for Soldiers' Wives Discussed

*90UM0845B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 32, 11-17 Aug 90 p 8*

[Terms of pension provisions; first three paragraphs are ARGUMENTY I FAKTY introduction]

[Text] The problem of finding employment for servicemen's wives remains unresolved on many military posts, with the result that the wives do not accumulate the length of service required to qualify for the full age-related pension.

What is being done to resolve this problem?

The above question was asked by M. Akiniyazeva, our correspondent. Below is a reply from Major General P. Kuchma, chief of the Labor and Wages Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The USSR Council of Ministers has adopted a decree that makes it incumbent upon executive committees of soviets of people's deputies, and heads of ministries, departments, associations, enterprises, institutions, and organizations, to take definite action to find employment for wives of servicemen and provide work on the basis of a part-time, flexible, or work-at-home schedule. It is also stated that time spent in residence by wives of officers, Army warrant officers, Navy warrant officers, and men on extended duty in areas that do not offer opportunities to work in a wife's specialty is to be credited toward the total length of service required to qualify for a pension on the basis of age or disability. This provision also extends to servicemen's wives that possess no specialty if they have been unable to find employment. The aforementioned time is credited toward length of service in an amount that does not exceed the length of service credit possessed by the wife prior to the day of application for pension, with a maximum of 10 years. In this connection, the total length of service cannot be greater than 20 years.

For example, assume that a warrant officer's wife as of the day she applies for an age-related pension possesses 14 years of service and that she did not work for eight years during the time her husband served a tour in areas where she was unable to find employment in her specialty. She is entitled to a credit of six years, thus qualifying her for an age-related pension on the basis of 20 years' length of service.

The above-mentioned periods servicemen's wives spend in their husbands areas of assignment are attested to by certificates issued by commanders (chiefs) of superior military units, installations, enterprises, and organizations; wives of reserve military men will be issued same by military commissars. A wife to obtain a certificate must apply to the unit commander or military commissar; she must be prepared to present documents attesting to unavailability of employment after 1 January 1990.

Servicemen's wives who did not work prior to 1 January 1990 are not to present above-mentioned documents. This provision pertains to military wives who live with their husbands while the latter are on duty outside the borders of the USSR.

Information entered into the certificate is taken from notations in the husband's personnel file, wife's labor book, and copy of the marriage (or divorce) decree.

Above-mentioned certificate is presented to social security organs when the wife makes application for pension.

Additional information on this subject may be obtained from military commissariats and social security organs located in the applicant's area of residence. Applicant

may cite USSR Council of Ministers Decree No 674 dated 21 August 1989 (p. 3) and USSR Minister of Defense Order No 27 dated 15 January 1990, with supplements.

Odessa Confronts Influx of Military Deserters

90UM0855A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Aug 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Maj V. Fedotov: "Problem Requires a Solution: 'Search and Investigation' Commandant-Style"]

[Text] Odessa Military District—The soldier detained at the Odessa Train Station introduced himself to the patrol as Igor Bondarenko. He explained his lack of documents by saying that he had arrived in the city from the Moscow Military District with an officer who, he claimed, had gone off somewhere. As is done in such instances, Private Bondarenko was taken to the commandant's office.

And there his ingenuous "tale" burst like a soap bubble.

"We immediately sent an inquiry to the Moscow Military District," said Lieutenant Colonel A. Kananin, Military Commandant of the Odessa Garrison. "The reply was quick in coming. Bondarenko had deserted his unit."

In the course of the year, military patrols in Odessa make checks on several thousand soldiers. Some of them (last summer, up to 15 people a week) are detained until their identities can be determined. Only a handful of the detainees turn out, for example, to have strayed from their commands. The absolute majority, by contrast, have wilfully deserted their units. And the full brunt of catching those who have deserted their units is shouldered primarily by the men who work in the commandant's office. Moreover, the deserter has to be returned to his unit as quickly as possible. For there are frequent instances in which deserters resort to crime to support themselves. They can also readily obtain "assistance" from bandit groups that have proliferated of late and that have both clothing and weapons at their disposal. However, the police get involved in a case only in the event that a deserter has committed a criminally punishable act.

In some cases, an "operation" to apprehend a deserter can go on for months. Finding deserters quickly requires an entire staff of trained operations officers. The commandant's office has none. The investigative work has to be done by ordinary (in our perception) officers. They are especially "lucky" in southern cities.

For example, a detailed study of the process of "migration" from units has revealed the following picture: In Odessa, the influx is increasing and coincides with...the swimming season! The influx "peaks" with the hottest weather. In summer, after all, it's relatively easy to find food in a sovkhos field and to sleep in a basement, or even right on the beach. The mass of travelers to the area

also works to the deserters' advantage: It's easier to get lost in the crowd. And not too long ago, in broad daylight, a crowd pushed an assistant military commandant away from a drunken soldier and helped the offender escape.

"We essentially have to perform the functions of a kind of army police," said Senior Lieutenant S. Fokin, an assistant military commandant. "We know this has to be done, but without the proper training and equipment we're in a tight spot."

One can understand him. After all, the officer wasn't trained to serve as a criminal investigator, though he sometimes has to serve as an operations officer. Such was the case, for example, in detaining one Yu. Tsybulya, who had been "on the run" for some time and had altered his appearance by growing a beard. Were it not for other features, the officer would have had no way of recognizing in the imposing man the face he was searching for (using an army photo). Knowing that Tsybulya was probably armed, Sergey nonetheless undertook to apprehend him.

That time, fortunately, no one was hurt. But there is no guarantee that this will always be the case. After all, the commandant's office is not a police station. And what a police inspector can legally do a patrol cannot. For this reason, a commandant's office has to carry out, at its own risk and with its own manpower, the following extensive measures:

From a report to the district troop commander on measures taken to apprehend Private N. (the deserter remains at large).

"...The parents have been contacted;

The city and rayon internal affairs directorates have been enlisted in the search (since the deserted committed a theft, the police have become involved in the case);

Officers of the commandant's office are monitoring places where Pvt. N. might turn up;

Known addresses have been placed under surveillance..."

Senior Lieutenant A. Sayenko was completely unrecognizable. Clad in a fashionable denim suit, he looked more like a prosperous cooperative operator than an assistant military commandant.

"A forced masquerade," said the officer, smiling tiredly. "I going to have some lunch, take a short rest, and then its back on duty, waiting in ambush." Sayenko unbuttoned his jacket to reveal a portable radio. "Look how I'm equipped. I borrowed it from some police operations officers for a while. We could use a pair of these..."

Several patrol groups were also enlisted in the search. Dressed in civilian clothes, they too lie in ambush.

"If we were to have on the staff a special unit like a commandant's company, many problems would quickly recede," said Lt Col Kananin. "The officers could organize patrol service, and contacts with the police and units would be the job of the special unit. The latter would also search for deserters. This would make it possible to stop diverting a very large number of soldiers attached to the commandant's office from their duties."

Reader Asks If Military Legislators Are Double-Dipping

90SV0091A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Sep 90 First Edition p 4

[Letter to the editors and response in the column: "Briefing for Readers": "Two Salaries?"]

[Text] Is it true that Colonel N. Stolyarov will be receiving two salaries as a result of his being elected chairman of the CCC [Central Control Commission] of the Russian Communist Party? One would be paid by the CPSU Central Committee, the other, for the rank of general, by the Ministry of Defense.

R. Maksakova, Abakan

Colonel N. Stolyarov, chairman of the Central Control Commission, Communist Party, RSFSR, responds:

I have been asked this question a number of times by both friends and persons of ill will. I wish to answer it publicly.

It is common knowledge that my present position is elective. I have been placed on detached status for service with the CPSU Central Committee in my capacity as chairman of the Communist Party CCC of the RSFSR, but I remain a member of the Armed Forces. I have neither been promoted, nor do I receive pay from the Ministry of Defense. The Ministry of Defense does not finance my activity. I wish to emphasize the latter point to put an end to false rumors.

Costs of Dismantling Krasnoyarsk Radar

91UM0035A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 9 Oct 90 p 3

[Article by military observer N. Panyukov in response to reader's letter: "Using a Sledgehammer on a Secret Installation"]

[Text] This "operation" will cost us hundreds of millions of rubles. And, after expending them, we will not receive anything, other than a pile of debris and a feeling of bitterness.

Complying with a treaty with the Americans, we are scrapping the Krasnoyarsk radar which was supposed to have gone into operation this year. It pains me to hear about this also because, in my time, I dedicated almost two years of my military life to the erection of this very same radar. Why did this new installation, which cost the country hundreds of millions of rubles of the people's money, end up being scrapped? How did the Americans respond to this step of ours? And, most important: Will the world be any safer without the Krasnoyarsk radar?

[Signed] V. Ivashov, builder. Sverdlovsk.

Through a gap in the wall, where there used to be a door, soldiers were hauling cumbersome cargo carts filled with all kinds of odds and ends, which until very recently constituted the "heart and nerves" of the radar. But now these condensers, which look like canisters, of which there are many, the heavy sections of cable with copper wiring that look like fat boa constrictors, the endless number of rustproof pipe fragments with shocking inscriptions, and all of the other things, in the words of the owners of the dismantled station, are nothing more than rubbish to be used as salvage or scrap metal.

"Yes, yes," sighs Lieutenant Colonel N. Soldatov, who heads the work here. "None of this is suitable any more for reassembly..."

Nikolay Pavlovich is one of the radar oldtimers. And, of course, he knows what he is talking about. Everything here was set up before his eyes. With difficulty and torment. Nikolay Pavlovich remembers 50 degree frosts and ordeals in getting the equipment ready. He simply could not watch how the gas cutters hack up the robot mechanical arm mounting (one of the more intricate units of a radar complex) with the fiery jet of a blowtorch.

"The work was awful.... Everything for the first time, everything by feel. I am not talking about material expenditures. Millions were lost before this robot began to 'run' with modules in the antenna field."

It is painful to watch the sledgehammer and the blowtorch on a spree at the expense of the keen and delicate creation of human hands. It is painful to watch how right before your eyes the hundreds of millions of rubles of the people's money invested in the radar are being turned into ashes. What is more, this dismantling, this

"Sisyphean toil" will also not be cheap: According to the most modest calculations it will come to no less than 50 million rubles.

And questions cannot be avoided here. How did this happen? Why was something built which, as it turned out, should not have been built?

Of course, no one thought that within four years of the start of the radar site construction U.S. President Reagan would suddenly come out with the SDI program, and that the "Krasnoyarsk secret installation" would become the U.S. Administration's trump card in disarmament negotiations. However, this reasoning is not very comforting. Both because it does not make it any easier for the state treasury, and because the ABM (antiballistic missile) limitation treaty, as we know, already existed at that time, and, of course, it could have been predicted that its violation would not be greeted with "loud cheers."

Yes, naturally, we did not have any malicious intent. Yes, we began to build the radar near Krasnoyarsk and not in the Far North only because this was supposed to have been three times cheaper (in truth, the tightwad pays double). Yes, we do have arguments on this score, that due to its technical characteristics the Krasnoyarsk radar cannot be considered to have all of the features of an ABM system... Well, what of it? The radar is being dismantled. And the money has vanished.

And how many similar installations with built-in doom have we created throughout the country? The Crimean AES [nuclear electric power station], the plant for destroying chemical munitions in Chapayevsk, the Mukachevo radar... You cannot count them all.

True, with respect to the Krasnoyarsk radar this doom, I understood after consulting with specialists, was not entirely irreversible. Given the desire, it could have been defended nonetheless. And the main argument for this is that no matter how paradoxical it appears, the danger of nuclear catastrophe is not reduced but is increased as a result of the dismantling of the Krasnoyarsk radar. For without it the northeastern missile-attack sector for our country remains virtually unmonitored.

The fact is that, in comparison with the radar, the so-called outer space echelon (several ESV's—artificial Earth satellite vehicles), gives a very low reliability of correct decisionmaking. Possessing the capability of monitoring the movement of missiles only in the boost phase when the jet engines are emitting heat, it also issues false alarms very frequently. The ESV's can interpret conventional man-made space objects that are deorbiting and falling into the thick layers of the atmosphere as ballistic missiles attacking us. There is no denying that it is a dangerous situation.

Nonetheless, this is the reality. And the dangers of errors in it will continue until such time as we replace the Krasnoyarsk radar with two warning stations, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty. But this, the specialists

believe, will cost not less than R2 billion. Where do we get this? And even given the resources it will hardly be possible to put these stations into operation any earlier than the year 2000. This, then, is the deplorable result.

The people working on the dismantling are puzzled as to why the Americans demanded that we pull down even the walls of the former radar.

"We should have told Bush and Cheney not to taunt us," a crane operator said angrily, interrupting operation of the controls for a minute. "Why remove eight floors from the structure?"

And if you consider that the USSR and the United States are not alone in possessing nuclear weapons, and that there is a danger of so-called unsanctioned launches from other regions, then you think to yourself: Is this dismantling not damaging to the whole world?

Incidentally, as B. Surikov, candidate of technical sciences and a senior consultant at the United States and Canada Institute, told me recently, American experts are also beginning to understand this. They are bewildered by the fact that the U.S. public did not receive timely exhaustive information on the actual role of the Krasnoyarsk radar. Does this mean that our politicians and military specialists did not do their work right? It appears that they should have been more persistent in showing that the Krasnoyarsk radar was not so dangerous to peace that only one word should be pronounced: Destroy...

However, what is the point of blaming the politicians now? They had their own logic for their actions, and their own high idea and good motives: Once and for all remove whatever suspicions of us there might be and unblock one more obstruction on the road to normal relations between the USSR and the United States. It is possible that our politicians also counted on the infectiousness of a good example, calculating that the United States will also dismantle, or at the very least mothball, some of its own radars, for example in Greenland and Great Britain. Unfortunately, nothing came of this. And all the American radars, in contrast to our own, are continuing to carry out their service in good working order, and we, according to the official military-political strategy of "rivalry" now prevalent in the United States, continue in the meantime to remain their main enemy until the year 2000. An enemy that has to be economically exhausted and politically discredited...

While we are celebrating a "funeral banquet" for the Krasnoyarsk radar today, we cannot remain silent about how the dismantling of such an expensive installation is being organized, and about what the people are saying

about this. It is bad that it is not entirely clear to this day: What will there be in place of the radar?

Various rumors are making the rounds: Some people are scaring taiga neighborhoods that there will soon be a housewarming here for a new prison, and some try to convince you that there are plans for the construction of a giant furniture combine here. But it seems to me that the most rational idea on this score was expressed by 75-year-old taiga resident Roman Yegorovich Nebylitsa, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War. He lives in the taiga, not far from the radar operators' compound. The old man heard that the radar may be converted into a relay station.

"Then, they say, you will be able to hear Moscow and America over the receiver," Roman Yegorovich said pensively. "The old woman and I bought a good radio set, but all it receives is Krasnoyarsk. It is boring. Klavdiya and I are now left here by ourselves..."

It is sad, but as I understand it, it is fated that the hopes of Roman Yegorovich and Klavdiya Ivanovna, along with thousands of Siberians who dream of saturated airwaves, will not materialize.

"Representatives of the Ministry of Communications also came here 'to consider a relay station,' as did 'buyers' from other departments, but no one, apparently, really liked the 'commodity,'" explains Lieutenant Colonel V. Maksimov, acting chief engineer. "They sigh and they sigh, and they are all enraptured by this, as they all say, 'miracle on the Yennisey highway,' but then they leave without anything. You see, it is a little far from civilization... At present, only the Ministry of Internal Affairs is not refusing. But does this ministry have enough imagination to put something other than a regular correctional labor establishment here?"

It is amazing... We are talking so much now about conversion. On this question we frequently waver over trifles. And here a multimillion-ruble facility is being left to the mercy of fate. Is it possible that excellent industrial premises are not needed by even one ministry for the organization of a new effort that would be useful to the entire state, and is it possible in the final analysis that no one needs an entire compound with multistory dwellings and well-built apartments?

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA is prepared to submit for public review, with the participation of foreign experts if necessary, projects for the reasonable utilization—within the framework of negotiations—of the "remains" of the Krasnoyarsk radar.

Write, call: 257-25-20.

Discussion of Mine Sweeping Equipment

90UM0755A Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA
in Russian No 7, Jul 90 pp 7, C4

[Article by V. Krasnov, senior scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences History of Science and Technology Institute: "Ocean Sweeps"]

[Text] During the Great Patriotic War, 108,442 mines were laid in the seas that wash the shores of our country alone. Nearly one million of them were employed throughout World War II. More than 8,000 ships and vessels were blown up and sunk by them. Even today, the mine is not obsolete as a weapon. During the very recent Iranian conflict, it caused considerable damage to shipping in the Persian Gulf.

Minesweeping is the primary method to actively combat ocean mines. This is accomplished using mechanical and influence sweeps with which anti-mine vessels or minesweepers are equipped.

The minesweeper's primary weapon is the sweep. There is a complex classification for them but we will examine them based only on the primary criterion: The capability to bring pressure to bear on mines and precisely mechanical and influence sweeps.

Mechanical [sweeps] are dragging and cutting operations intended to detect and cut off moored mines. Mines are exploded through direct contact with a ship's hull. As a rule, a mechanical sweep consists of a sweep wire and a towline manufactured from steel cable, a sweep winch, and control devices. Steel grapples that hold on to a swept mine are fitted to the sweep wire. Control devices, depressors [at the inboard end of the sweep wire], and others [keep the sweep wire extended laterally] conduct the sweep wire at the prescribed depth and maintain the required seizure width.

The towing sweep is performed in pairs, that is, it is towed by two ships bows on (parallel to each other). When laying or recovering the sweeps, minesweepers must almost touch each other which is difficult to execute in heavy seas or at night. Due to the shortcomings mentioned, that type [of sweep] is less widely used than cutting and dragging by one ship.

The sweep wire of the mechanical sweep is equipped with steel cutters. They cut the mine mooring cable which has been caught in the sweep; the mine surfaces and is destroyed. Sometimes they suspend explosive devices that blast the mine mooring cable instead of cutters. The control devices are roughly like those on towing sweeps but there are models that have special hydrostatic instruments to automatically maintain running depth. Mechanical sweep seizure width is 100-400 meters and draft is up to several dozen meters. Sweep draft can be increased during sweeps of antisubmarine mine fields and also those that are equipped with anti-sweep mine defenses.

Influence sweeps have begun to be installed on minesweepers with the appearance of magnetic, acoustic, magneto-acoustic and other types of mines whose detonating fuzes react to a ship's varying physical fields. What is their operating principle? The physical field they simulate is capable of affecting a mine's detonating fuze, causing it to explode. But special instruments have been installed on proximity fuze mines to increase their anti-sweep resistance. Thus, an arming delay mechanism turns on the detonating fuze circuit's combat position only after expiration of a prescribed time period (after several hours or days). Sweeping serves no purpose until the arming delay mechanism is triggered. But the ship counter compels the sweep vessel to pass over the mine or near it for as many times as the ship counter has been set.

Magnetic bottom mines are swept using an electromagnetic sweep. It consists of two floating cables, a short one and a long one, with electrodes on the ends. A magnetic field is created when current passes through the circuit: Power source—cable—first electrode—sea water—second electrode—cable—power source. While sweeping, current direction changes periodically which affects mine detonators using magnetic fields of different polarities. The electromagnetic sweep operating program (direction, power, and type of electric current) is set by a special device (PAUT [not found], a "timer", etc.) that is located in the minesweeper's primary control station. Diesel generators with 200-600 kilowatt direct current capacity are the power source.


A loop [sweep] is another type of electromagnetic sweep. It consists of an electrical circuit in the form of a loop through which current flows and it pulls back and support the buoys, sweep wire, power source, and launch control devices. But it can only be used in shallow water areas.

Sweeping mines with acoustic firing mechanisms also requires special devices, acoustic sweeps. Here mechanical striking sources (a pneumatic or electronic hammer and membrane enclosed in a resonating bell) imitate ship noises.

Hydrodynamic influence mines were widely used at the end of World War II and during local wars in recent years. Their firing mechanisms react to changes in the hydrostatic pressure of water that originate from a vessel passing nearby. Combating such mines has been difficult since it is technologically complicated to imitate a hydrodynamic physical field. Therefore they send a special ship penetrator and they tow a barge or an old vessel into the mine field. They are sunk, thus insuring a section of the sea is swept clear that was a threat due to hydrodynamic mines.

During the postwar period, minehunters have entered the minesweeper's inventory. They can be: Towed or installed directly on a ship; hydroacoustic, which operate like ordinary sonar (an acoustical impulse emitted by it reaches the mine and, if reflected off it, it returns to the

Ocean Sweeps



Key:

- 1. Mechanical cutting sweep
- 2. Electro-magnetic cutting sweep

- 3. Helicopter mechanical sweep
- 4. Soviet ocean minesweeper

receiver and is depicted on the electronic indicator); and, magnetic (magnetometers) or electromagnetic—they register a change of the earth's magnetic or electromagnetic fields that are caused by the presence of mines in a given location. A television hunter consists of a lowered or towed transmitter-camera with a towing cable and video receiving unit aboard the vessel. The camera is maintained at the assigned depth using a special device. Remote control of this device is also envisioned.

Minesweepers are deservedly called "plowmen of the sea." For them, combat operations do not end with the conclusion of a war. They clear enemy and our own mines from waterways during many postwar years, thus insuring safety for shipping.

The article's author managed to serve on a minesweeper of native and American construction from 1945-1948 and participated in combat sweeps in the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan. Ships did strike mines during the sweeps. In our division, it happened to T-160; it was struck during a sweep in the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka area. Of a 45 man crew, 37 were killed along with Sr Lt Konovalov, the commander.

In the 1970s, Soviet Naval minesweepers were invited to sweep the Gulf of Suez and to clear mines from the port of Chittagong (The People's Republic of Bangladesh). In 1986-88, they participated in search and destruction of mines in the Persian Gulf. Soviet sailors successfully accomplished all of these missions and earned deep appreciation abroad.

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"Patriot", "Voyennyye znaniya", 1990

Problem of Scrapped Ships in Northern Fleet Area

90UM0722A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Jul 90 p 2

[Article by NA STRAZHE ZAPOLYARYA Northern Fleet Newspaper Correspondent Senior Lieutenant A. Bystrov: "Ship Graveyard or Why Gold Is Rusting"]

[Text] The frames of the ships, like skeletons of prehistoric animals bent by explosions of compartment interiors, are heaps of rusted metal.... This is what a one and a half kilometer long section of the Kola Bay shoreline called the ship graveyard looks like in its day-to-day existence. Here they wait their turn to be smelted. Strictly speaking, today the ship graveyard reminds us of nearly all the country's seashore near the Navy's major ports and bases. The situation has become so alarming that a year and a half ago the USSR Council of Ministers was compelled to issue an order that directed Minmorflot [Ministry of the Maritime Fleet], Minrybkhkh [Ministry of the Fish Industry], and Minoborony [Ministry of Defense] to develop and implement a series of measures during 1989-1990 to completely clean up the banks of rivers and the shores of seas from written off and discarded ships by the end of this year.

No one doubted the need to take extreme measures. It is sufficient to say that, according to approximate calculations, there are more than 100 boats and ships with a total displacement of nearly 120,000 tons that have been sunk, half-sunk, or abandoned on shoals and on shore in the Northern Fleet alone. In short, the naval forces of neighboring Norway total 100 boats and ships with a total displacement of nearly 51,000 tons. This comparison allows us to graphically present the size of the grandiose monument that we have erected to mismanagement. We are bearing enormous economic losses because of this attitude toward written off ships and boats. Each year, rust "consumes" 20-30 kilograms of each ton of discarded ship steel. Essentially, gold is rusting away that more diligent managers "extract" from scrap metal. And the damage inflicted on living nature? This is why we need to find out why, over several decades, did the Navy not resolve the problem of utilization of its worn out ships or see how realistic the time periods established for elimination of its unsold steel stock were?

A search for answers to these questions first of all led us to the fleet's only ship dismantling facility (SDF) that is located at the previously mentioned ship graveyard. Established in 1953, the SDF is extremely ill-equipped: There is still neither a dock nor a slip, gantry crane, or the main ship dismantling "tool"—a gas torch. All production, service, and living facilities are located on a former... floating jail that was used in this manner by the interventionists in 1920. Personnel turnover is high as a result of unsatisfactory working conditions. The development of the base over the course of the last more than 20 years has in many ways been held back by the December 18, 1968 Murmansk Gorispolkom [City Executive Committee] decision that bans capital construction here.

"The fact is also that one ton of scrap metal at our production facility has a very high cost," clarifies P. Sulikov, fleet capital equipment department chief. "Thus, last year it totaled 101 rubles, 88 kopeks. And Vtorchermet [Reused Ferrous Metal] where we send our scrap metal, pays 25 rubles, 70 kopeks per ton. And just the year before last, SDF expenditures exceeded income by 110,000 rubles."

Can it really be that it is much more profitable for the Navy to sink written off ships or to abandon them on shore than to actually bear losses for turning them into scrap? Yes, that is so. And here it is impossible not to marvel at a State price policy which equates the Navy's expenditures on the labor intensive dismantling of ship hulls with the expenditure of effort of a Pioneer who hauls a wash tub that is full of holes to a schoolyard during a subbotnik [voluntary unpaid work originally performed on Saturday]. But, on the other hand, is only the State at fault when the five SDF workers—this is its entire "effective combat strength"—can only dream about a plasma cutting torch. Incidentally, a plasma cutting torch is already yesterday in foreign practice.

There, special powerful scissors and "guillotines" are finding increasing application.

Unfortunately, for decades in the Northern Fleet, as generally in the country, we have not become seriously involved with the problem of utilization of old ships and improvement of the ship dismantling facility. And it is hard to say how much fault there is here and how much rear services organs are responsible for this misfortune. It really is no secret that men and equipment have been rushed first of all to develop the Navy's combat facilities.

This approach is totally reflected in the state of affairs in the sphere of processing written off "expended" ships. And the situation here is practically not changing for the better. In any case, the fleet's ship dismantling facility does not anticipate any reinforcements—material, technical, or other—at all in the foreseeable future. It turns out that we cannot count on the total elimination of the ship graveyard either this year or in the next few years. At least in our fleet.

Becoming closely acquainted with the fleet's capabilities with regard to raising sunken and crushed boats and ships—and there are dozens of them—did not increase optimism. The time period for fulfilling it has been just as strictly and unrealistically defined—by 1991.

The fleet's Search and Rescue Service (SRS) is also poorly equipped to carry out ship-raising operations. It has 1946 model ship-raising pontoons in its inventory. It does not even have its own floating cranes that are indispensable when raising ships. The two technical ship-raising detachments created last year in the fleet are operating far from at full strength due to a poor material technical base and a shortage of skilled personnel. Moreover, this year assets allotted by the SRS for ship-raising, development, acquisition, maintenance, and design of rescue and ship-raising equipment were cut by nearly one million rubles. Four positions were cut on the search and rescue service staff when the need is extremely great for carrying out complex engineering calculations (and in the best case they are being conducted using pocket calculators).

We did not even get the opportunity to talk about material incentives for the ship-raisers' truly back-breaking labor. Even highly qualified officer-divers receive 500 rubles or a bit more. For comparison, a paper recently sent to the SRS from a Moscow subway builder invites diver-caisson workers (even compulsory service sailors have the required skills for this work) to apply for work and announces that the salary there is 850-1,000 rubles per month and that housing is provided. Commentary is hardly needed.

So, how much time does SRS actually require to raise all of these boats and ships?

"Nearly ten years," calculates SRS Chief Engineer Captain 2nd Rank V. Novozhilov. "Really while considering our technical equipment and also the impossibility of

conducting work in the winter, we will not be able to raise more than 10 ships annually."

The chief engineer also shared his own alarm. At the end of last year, a ship was raised that the ship-raisers kept afloat for five days. And afterward they were once again forced to abandon it on a reef, there was no place to put the ship, the SDF was already swamped with iron.

Just where is the way out of the critical situation that has developed? It is really impossible to call the Council of Ministers' authorization to sell written off ships abroad a serious solution.

Foreigners are purchasing ships from us according to the price of ordinary ferrous scrap metal—for approximately 100 to 150 dollars per ton of "live" weight. Income is also reduced by the sum spent on difficult pre-sale preparations, towing, etc.

"The country is bearing enormous losses while selling written off ships," they advised me at the Moscow headquarters of Interscrap, a Soviet-American joint venture for dismantling scrap metal. "If briquetted ferrous scrap metal is a product of industrial production with an adequately high price, the sale of ships is the sale of ordinary raw material with its corresponding price."

It is necessary to mention that the Northern Fleet which is paying the primary share of the costs for pre-sale preparation of ships is literally not receiving a cent from the sale: 85 percent of the currency received enters the State Budget and 15 percent is given to the Navy.

Definite hopes in the fleet are associated with the activities of Interscrap Joint Venture that was created last year to dismantle ship structures and to produce briquetted scrap. Four ecologically clean plants must be built and equipped with the latest word in technology (American) in a compressed time period: In the Northern, Baltic, Far Eastern, and Black Sea fleets. But a mass of problems await this large construction and the creation of Interscrap was not provided for by five-year plans. That is, we need to not base it on one year's expectations. And then it is not known if the northern department of this venture will be able to rapidly process the fleet's ship scrap: Reserves of similar goods are also great at Murmansk Maritime Steamship Line, the fishing fleet, and other ship holders.

In other words, there is no place from which to anticipate or count on help in the near future and, to avoid future material losses, the fleet must count on its own forces for now. But first of all, as the experts think, they must reject haste in such an important and complicated matter and plan realistic ship-raising and boat and ship hull dismantling tasks in accordance with [available] time periods and assets. Although it seems that at the same time we must not forget that up to 20,000 dollars is being transformed into rust dust at just the one Northern Fleet SDF. In short, the fleet needs its own technically well-equipped ship dismantling facility that utilizes environmentally safe technology just like it needs air.

For now the ship graveyard continues to grow. And the State and the environment continue to bear losses.

Discussion of Agreement To Raise 'Komsomolets'

90UM0754A Moscow TRUD in Russian 14 Jul 90 p 3

[Article by TRUD Military Commentator V. Badrukin: "The Threat Has Been Hidden in the Ocean Depths: The Dutch Propose a Project To Raise the Sunken Submarine"]

[Text] USSR Minsudprom [Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry] Rubin Maritime Equipment Central Design Bureau [TsKB MT] General Director Academician I. Spasskiy and Dutch Deepwater Operations Consortium [NKGGO] Director K. Reinhardt signed a contract on raising the Nuclear Submarine Komsomolets.

The Deepwater Nuclear Submarine Komsomolets sank while on combat patrol on April 7, 1989 in the Norwegian Sea, 180 kilometers southwest of Medvezhiy Island. This event touched all of us not only by the crew's heroism and selflessness and the tragic outcome but also by the fact that it exposed profound contradictions between the Navy and the shipbuilding industry. The loss of the Komsomolets pierced the blank wall of secrecy that for decades carefully protected numerous problems in design, construction, and operation of our legendary missile submarines from "foreign" view.

But about this a bit later. But for now let us try to examine the main question: Is it worthwhile to raise the Komsomolets from the depth of 1,655 meters?

Up till this time no country in the world has experience conducting such operations. The American Challenger that was created at one time for precisely such purposes only raised individual pieces of submarines from great depths. And these operations cost astronomical sums. As a rule, all attempts to find methods to raise sunken ships from great depths have foundered on the reefs of enormous financial expenditures.

Many years ago the American Submarine Scorpion "laid on the ground" near the Azores as the result of an accident. The U.S. Navy leadership assured world society at that time that there could not be any radiation leaks from the submarine. But years passed and analysis of water at the site of the sinking began to show the presence of elements of heavy metal. And really not only a nuclear reactor (although it was shut down) but also two missiles-torpedoes with nuclear warheads remained on board the sunken Komsomolets....

Surveillance of the situation around the Komsomolets that is being conducted using Scientific Research Ship Akademik Mstislav Keldysh and the Mir-1 and Mir-2 Deepwater Devices and analysis of the seawater at the accident site do not provide any grounds for alarm for now. But only for now.

We will not forget that the Komsomolets sunk in one of the most biologically productive regions of the World Ocean that has special ecological significance when the stable deep currents are taken into account. The varied interests of not only the Soviet Union and Norway but also other countries, first of all Sweden, Iceland, and Great Britain extend into it. The societies of these states are manifesting growing concern as a result of the ecological consequences of a possible deterioration of the radiation situation near the submarine in the near future.

Discharge of radioactive substances from the Komsomolets' nuclear reactor after the corrosive destruction of its hull and pipelines is predicted to be the most probable cause of radiation contamination. These alarms are also worsened by the fact that the submarine's hull, as the Navy command has reported, was made from titanium—a metal, as I recall from my high school chemistry course, that is very active.

I do not think it is worth talking about the possible consequences—Chernobyl got it into our heads for ever that we should not joke about radiation. And the ocean is throwing up ever new and *for the time being* unexplained ecological mysteries at us—massive suicidal beachings of whales, dolphins, starfish, and similar undersea creatures—as if constantly reminding "Come to your senses, people." Of course, the Norwegian Sea is not the center of heavily populated Europe but it would be folly to leave a delayed action ecological time "bomb" even here.

In my opinion, there is one more reason to raise the Komsomolets. It does not appear in one official document and neither Navy Admirals nor Minsudprom officials mentioned it in conversations with me. But nevertheless....

Let us recall how the submarine tragedy was covered in the press. A whole sea of information was splashed out on us for several months and we to our horror learned that it turns out that the Komsomolets is far from our first nuclear submarine that has come to rest on the bottom of the ocean. That the shipbuilders seized as a rule "push semifinished products" off onto the Navy with the amazingly streamlined wording "in experimental operation" that also allows them to receive bonuses and to avoid responsibility for the consequences.

Here are just several grains of this "testing." The operation of two ships was totaled banned last year to prevent accidents due to technical discrepancies of individual elements of submarine electrical equipment. One nuclear submarine spent more than half of the warranty period in repairs and in ship trials. Just in the last five years, Minsudprom enterprises have been presented with 529 claims and compulsory fines for delivery of defective equipment on nuclear submarines. Industrial workers have not been left in debt. While attempting to divert the needle of criticism to an alternate path, they

persistently proposed subjecting the operations of submarine crews to very thorough analysis under extreme conditions. "But you need to know how to fight the flames if a fire occurs...." is a quite transparent allusion to the Komsomolets' supplier V. Chubakin.

Today I do not want to once again weigh the parties' polemical arguments (all the more so since our industrial workers have actually done quite a bit in order to teach seamen to fight fire: There have been 16 fires on nuclear submarines associated with short circuits in the main distribution boards just in recent years). Really if the raised Komsomolets will help to establish the primary cause of the tragedy for certain, everyone will gain from this—both the designers, builders, and submariners. The fewer funerals we have in our homes the better. If only for the sake of avoiding possible future victims and to prevent similar accidents, we need to raise not one submarine but however many it takes.

The government tasked Rubin TsKB MT to become involved with this and it came to the conclusion: All proposed domestic projects do not withstand criticism. But there is perhaps one thing that unites them: The lack of preparedness of our science and industry to carry out orders and to satisfy the needs of the search and rescue service. It would have been naive to expect a different result. It has been programmed by a prolonged disdainful attitude toward the development of this service and by the residual principle for financing it. And really the fates and lives of hundreds and hundreds of people who find themselves in extreme situations stand behind this.

Thus, having "sifted through" dozens of native and foreign proposals, Rubin TsKB MT experts decided on the Dutch order. Why is it so attractive and what compelled them to make the decision to invest large amounts of money for the development of "not our" equipment?

USSR Shipbuilding Industry Deputy Minister L. Rezunov:

"First of all I will answer the 'painful' question about money. We came to an agreement with NKGO on an entirely acceptable price, considering the project's magnitude. Furthermore, Rubin will obtain hard currency from the government in the form of credit. The fact is that, according to the contract's terms, a joint venture will be formed and Rubin will become co-owner of a unique ship-raising structure after the submarine is raised. It will be utilized in the future for raising ships from great depths according to orders from Soviet and foreign organizations. Before resorting to this step, We researched demand on the world market and we became convinced of SP's [Rescue and Recovery] possibilities. Incidentally, part of the sums spent will go toward subsidizing development of a domestic deepwater ship-raising project.

Now about the Dutch proposal. The NKGO project is an entire package of new improved technologies. They want

to use aramide fiber (tvarona) cable that weighs five times less than steel and at the same time has 8 to 10 times more relative strength. We do not have such a fiber—the firm maintains its production technology a secret. Furthermore, we were also attracted by NKGO experts' certainty that they can carry out raising the Komsomolets in 1992. I want to stress that at the present time the Dutch consortium proposal is the only technically well-grounded [proposal] that can be realized during the required time period."

I could also close on this optimistic note if there was not another point of view that Vice Admiral V. Zaytsev, Chief of the Navy's Main Directorate of Operations and Repair sets forth and which, in my opinion, is so serious that it must be taken into account.

"I adhere to the fact that in this case we need to 'measure seven times' before we 'cut.' We must not forget that the submarine sank with a complete combat load that is also being quiet *for the time being*. We really need to think about what may happen if we disturb it. Of course, the probability of a disaster is very small but not so small that we can dismiss it from the calculations. In this case in my opinion, it is inadmissible to reason from positions of "with luck we will get by."

When I expressed these doubts to Admiral L. Rezunov, Leonid Nikolayevich assured me that this situation has been analyzed and totally excluded. Well, we will hope that the Dutch will present a totally safe method of resolving this unique task and that our experts will once again comprehensively study it. There is time since really only a contract to develop the project has been concluded.

Pacific Fleet Handling of Retired Vessels

90UM0792A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian Aug 90 First Edition p 2

[Article: "Millions in the Shoals"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The 10 July issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA included correspondence entitled "A Graveyard for Ships." The article centered on the Northern Fleet's decades-old inability to resolve the problem of utilizing decommissioned ships, which causes considerable harm to both the state and nature.

How is this problem being handled by the Pacific Fleet?

Long-time residents can recall that, as recently as 10 years ago, the headquarters of the Rescue Ship Division was quartered aboard the steamship "Teodor Nette." That was the very same ship known to us all from the school reader collection of Mayakovskiy's poems. However, it would be a rare person who would be able to recognize the craft as the poet did, at least not in the Kamchatka stage of the renowned ship's existence. "Blowing steam all over" as she made her way to the distant peninsula, patched again and again during her

long life, she dropped anchor here, never to move again. She later came to be used as a floating dock, and, more recently, was filled with concrete and made a part of a stationary dock, lending additional strength with her steel hull.

You could say that this is not a bad example of putting a decommissioned ship to good use. Unfortunately, this cannot be said of the large guided missile ship "Gordiy" and the destroyer "Vliyatelnyy," ships that have recently been taken out of service. They were both towed to sea and used for target practice. Several thousand tons of metal sank to the bottom of the sea all at once.

"Future generations will be smarter than we," remarked Captain 2nd Rank Nikolay Temerev, who took part in sinking the ships. "They will eventually raise the ships and have them remelted."

Are military seamen not presently interested in providing scrap metal? After all, all units are furnished a plan, one that lists ever increasing requirements.

"We have no problem reaching our quotas," explained Temerev. "Last year alone we decommissioned three large ships totalling about 5,500 tons of high-grade steel. The problem is not in amounts, but in preparation of scrap. For example, a floating crane is assigned for the sole purpose of removing armament from the ships. Everything else—dismantling, cleaning, sorting, loading—is nothing but heavy, thankless labor. The other day we settled an account amounting to 200 tons planned for the year; we received 500 rubles as payment. That comes to 2.5 rubles per ton. With such a pitiful incentive, enormous labor investment, and lack of outside help, the simplest thing to do is sink old vessels."

The lack of interest in providing scrap on the part of military units and the relentless application of administrative methods are apparently why the amount of metal going to waste on Kamchatka and Chukotka—including metal in naval ships—is estimated as heading toward the total of 700,000 tons.

In a small cove alone—located adjacent to Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy and known as the "graveyard for ships"—there are more than 30 watercraft waiting to be raised and turned into scrap. They include everything from old diesel-powered submarines to tugboats that were still made of Krupp steel. Some of them were towed there way back in the middle of the 1950s.

There seems to have come about a change in thinking relative to this rusting "property," with a special salvage detachment organized to clean up the area. This is a blessing, a visible advantage of the "new thinking." However, the detachment has been assigned only two ancient prime movers that are in such poor condition that they themselves seem ready for the scrap heap. Also constituting a sorry sight are homemade floats, kerosene-fueled cutters and other equipment put together by workers that the detachment has to make do with for want of something better. Captain-Lieutenant Nikolay

Minakov, detachment chief engineer, dreams of somehow obtaining a tank recovery vehicle fitted with a 75-ton winch. It would pay for itself with interest, in foreign exchange, at that. After all, almost all the Far East metal is exported. To Japan, primarily.

Well, this is not the first time personnel afloat must take on someone's else's troubles. They can do a little of this and a little of that, and even speak intelligently on refining metals. I just hope that we do not forget our main business—naval science—in the process.

(Captain 2nd Rank M. Lukanin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent)

A Necessary Epilogue

The editors have been informed by the Material Resources Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Material Resources and Planning Department of the Navy that in ports, bases, and adjacent areas there is an accumulation of hundreds of watercraft, including vessels that were sunk way back during the war. If the truth is to be known, this should not be a headache for military seamen. Officially speaking, enterprises of the USSR Ministry of Metallurgy should take over the task of dismantling ships. However, there is no modern ship dismantling base. In the country there are four low-capacity ship dismantling shops—at Sevastopol, Riga, Murmansk, and Leningrad—that receive from the Navy for dismantling three or four vessels a year. In the Pacific Ocean basin there are no such enterprises at all.

The existing situation is a result of USSR government plans that were not carried out. They called for operational readiness by 1985 of ship dismantling enterprises in Murmansk Oblast and in the Maritime Province. Output was to have been 60,000 and 100,000 tons, respectively. It was planned to achieve this needed output as early as the end of the present five-year plan, but the construction ministries did not pick up their end of the arrangement. In this connection, plans call for increasingly greater annual outputs, with the Navy required to furnish 25 percent more than the preceding year. Another government order issued in 1988 calls for development of ship dismantling bases in the 1990s, including the creation of a joint Soviet-American enterprise, with branches located in a number of maritime theaters. These remain as projects for the future.

There is no choice but to use local resources to dismantle decommissioned ships. The Ministry of Defense has exhibited initiative in this regard. However, the methods in use are primitive. Alas!—in the country no efficient equipment is being developed and manufactured for wide use for these purposes.

The matter is complicated by the fact that existing pricing of metal scrap and the rates of payment do nothing to justify the expenditures involved. This kind of "economy" may safely be called short-sighted, for it leads to enormous losses. The central finance organs should state their opinion of this.

The above and other problems associated with the preparation and transfer of recycled metallurgical materials should be resolved without delay. They have assumed the highest state interest. Speaking in general, it is necessary to set up in the next few years, within the framework of the state conversion program, developed and efficient production that would return to the economy not only metal, but other materials that are also still used as scrap. This should include more than ships that are taken out of service.

This would appear to be of primary interest to the government of the USSR. We are speaking about millions of rubles lying in shoals. It is more difficult to remove the money from there than it is to simply obtain it from the populace by increasing prices, of course. Nevertheless, this is something that can be done if we put our minds to it!

Submarine Officers' Attitudes Toward Shorter-Term Contract Service

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11 Aug 90 First Edition p 2*

[Interview with Captain 1st Rank L. Rogulev, a task force chief of staff, Captain 2nd Rank A. Skirtach, senior assistant to the chief of staff, and Captain 2nd Rank A. Selivanov, a shore base commander, by Black Sea Fleet Permanent Correspondent Captain 2nd Rank V. Pasyakin: "Service by Contract"]

[Text] The Main Naval Staff has developed proposals to man individual units with seaman and petty officers who have concluded contacts with the Ministry of Defense to extend service in the Navy by 2.5 years. The draft experiment has been submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet in a package of documents on the transition from a three-year to a two-year term of service in the Navy. Our Black Sea Fleet Permanent Correspondent Captain 2nd Rank V. Pasyakin visited a submarine task force in which this contract service variant will be tested. He talked with Captain 1st Rank L. Rogulev, task force chief of staff, Captain 2nd Rank A. Skirtach, senior assistant to the chief of staff, and Captain 2nd Rank A. Selivanov, shore base commander.

[Pasyakin] The draft "Regulation on Naval Seamen and Petty Officer Performance of Active Military Service Under Contract" is a quite voluminous document. Therefore, I propose we dwell on those factors that are most interesting to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers. For example, the time periods of the experiment....

[Skirtach] The future "volunteers" will be "recruited" from the Spring and Autumn 1991 draft contingent who have graduated from Navy training detachments. Consequently, the experiment will last until the spring and autumn of 1994.

[Pasyakin] Who will be afforded the right to conclude contracts?

[Skirtach] Unit commanders who are equivalent to regimental or 2nd rank ship commanders or higher and also commanders who enjoy equal disciplinary rights with them and who have the right to issue orders.

[Pasyakin] The question which perhaps is most often met in reader mail relates to monetary salaries....

[Skirtach] It will depend on the service region, ship class (surface ship or submarine), specialty, and certain other factors. We have calculations by Naval Financial Services Monetary Allowances Section Chief Major V. Kabernik. I will name the low and high limits—from 150 to 300 rubles (obviously, even more in the Northern Fleet). Incidentally, this will not result in an increase of the Ministry of Defense budget—funds for the experiment will be released during the course of the second stage of the Armed Forces reduction. I must say that we envision the following monetary salary distribution procedure: A serviceman will be handed 50 percent of his salary. The remainder will be entered in the military unit current account that is designated for safekeeping of servicemen's personal savings. After two years of service, 70 percent of the salary will be handed out. Furthermore, unit commanders are authorized to issue money from salaries for acquisition of personal items for servicemen who are examples in service and also when they depart on leave and to transfer money from a servicemen's salary to his family or parents. Complete settling of accounts will occur upon release into the reserve or upon abrogation of the contract.

[Pasyakin] What benefits are stipulated for servicemen who perform service in accordance with the contract?

[Skirtach] Payment of a lump sum monetary allowance in the size of one month's salary is envisioned. After two years of service—release from the unit location at the end of the work day and also a 30 day leave not including travel time. After completion of service according to the contract, those desiring to can transfer to extended service or can enter a military school without having to compete.

[Pasyakin] Can a serviceman abrogate the contract?

[Skirtach] The draft Regulation provides for abrogation of the contract for the following reasons: By application of the servicemen themselves in the presence of valid reasons, state of health, and also incompatibility with the service, lack of discipline, or as a result of a conviction by a court for a crime committed. Without going into details, I will say that in the last three cases we foresee repayment to the State of part of the monetary allowances paid to them and other sanctions. These measures are normal practice in armies where people serve under contract.

[Pasyakin] The future experiment participants are still far from the Navy. And how do those serving today regard its conditions?

[Skirtach] We conducted a poll of seaman and petty officers in nine submarine crews. The overwhelming majority reacted favorably to the experiment. And 30 percent of those polled stated that they would sign a contract under these conditions....

[Rogulev] In my opinion, at first we should conclude contracts not with seamen who will enlist from training detachments in 1991 but with those who have already served and who have proven themselves [to ensure] the experiment's purity. I think the interrelationship between experienced crew specialists and those taking their first steps as "professionals" could have a negative impact on the results of the experiment.

[Pasyakin] Obviously, this is not the only comment or suggestion that has arisen in the task force during the course of studying the draft Regulation...

[Rogulev] We think that it is necessary to establish lump sum compensation according to annual results to the most outstanding seamen in the size of half or full pay. Furthermore, since seamen will wear an officer's cap with a conscript serviceman's emblem, we need to provide for seamen to wear extended service sleeve rank and also low quarters [shoes] during the summer. These and other proposals have been sent to the Main Naval Staff....

[Pasyakin] The experiment's success depends in many ways on the task force's readiness to receive "volunteers" and to create living conditions for them....

[Selivanov] We can fence off a place for crew quarters in the barracks and we can set up four place tables in the mess hall for those who are serving under contract....

[Rogulev] I think that we nevertheless have difficulties with housing issues. We will hardly be able to create suitable conditions for the future contract submariners through our own efforts....

Many questions arose after my conversation with task force personnel for which I also did not find answers. For example, why do they propose to pay submariners completing service under contract only a certain portion of their monetary salaries? Is this not an infringement of their rights? It remains unclear how their life style will be organized. From a conversation with Captain I. Kutafin I learned that a large part of the barracks fund is undergoing major repair and the time periods for its completion is difficult to predict. Buildings are overcrowded and the matter has been reduced to the point that some crews live on submarines even when they are in port (the plan for these boats did not at all provide for this). Many problems with military discipline in the collective remain unresolved to this day. Will this not become a cause of tension between the seamen and petty officers of these crews and those who will arrive to serve under contract? In short, much can be said about the purity of the experiment but the main thing is about its results.

I wanted to ascertain the task force commander's opinion on all of this but I did not succeed in doing so. Despite a preliminary agreement, Captain 1st Rank F. Pogorelov avoided the conversation. This is particularly troubling since we are not talking about an elementary physics experiment in a school laboratory, let us say, but about the future of our Navy and we are actually searching for approaches to the future. And while the Regulation exists in draft we need to more comprehensively discuss it and make the necessary corrections to it. The Navy and this specific task force simply do not have the right to fail in this experiment.

Discussion Group on Recent Problems of Conversion

90UM0657A Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 11, Jun 90
(signed to press 31 May 90) pp 45-50

[Roundtable discussion: "Conversion: Gains and Losses"]

[Text] The problems of conversion have recently become an object of heightened debate. The liberally inclined intellectuals, and not only they, have adopted disarmament and the related reorientation of economic policy as a panacea against all our economic troubles. Their opponents have rejected the idea of conversion, viewing it as a threat to state security in a rather complex international situation. Who is right? Is our society ready for a reasonable, gradual conversion of "defense" from the output of military products to peacetime ones? What is the strategy of conversion and what are its scale and paths? Many economists have endeavored to find answers to these and other questions. We invite our readers to become participants in a roundtable discussion held at the journal's editorial offices. Participating in it were military scientists including Doctor of Economic Sciences, Col N.F. Karasev (leader), candidates of economic sciences, Cols V.I. Martynenko and V.A. Staropolov and the Deputy General Director of the Central Scientific-Production Association Vypmel, Candidate of Economic Sciences V.P. Bakhar.

[N. Karasev] Conversion in our nation has assumed a noticeable acceleration after the conclusion of the Treaty on Medium- and Shorter-Range Missiles and this has brought about a reduction in military production in 1988 and 1989 and, as a consequence, reduced the allocations for the USSR Ministry of Defense for the purchase of military equipment. The State Plan for the USSR Economic and Social Development in 1990 provides a further decline in military production. A State Program for Conversion of the Defense Industry for 1991-1995 has been worked out.

Essentially, this is a fine undertaking. There will be a gradual escape from the burden of military expenditures and the functioning of the national economy will be normalized. The disproportions engendered by militarization will be eliminated and enormous additional resources will be released that are essential for carrying out large-scale social tasks.

However, it must not be forgotten that the idea of conversion and its aims cannot be realized automatically. It is known, for example, that the initial stage in the present conversion has had a somewhat spontaneous nature and the quotas for it have been a complete surprise for many defense industry enterprises. A number of defense orders were canceled in the first and second quarter and this confronted the production leaders with serious difficulties. For example, the converting of production to produce medium-complexity articles, for instance a refrigerator, takes a year or two and certainly it is also essential to find the suppliers of

raw materials and preassembled parts as well as retrain the workers and specialists. The difficulties were made even greater because the start of the conversion coincided with the switching of the "post office boxes" to new methods of management. That is, we were experiencing what had been repeatedly found in our history—the lack of preparation for an important political decision and the wagering on a "cavalry attack"...

[V. Staropolov] Let us turn to the State Program for the Conversion of the Defense Industry for 1991-1995. This takes into account two fundamental aspects. The first is the maximum preservation of production capacity of the defense enterprises. Here the reduction in the output of weapons and military equipment should be compensated for by an increase in the output of the most important civilian products and consumer goods. Secondly, conversion was to be carried out without halting production. These givens, as we see, raise a number of problems for the production workers of "maintaining" and "increasing" but also "without halting." Here is something to reflect on...

The basic national economic sectors have been designated the development of which is to come primarily from capacity released in the conversion process. These are the output of equipment for the processing sectors of the APK [agroindustrial complex], light industry, trade and public dining, nonfood consumer goods, electronics, computers, medical equipment and communications equipment. Among the clients are the ministries of civil aviation, maritime transport and the fishing industry. For example, conversion creates prerequisites for emerging in the 13th Five-Year Plan to the complete satisfaction of the demand of civil aviation for aircraft. It will provide a significant rise in electronics products with the doubling of the production volume over the following 5 years, including the production of personal computers which will increase by 5-fold and computer equipment by 3-fold. Production of the means of communication will increase by 80 percent.

Of important significance is the circumstance that the defense plant collectives are highly organized and well coordinated collectives which have been tested for carrying out crucial assignments for developing military equipment. As they say, the bet is being placed on them.

[N. Karasev] But on this question there are also other viewpoints....

[V. Bakhar] I, for example, have serious concerns that the conversion program may end up to be the next paper "much ado about nothing" precisely because it has been organized according to the principle of "do what you can" rather than "do what is necessary." Just how acute this problem is we can see from our first contacts with the foreign market. Since in the conversion of the defense sectors, it is a question of significant investments with a long-term goal, the development of the domestic market is extremely essential.

Reference information. In 1989, the enterprises of the defense complex delivered 100 percent of the national production volume of television sets, home sewing machines, more than 97 percent of the refrigerators and tape recorders, over one-half of the motorcycles and around 70 percent of the electric vacuums and washing machines.

[V. Staropolov] All the same, I feel that the State Program is properly focused in involving the defense complex in a significantly larger number of national economic endeavors. Certainly, the revising of the basic principles of secrecy toward greater openness creates real conditions for a broad exchange of scientific and technical achievements, primarily between the defense and civilian industrial sectors.

There is also the viewpoint that supposedly we should not switch the released capacity to producing equipment for the APK, light industry, trade and public dining, but rather it must be switched to products which are technically more complex and closer to the specialty. There is a rational core in such an approach. But the circumstance must also be considered that the nation's economy is in a critical state (this involves first of all agriculture and the saturating of the market with goods) and correspondingly the measures for improving it should be emergency ones designed to resolve the problem in 2 or 3 years.

[N. Karasev] Putting it briefly, "Let's have conversion!".... Unfortunately, the first analysis of the gains and losses from this process shows that we will intensely initiate the next campaign which has been worked out little from the scientific viewpoint. In such a grandiose undertaking, is it really possible to measure the prospects in 2 or 3 years for the sake of eliminating the emergency situation in the economy? What about after this?

[V. Martynenko] I share this concern. In contrast to many countries which now for an extended time have been working out the economic, legal, social and specifically the military aspects of conversion, we have started it without as yet having either a serious theoretical foundation or sound plans and programs. The practice of conversion is moving rapidly forward and for now with just one goal of closing the breaches in the economy as quickly as possible and at any price.

And so turning up in our stores are shovels made from titanium with an admixture of the particularly valuable alloy, and bottle-washing machines are developed for which the military plants "charge" 50,000 rubles instead of the former 11,000 (more expensive materials and production methods). One can understand the amazement of workers and engineers at the Yenakiyevo Metallurgical Plant who were instructed to manufacture reinforcing rod, beams and angle iron from...tank armor. Previously, these articles were produced from scrap metal and now the plant has been given 400 tanks for reprocessing at 35 rubles a ton....

[V. Bakhar] Let us emphasize the obvious: from the standpoint of the defense industry sectors and the individual enterprises, no matter how eloquent the words about this might be, conversion is economically disadvantageous. Here is why.

The short-term socioeconomic goals of the enterprises and sectors are in contradiction to the long-term economic goals of the national economy as a whole. The only method for resolving the problem globally is coordinate the goals and create an economic interest for the enterprises, giving them tax advantages and doing this in legislation. Equally important is the problem of the lack of sufficient capacity among the enterprises. On the one hand, the centralized capital investments have been sharply reduced and on the other the hands of the enterprises have been tied by the rigid tax rates and the state (and not the market) price formation system.

[N. Karasev] What ways for resolving these problems are seen by the supporters of conversion?

[V. Bakhar] In this situation, it seems logical to abandon taxation on that portion of the profit which the converted enterprises use for the purpose of converting production. In our opinion, this benefit should be stipulated in the USSR Law Governing Taxation.

A solution to the conversion problems to a significant degree could be aided by developing foreign economic ties for the enterprises in the defense sectors of industry. Above all, this would be the delivery to foreign markets of production and technical-end articles, individual assemblies and parts, certain types of consumer goods which are in demand on the foreign market but are not so scarce in our nation, on the basis of barter agreements (the selling of goods for other goods between our organizations and foreign ones.—Editors), and the placing of these orders with capacity released in conversion virtually without any change in its structure. Such contacts do not require additional capital investments and they produce very high profitability due to the great gap in the rates of convertible currency and the ruble, the difference in wholesale prices at which the goods are purchased abroad and the retail ones at which the good is sold in our country. They make it possible in a short period of time to resolve a triune problem: to load up idled or inefficiently used production capacity; to provide consumer goods for the domestic market, including for the workers of the defense sectors; to earn money and acquire the essential production equipment for organizing the output of new consumer goods at enterprises of the defense complex. This method of foreign economic ties can be implemented faster than others.

The second direction is to organize joint enterprises with foreign firms for producing technically complex consumer goods or particularly scarce production- and technical-end products such as personal computers, photocopy equipment, automation systems, communications equipment and other articles.

[V. Martynenko] Contact with "overseas" is of course a good thing. However, we should not forget the dealings of the ANT [Tupolev] concern which tried to sell 14 tanks abroad and was discussing the sale of a batch of MiG-29 aircraft. I do not link this directly to conversion. But the very fact of the uncontrolled sale of defense sector products is alarming.

Also disconcerting is the noticed dangerous trend of dispersing the released materiel to various ministries. At present, this trend can be intensified in line with the conversion to territorial cost accounting with conversion beginning to be engaged in actively but not always intelligently by local party, soviet and economic bodies which frequently focus all attention solely on the technical and economic aspects of operations of the defense industry enterprises.

Reference information. In 1990, according to the plan they will produce some 1.28 billion rubles worth of equipment for medical needs. By the end of the 13th Five-Year Plan, the production of this equipment will more than double and in 1995, will be 2.8 billion rubles.

[N. Karasev] One is struck by the fact that with the broad and active social discussion of conversion, the question of our state's military-economic potential has remained completely untouched. Clearly, with the halt in the output of certain types of weapons, military production objectively is still required. But certainly this is a system which in its present form is actually being destroyed under the conditions of conversion. Consequently, simultaneously with halting the operation of certain elements of military production we must recreate an integrated system of the remaining structures for producing weapons and combat equipment. I consider this one of the important elements in the statewide program of conversion. Otherwise there can be the premature and unjustified collapse of the military-industrial complex which creates the material basis for our state's defense capability.

[V. Staroplov] The conversion mechanism should also take into account purely financial aspects. Up to the present, the financial situation of the defense industry was sufficiently stable. The production of weapons and military equipment was dependably financed from the state budget. The required amount of weapons was at times achieved at a price of any expenditure. Certainly in developing weapons in the forefront was the achieving of superiority for various combat performance.

Under the conditions of conversion, we must not allow that the expenditure method of management be transferred to producing civilian products and become a source for their increased cost which is not compensated for by higher quality. For this reason a most important demand on the economic mechanism of conversion is the giving of an antiexpenditure nature to it. Such a mechanism can be fully realized under the conditions of eliminating the deficit and satisfying commodity demands. For now, the solution to this problem clearly

should follow the path of setting up state control over prices, particularly contractual ones and limiting their upper level.

[N. Karasev] Let us approach this problem from the other side, that is, from the standpoint of the demands and prospects of radical economic reform with one of the cornerstones being, as is known, full cost accounting on the basis of self-financing. There has been alarmingly little elaboration of the questions of financing the defense plants under conversion conditions. And at the same time, there has been a sharp deterioration in the financial situation of the defense plants undergoing conversion. Certainly this is an economic anti-incentive for conversion. Under the conditions of the planned decisive break in the command-administrative system of economic management, such a situation objectively cannot be left overlooked.

[V. Bakhar] I would emphasize that there is an entire group of problems which must be encountered in carrying out conversion. This is linked with the special economic relations and the organization of the production of military equipment. First of all, there is the focusing of the development and production on achieving the result, for the questions of cost remain in the background. This is due to the fact that the defense sectors largely develop and produce unique equipment with a short production run. The orientation of such production requires the maintaining of developed experimental facilities, subdivisions for preparing production and this entails a high level of overhead.

[V. Staroplov] On this question there are, in my mind, some good ideas. In particular, it has been proposed that the state order for producing civilian products be placed on a voluntary, competitive and economically advantageous basis for the defense enterprises. With the aid of a flexible system of standards, taxes, benefits, prices, interest rates and payments for resources, the state should interest the defense enterprises in producing the types of products which are most essential for the state at the given moment. For example, setting preferential standards for enterprises working to develop a new type of product. During the period of this development, subsidies from the centralized funds of the ministries and the state are possible.

It is essential to bear in mind the enormous reserves for reducing production outlays in the defense sectors on the basis of increasing the volume of consumer goods output.

For example, the Moscow Kommunar Association, in addition to its main product, makes the Chayka vacuum cleaners. Here every day they manufacture 1,200 vacuums. The annual output is 340,000 units. In its plan the collective has outlined measures to develop a new model which is up to world standards and in the near future to significantly increase the output of this product. The Production Association Krasnoyarsk Machine Building Plant imeni V.I. Lenin has increased the output of the

Biryusa make refrigerators and compressors, which are known not only in our nation but also abroad, up to a high pace with a refrigerator coming off the plant conveyor every 20 seconds and a compressor every 12 seconds. As a whole, consumer goods production in 1990 will be brought up to 306 million rubles.

Major reserves are to be found in the successfully chosen form of organizing production and this also can substantially influence the market and the financial situation of the defense enterprises. We feel that the enterprise itself should determine along what path it is to develop. For some defense enterprises, primarily the planned loss ones, this can be converting to a lease. For some, production cooperation [subcontracting], the second model of cost accounting, is acceptable as well as the creating of joint enterprises with foreign firms.

[V. Bakhar] In developing this idea, let me say that the solution to the problem would be aided by organizing within the NPO [scientific-production association] and PO [production association] of the defense sectors individual, economically independent enterprises oriented at producing consumer goods. The basic production of the defense complex must be aimed at delivering the technologically most complex assemblies and components to industry.

Now about production cooperation. In producing weapons and military equipment, its structure will differ substantially from the organizing of production cooperation for consumer goods. The forming of new production cooperation ties has now become a problem. The command-administrative methods no longer operate and the ministry is no assistant. On the other hand, a cooperative market has still not come into being and the methods of reconciling economic interests (particularly under the conditions of taxation on the wage fund) have not yet been worked out. It is essential to bear in mind the fact that for organizing the new production, the enterprises themselves should invest significant, if not all the funds.

Clearly, it would be advisable to establish joint stock enterprises where the controlling shares would belong to the state enterprises and with the involvement of funds from the commercial banks and the public. Such a joint stock enterprise would be based on a concern which brings together the basic products of the producers regardless of their departmental affiliation.

Reference information. In 1989, the output of military equipment for the defense complex was 95.5 percent of the 1988 volume (prior to conversion growth was 105.5 percent), while the production of civilian products rose to 108.9 percent against 105.7 percent prior to conversion. In 1990, this trend will be maintained and will be 95.3 percent of the previous year for the output of military products and 113.1 percent for civilian products.

[N. Karasev] In the course of conversion, a mechanism should also be worked out for transferring the results of the defense scientific research and experimental design

(R&D) into the civilian sectors. Each year, the defense industry turns over to other sectors up to 100,000 sets of documents, however the return from them is not great. Vladimir Anatolyevich [Staropolov], what do you feel are the reasons for such a situation?

[V. Staropolov] In the first place, the developers of new equipment have not been interested in providing practical aid to introduce it considering the particular features of one or another type of production. Secondly, the secrecy of the work being carried out was a substantial impediment for the more efficient use of the scientific and technical achievements of the defense sector. Thirdly, the technical level of the civilian enterprises at times does not allow the introduction of the proposed plans. The transfer carried out of a number of the enterprises of the Minlegpishchemash [Ministry of Light and Food Industry Machine Building] to the defense sectors disclosed the depth of the technological lag of civilian machine building behind defense. The share of precision casting, for example, was 18 percent there and 85 percent at the defense plants, while stamping was respectively 16 and 55 percent. Under these conditions, it is essential to make maximum use of the economic capabilities of the new economic mechanism and broaden direct ties, contractual relations and mutually advantageous cooperation in producing technically complex civilian-end products.

[N. Karasev] The military people naturally are interested in how conversion will be reflected on the socioeconomic conditions of their life. Vladimir Ivanovich [Marty-nenko], you have investigated this problem. Please say a little about the results.

[V. Martynenko] According to the Decree of the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies "On the Basic Directions of USSR Domestic and Foreign Policy," conversion should not have any direct impact on the imperial and domestic conditions of the servicemen and their families. All the resources released in carrying out conversion should be channeled in increasing the output of consumer goods, equipment for light industry and the APK, improving trade, public dining and public health. The servicemen and the members of their families on equal footing with other citizens of the nation will make full use of the results of the increased efficiency in the operation of these national economic spheres. At the same time, the Congress resolved to use a portion of the funds released in line with the cutback in the Armed Forces for improving the material and domestic conditions of the servicemen and the members of their families.

The decision on precisely what "part" this would be was turned over to the USSR Supreme Soviet and it adopted a series of proposals of the Ministry of Defense for increasing pay, introducing additional payments for a class rating and for standing alert duty as well as a procedure for compensating for expenditures to rent housing and so forth.

It must be pointed out that many deputies were literally amazed learning that a significant number of officer families lives below the poverty line. We have always felt that the work of the military was one of the most highly paid. But over the last 20-25 years, the standard of living of officers has declined both in absolute terms, from the viewpoint of the volume of consumed material goods, and relatively in comparison with the standard of living of the civilian population. These somewhat unexpected conclusions were reached by a group of scientists from the Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin. The recent salary increase for a majority of the officers only partially compensated for the inflation, increased prices and the complicating of the housing problem over the last year or 18 months.

However, it would not be completely correct to rely solely on an increase in the budget allocations for solving the problems under the conditions of the very complex economic situation in the nation. The Armed Forces and their economy have enormous reserves which with a rational approach can be used for material incentives of military labor.

Generally speaking, conversion is conversion and it is up to the military themselves to be concerned with their own economy.

Of course, the roundtable discussion has not raised all the vexing problems related to conversion. They must still be thoroughly studied in order to turn the developing process of the planned conversion of our military enterprises to the broad-scale output of peaceful products into a scientifically based direction in economic policy.

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Defense Clothing Supply Plan Underfulfilled

90UM0780A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Jul 90 First Edition p 4

[Question by Major G. Sviridov, and response by Major-General R. Zubov, entitled: "Barefoot in the Ranks?"]

[Text] What is the situation concerning the supply of clothing for the Ministry of Defense? Can it be true that enterprises in a number of republics are refusing to manufacture military uniforms?

Major G. Sviridov

Major-General R. Zubov, deputy chief of the Central Clothing Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense:

—The 1989 clothing procurement plan fell short by 36.5 million rubles as 26 enterprises failed to fill orders for 43 different items. During the first quarter of this year the plan is again experiencing a shortfall, this time involving 22 enterprises and 28 items.

Consequently, there has been a noticeable tendency to consistently undersupply state orders which the government made up expressly for the supply of clothing goods to the USSR Armed Forces.

Enterprises subordinate to the RSFSR Ministry of Light Industry and the Moscow City Executive Committee have effectively cut off the supply of campaign ribbons, citations, stars and other insignia.

The Estonian SSR Council of Ministers has rejected the Ministry of Defense's 1990 order across the board.

If earlier there were carry over reserves of clothing goods at central, district and troop warehouses, which permitted military personnel to receive authorized items as needed, such reserves no longer exist.

The primary reason for shortfalls in delivery and the refusal by enterprises to enter into contracts is the low profit margin in manufacturing clothing.

In filling Ministry of Defense orders under the new economic conditions it is advisable to confer the status of a government purchase when ordering military clothing items, as well as the fabrics, accessories, and raw materials which go into their manufacture, having first made filling military orders more profitable. This would have the effect of giving military orders priority over other orders, making mandatory the filling of such orders, and holding an enterprise's management economically accountable.

Return of Precious Metals to Civilian Economy

90UM0813A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Jul 90
Morning Edition p 8

[Article by USSR Ministry of Defense Press Center Associate N. Medvedev: "Gold? From the Army?"; first two paragraphs are IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] The government has set a considerably higher quota for this year's return of precious metals by the Ministry of Defense. In this connection, in the first six months of the year, military units turned over to the state 40 percent more gold than in the same period last year. The amounts of silver and platinum surrendered were greater by a fourth and 1.5 times, respectively. Expressed in general monetary terms, this represents millions of rubles.

How is it that the Army and Navy are in possession of precious metals? Colonel G. Semenov, a branch chief in the USSR Ministry of Defense's Material Resources Directorate, explains.

We do not have any precious metals in the "pure" form, of course. The defense industry uses them in devices and items of equipment to enhance reliability and durability. In minute quantities, of course. But the total volume used is considerable. Thus, one fighter plane model "contains" 512 grams of gold, 17 kilograms and 183 grams of silver, and 69 grams of platinum.

This year, we are to turn over to the treasury a substantial amount of "treasures" presently in the hands of the Ministry of Defense. How does this come about? Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles are being destroyed in compliance with the INF treaty. Components and systems that cannot be otherwise utilized have already yielded almost 4 tons of silver, 30 kilograms of platinum, and more than 20 kilograms of gold. Equipment and armaments that have suffered obsolescence or deterioration in operational readiness are taken out of service and recycled. Primary effort goes into removing components that contain precious metals, an activity common to virtually all the Armed Forces. Unfortunately, the country does not manufacture any equipment that can be employed for this express purpose. That is why we must limit ourselves to the use of screwdrivers, pliers, and snips.

Strictly speaking, all activities that have anything to do with recycling of military equipment should be the responsibility of the government. We—the military—are still the ones charged with that. The "graveyard" of combat ships continues to increase, but the finger of blame is pointed at the Navy, of course. There are mountains of scrap that should be hauled away from military units, but once again the military is accused of lack of order. Technically, this is true. But dismantling of a ship for scrap is quite an undertaking for military seamen. There simply are no tools or equipment available.

We have a problem with turning scrap over to Vortsvetmet organizations, which tend to set conditions we cannot satisfy. As a result, property continues to rust away. Another problem is recovery of precious metals. It would be much more advantageous to ship devices to specialized state enterprises for removal and disassembly of parts containing these metals. This is not the way it is being done. What we should be turning in is scrap containing precious metals, extraction of which is exceedingly labor-intensive. The only dispensation we received was from the Monchegorsk Severonikel combine, which is willing to accept assembled devices. Enterprises generally do not wish to take in scrap if it does not meet their requirements.

There is a definite need for state enterprises to accept scrap and waste containing precious metals without imposition of any constraints. This will make it possible to effect a considerable increase in the flow of these metals into state resources.

Col Gen Vorontsov Notes Shortage of Transport Equipment

*90UM0813B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Aug 90 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Col Gen Yu. Vorontsov, chief, Central Military Transportation Directorate, USSR Ministry of Defense: "Economics of Military Transportation"; first paragraph is KRSNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] We all spend some time thinking about roads and highways, including railroads, with their arteries supporting our country's vital activities. Military transportation organs play no small role in this. Incidentally, today is Railwayman's Day, and it is their professional holiday, also. They carry out a number of specialized tasks, especially delivery of military units and subunits to training areas, camps, training centers, and training grounds; they carry personnel in times of call-up and discharge from military service, and perform other tasks.

We are making changes in our work as a result of the rapid transformations occurring in the political, economic, and social spheres of our country's life. They are so significant that they warrant this discussion.

One of the most difficult and responsible tasks facing us today is preparing for the withdrawal of troops from Eastern European countries and Mongolia. The schedule calls for withdrawing this year and in the first six months of the coming year several hundreds of thousands of persons from Hungary and Czechoslovakia alone. This includes military personnel and their families, blue and white collar workers, and tens of thousands of pieces of equipment. It is estimated that moving troops and supplies from the Central Group of Forces by rail alone will require the use of more than 62,000 freight cars and flatcars, all of which will comprise 1,800 military trains. Movements from the Southern Group of Forces will amount to something less than that.

This undertaking is associated with substantial difficulties, which started back in March. The decision was made to go ahead, but all military transportation operations had already been planned for the year. We had to make changes as we went along. We are still unable to effect smooth operations. The degree to which border transfer points are occupied with incoming import freight has a telling effect on us. There are times when thousands of freight cars pile up at the points.

All groups of forces are experiencing an acute shortage of containers, the supply of which covers only about a fourth of our requirement. This is due primarily to the reduced shipments of goods made in the USSR. Returning home in addition to military personnel are civilian specialists that were working in Eastern European countries.

We have received and are still receiving much help from the Ministry of Railways, where special operations teams have been set up to take care of any problems that may arise. Necessary repairs were made, particularly on the Lvov Railroad, and improvements realized. Thus, forces were joined to set up service by 20 shuttle trains. In each one there are 10 cars that can be readjusted for the Western European gauge from the union gauge and vice-versa. This brought about a considerable reduction in volume of transfer operations carried out at the Ministry of Defense transshipment base and permits timely dispatch of freight, particularly that of a hazardous nature.

Nevertheless, the workload and scheduling are gruelling. New problems are added to the old ones, such as the shortage of "empties." For example, in the period of 10 to 20 July, 2,912 box cars arrived at the yards of the Lvov Railroad from other railroads, but only 480 of them were in serviceable condition.

Also telling is the levying of other urgent tasks on military transportation organs, such as delivering motor transport battalions to crop harvest areas. The first phase of this operation - assembling and dispatching 400 trains carrying personnel and equipment - is essentially completed. However, we all know that the harvesting of abundant crops constitutes quite a problem. The government has decided to make more trucks available so that all the crops can be removed from the fields. We are faced with the task of delivering on a priority basis 20 motor transport battalions on top of the 70 previously put together. Some of them will be taken from groups of forces, something that will cause certain difficulties, since railroads located in the western areas of the country are presently overloaded. In addition, ahead of us are new movements necessitated by change in the "geography" of the harvest labors.

I am of the firm opinion that the conditions attending military reform, reduction in the Armed Forces, and conversion of military production will endow the economics of transportation with heightened importance. One can easily see that excessive yard time is one of the causes of the car shortage. Yard time is especially long in military construction organizations, which incur for the Ministry of Defense 40 percent of all fines. Guilty here are PVO [Air Defense] and VVS [Air Force] units, the Far Eastern and Transbaykal military districts, and the Northern Fleet. There is another cause for concern. Yard time was decreasing steadily at the rate of five percent per year for several years, but last year it remained the same as the year before.

Also necessitating review is the system of providing the Armed Forces with the requisite commodities. Large losses are incurred due to the large amount of inefficient cross-hauling of equipment, fuels, and materials. For example, a Baltic Military District unit commanded by Colonel N. Yudin receives rail shipments of motor vehicles from the Moscow, Volga-Ural, and Siberian military districts, then dispatches the freight in the opposite direction - to Arkhangelsk and Vladivostok. For only four shipments made in June of this year, the increase in transportation costs alone amounted to more than 10,000 rubles. This is not a rare occurrence.

In addition, the Military Transportation Service will definitely be affected by current and future changes that are occurring in our economy as a result of the trend toward a market economy. For example, organizational and structural reorganizations that are in progress in the Ministry of Railways have resulted in a reduction in number of railroad divisions. Some rail lines have replaced the dispatcher's office with an automatic dispatch center. This made it necessary for us to introduce

in some cases round-the-clock supervision by VOSO [Military Transportation Service] officers.

The changes effected have the purpose of rendering freight receivers and freight senders more materially responsible for noncompliance with transportation plans, excessive yard time of rolling stock, and failure to honor contractual agreements to speed up spur track traffic.

At the same time, the cost of a number of services, such as rail car leases, service travel tickets, and others, is increasing. Also raised is the question of possible elimination of or payment for car exchange yards, of which there is quite a number in the Ministry of Defense. It must be stated that Ministry of Defense organizations and enterprises do work that is quite peculiar to them. This includes conditions attending operation of restricted installations, compressed construction periods, and large number of special-purpose zones. Due to these and other reasons, it is imperative that the car exchange yard be retained. The car payment schedules proposed by the MPS [Ministry of Railways] will result in increasing the Ministry of Defense's budget by tens of millions of rubles. Problems such as that abound.

Our work will also be affected by worsening of the socio-political situation in a particular area of the country. We can all recall the stoppage on the Azerbaijan Railroad that occurred at the end of last year and beginning of this year. It was a severe test for VOSO officers. The skillful actions of Colonel V. Martynenko, the chief of the Military Transportation Service of that line, made it possible to make a count of all cars carrying construction materials that remained at the stations and effect rapid movement of military trains protected by guards to the unloading point. Major V. Kasyanenko, the officer in charge of the Nakhichevan line section and station, coped very well with the difficult situation.

In military transportation organs there are many such officers who discharge their duty with honor. Their efforts are directed toward timely satisfaction of all Armed Forces requirements, thus promoting combat readiness.

Conversion in Aviation Industry Discussed

904D0204A Moscow SOVETSKAYA TORGOVLYA
in Russian 7 Aug 90 p 1

[Article by Viktor Aleksandrovich Zelenov, chief of the Economics Main Administration of the Ministry of the Aviation Industry, as reported by A. Veryuzhskiy: "The Conversion: The Aviation Industry Version"]

[Text] Viktor Aleksandrovich Zelenov is the chief of the Economics Main Administration of the Ministry of the Aviation Industry. And naturally, his account deals with the subject of deepest concern today for this sector of the defense complex—the conversion, its progress, the problems and initial results.

"I should begin by saying that it is precisely the successes of aviation and space exploration which bring countries and continents closer together and enable people to feel that the earth is our common home," Viktor Aleksandrovich said.

So the conquest of distances, considering that the concept of "conquest" here is not the example of the "conquest of nature" in the dictionary, is very much to the point. By beginning as a campaign, without a program that was economically well calculated and scientifically substantiated (and it still is not), the conversion nearly turned everything upside down in our very strong and advanced industrial complex as well. What should we have been concerned with? Well, primarily with the changeover of the major capacities relieved of military orders to the production of civil aircraft and aircraft engines, of course. After all, there is already a severe shortage of them in the country.

According to our calculations, Aeroflot was unable to meet the demand of 20 million people for air service last year, which is equivalent to a loss of nearly a billion rubles of "real" money.

The Ministry of the Aviation Industry expects to increase production of aircraft for civil aviation by 2.7 times as much in the next few years.

The periods of time to reach series production are a weak point here. They have been dragged out intolerably for a number of reasons. And evidently the development of a number of ideas on a competitive basis, as well as jointly with major Western aviation concerns, will help to shorten them. Among these projects, it is worth singling out the supersonic aircraft which we will be developing jointly with the United States and Great Britain. It will have a speed of 2,000 kilometers per hour, as well as a subsonic modification which will carry 18 to 50 people in its various versions.

We need not mention how important the role of this executive aircraft will be in the expanding international, political, economic, and cultural relations.

But after deciding that it is most advisable in the course of the conversion to direct the highest scientific and technological potential of the aviation industry, and not only by our country's standards, into expansion of civil aircraft production, we will also shoulder concern for a number of other areas in the national economy.

Orienting the conversion to the development and manufacture of consumer goods should be singled out in particular. In saying this, I am by no means contradicting what has been stated earlier. After all, it is quite a different matter when the high skill of our designers and the industry's potentialities are utilized for the development and manufacture of technically complex commodities and machinery for the light and food industry, not the first consumer goods that come along.

Machines, machines, machines... It only seems that machine building for commerce and the industrial sectors operating in it is a simple matter. In reality, this concerns such a manysided and complex technical range that it makes your head spin.

The aviation industry is assuming responsibility for the establishment of 150 small shops to can vegetables and fruits in the first stage. They can be sited at places where the items are produced by restricting the gigantomania which leads to product losses in shipment.

As an example, the set of equipment will include a production line for pasteurization of fruit and vegetable products without heat treatment, based on high-frequency currents and line-operated drums for juice preparation. The smaller the openings, the clearer the juice. And a laser beam forms these minute openings in the production process.

Life-support systems based on diaphragm technology, which the aviation industry develops for aviation and space flight, guarantee the preservation of potatoes, vegetables and fruits when they are transferred to vegetable storage facilities.

Among our developments, we should also single out the mobile installations for processing and drying silkworm cocoons. The designers succeeded in fundamentally changing this human occupation, which had not changed in thousands of years. An installation such as this comes to a kolkhoz on a motor vehicle, the work is done in several hours, and it can move on to another farm. The annual economic gain from each such mobile unit adds up to a half million rubles.

There is a broad range of consumer goods that have been put into production or are in the process of being put into production by the aviation industry. I can add refrigerators, washing machines, and vacuum cleaners to the list of technically complex items already mentioned. Production will be in significant volume. About 1 million, 2.2 million, and 1.8 million units, respectively, will be turned out annually.

This year we will turn out nonfood consumer goods valued at 4 million rubles (in retail prices). Production of them will be increased by 1.5 times as much as in the preceding year.

An important step will be taken to solve our important problem of providing passenger cars and household appliances with spare parts, components, assemblies, and units. Considerable volume is involved here this year: 92 million and 11 million rubles, respectively.

The Ministry of the Aviation Industry intends to establish an entire network of "Antey" firm stores to sell the goods manufactured in its enterprises. Six of them have already made their debut: in Leningrad, Ulyanovsk, Ramenskoye in suburban Moscow, and other cities.

The aviation industry display at the "Konversiya-90" international exhibition held recently in Munich was

perceived as a revelation. It was followed by numerous offers from foreign firms to provide them with aviation equipment and consumer goods with a total value of 5 billion rubles and to establish joint ventures, primarily to manufacture equipment for the light and food industry. And even though everyone is aware of the obstacles which arise on this path, we were not avoided and several enterprises are already a reality.

This is the kind of joint venture with the Kaluga Motor Building Association, the "Zarya" Footwear Association, and the ("Shen") firm in the FRG, which specializes in the production of computer-controlled machines to stretch leather in shoe manufacturing.

A Soviet-French joint venture in which the Perm Motor Building Association will take part will begin turning out machinery for the textile industry and fabric processing.

I think that workers involved in commerce will be interested in learning about the aviation industry's contribution in developing the industrial sectors which produce consumer goods. After all, this means that there will be more of various items available for consumers.

Military Agricultural Enterprises Bring in Harvest
90UM0849A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Aug 90 First Edition p 1

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA regular correspondent in the Kiev Military District, Colonel A. Polyakov, interviews General Major Gennadiy Georgiyevich Kurdakov, deputy commanding general of the district's rear services troops: "The Harvest From the Military's Fields"]

[Text] The harvest is underway. What are the military agricultural enterprises doing during these difficult days to produce food products? Colonel A. Polyakov, our regular correspondent for the Kiev Military District, talked about this with General Major Gennadiy Georgiyevich Kurdakov, deputy commanding general of the district's rear services troops.

[Polyakov] Gennadiy Georgiyevich, judging by the press and the alarming television reports, it is once again a "battle" almost everywhere to capture the abundant crops and "reverse" the harvest "campaign." Just how do things stand with the harvest in the district's military fields?

[Kurdakov] As the man responsible for ensuring that tens of thousands of people have their daily bread, it is especially painful for me to see how difficult the harvest is. After all, this is our food ration for the entire year.

Where the military sovkhoses are concerned, we began to prepare for the harvest as early as spring. The harvest was organized in three shifts, all transportation assets were working at hauling the crops, and there was virtually not a single hour of idle time on the harvest conveyor. Thus, by the beginning of August the early grains (except corn) had been harvested to the last grain.

Despite the fact that almost no rain fell this year, the harvest in the oblasts where the sovkhoses are located was ten quintals above average. Where the plan called for 24 thousand metric tons of grain, 27 thousand metric tons were collected.

[Polyakov] I understand that it is nice to see such results but just what is behind them?

[Kurdakov] They achieve success through planning, initiative and economic incentives.

All the sovkhoses (and we have five of them) are oriented toward meat and milk production. This dictates objective circumstances. Farms situated in the training grounds occupy unproductive land. For this reason, their main task is to raise fodder. We emphasize corn, sunflowers and beets. To raise crop yield we use fallows, organic fertilizers and high-quality seeds. As a result, for example, on the "RASSVET" sovkhos, which was recently recognized as the best in the armed forces they managed to lay in enough feed for one and one-half years.

Last year the plan for meat production on the district's sovkhoses was overfulfilled 104 percent, milk 110 percent. The milk yield per head was 3650 liters and the clear profit to the farms was more than three million rubles.

[Polyakov] And how are things with the military units' subsidiary farms?

[Kurdakov] The work is also hard there; there is a good harvest of vegetables and fruit. Primarily though, they are involved in intensive fattening of the livestock. For example, its own subsidiary farm provides meat for the entire year for the unit in which officer V. Kravets serves. Nor are things going too badly in the units where officers V. Grizodub and V. Seltsov serve. In the unit where Lt Col M. Filchagov is deputy commander for rear services, however, they recently exposed a dismal picture. The roof of the barn is worn out, the walls are dilapidated, and not infrequently the livestock is fed only once per day; and this despite the fact that the unit was sent a model farm plan and money was allocated for construction.

[Polyakov] We all know that the country's most serious problem right now is how to preserve the crops which have been grown...

[Kurdakov] And here a great deal, if not everything, depends upon the supervisor. In the units where Major V. Gerasimov and Captain N. Belyayev are the chiefs of food services, potatoes and vegetables are preserved in metal containers and the storehouse is well ventilated. In the unit where Senior Lt I. Gibalo is chief of food services, all pickling is done in glass jars and this will ensure a high level of preservation. Yet in the unit of Lt Colonel S. Osipov, deputy unit commander for rear

services, about 20 metric tons of potatoes rotted last year. When this was investigated, they found scandalous negligence.

[Polyakov] We have been talking primarily about satisfying the needs of the military personnel in compulsory service. Just what is being done for the families of officers and warrant officers?

[Kurdakov] In this area most of the weight falls on the shoulders of the commissaries but only 60 percent of their requirements are covered by central funds. They must rely on their own resources. For example, the commissary run by A. Tikalich has its own subsidiary farm which has 1500 pigs. It supplies tens of metric tons of meat to the food system. The "STEPNOY" sovkhov, on a share basis with the "DYMOK" cooperative, produced 31 metric tons of sausage products. On the "BORISPOLSKIY" sovkhov, we are introducing a shop for smoked foods and the processing of milk products.

We expect that the sovkhoves, through their own resources, will produce more than 200 metric tons of cereals...

There are also difficulties, however. For example, there is not enough concentrated feed for the subsidiary farms. Or take this example: how can 15 officers of the veterinary services provide the required veterinary supervision for many tens of subsidiary farms?

[Polyakov] They have begun to speak once again of the Chernobyl problem. Have there been any cases of products contaminated by radionuclides? There are known cases where watermelons in commissaries were not sweet and were foamy like soap...

[Kurdakov] Indeed, in the spring of 1986 radionuclides were discovered in milk produced by one of the subsidiary farms. This occurred because the cows grazed on spring grass. I can state absolutely responsibly that, since then, our products have been clean. We continually control them to that end.

DOSAAF: Draft Guidelines for Restructuring

90UM0719A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 24, 11-17 Jun 90 pp 8-9

["Draft of the Basic Directions for Extending Perestroyka in the RSFSR DOSAAF Organizations"]

[Text] In the interests of further extending perestroyka in mass defense work in the RSFSR DOSAAF organizations, the conference feels it necessary to stipulate the following basic areas:

1. Increasing the effectiveness of mass organizational work, the development of the processes of democratization and glasnost.

In declaring the defense organization of the Russian Federation to be an equal component of the USSR DOSAAF, its main goals are to be:

- assisting in creating the conditions for the transformation of the USSR DOSAAF from a centralized organization into an Union of societies and organizations aiding in strengthening national defense;
- the concentration of organizational efforts, material resources and finances on further developing military patriotic, mass defense, training and sports work in the Russian Federation DOSAAF considering the national, economic, geographic and other conditions of the corresponding regions.

In addition to the defense organizations of the autonomous republics, the krays, oblasts, autonomous oblasts and autonomous okrugs, the organization of the Russian Federation DOSAAF can include on a voluntary basis other societies, organizations and associations having patriotic and technical-sports goals and recognizing the Bylaws of the defense society. The RSFSR DOSAAF Central Committee is to be entrusted with the legal defense of their interests in state and social bodies and is to grant them the right to use training, sports and other facilities as well as jointly created material and financial resources.

The training of workers and youth for labor and defense of the socialist fatherland is to be considered the basic task of the RSFSR DOSAAF organization.

In the aims of establishing democratic leadership principles, the RSFSR DOSAAF Central Committee is to be entrusted with the following:

- organizing interaction with the republic social and state bodies;
- leadership over the practical activities of the defense organizations comprising the RSFSR DOSAAF, the elaborating of recommendations on mass defense work;
- exercising control over carrying out the demands of the superior directive bodies, the decrees of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and its own decisions;
- planning and providing the necessary organizational and material conditions for preparing the youth for military service;

- organizing republic and international measures in various areas of activity;
- recruiting, placing, training and indoctrinating the leadership cadres (together with the kray and oblast DOSAAF committees);
- creating and distributing the reserve funds of financial and material means.

The kray and oblast DOSAAF committees, in being the superior leadership bodies of their defense organizations, possess all the powers of independently resolving questions comprising their competence.

The strengthening of the DOSAAF rayon and city committees considering the local conditions should be carried out by bringing together into a single staff the workers of all DOSAAF organizations located on the territory of the rayon or city as well as incorporating on a voluntary basis in the rayon or city organization the collectives of other social organizations involved in patriotic and technical-sports activities, with the exception of the DOSAAF training organizations involved in training specialists for the Armed Forces under the plans of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

In the interests of improving mass defense work, the DOSAAF kray and oblast committees, with the approval of the corresponding rayon (city) committees are to be given the right of establishing a single organization on the level of several city or rural rayons.

All the necessary conditions are to be created for the development of social initiative, glasnost, criticism, self-criticism and openness in the work of all the leading bodies of the republic defense organization from top to bottom.

In working out decisions on the most important questions in the activities of the Society, they are to consider the opinion of not only the majority but also the minority of its members, even to holding, when necessary, republic, kray and oblast referendums. There is to be better democratization of the election process in forming the leading bodies of the Society. The elections of the DOSAAF committees and auditing commissions of all levels and their leaders are to be carried out on an open, alternative basis, considering the opinion of a broad circle of the social aktiv and with obligatory representation from each autonomous republic, kray, oblast, autonomous oblast and autonomous okrug.

There is to be constant participation of the members of the elective bodies in the practical work on the commissions, in inspections and in carrying out measures to implement adopted decisions, in providing aid on the spot, in generalizing and disseminating advanced experience, in preparing materials and questions for discussion at the presidiums, plenums, conferences and congresses of the corresponding DOSAAF organizations.

A practice is to be made of regular reports by the members of the elective bodies to the corresponding

committees as well as at the meetings of the collectives of inferior defense organizations.

The functions of the staff are to be set, having completely subordinated the staff to the elective bodies in all levels of the Society.

The structuring of the defense organization is to be carried out:

- according to territorial-production features;
- according to the place of residence of the Society members;
- according to the interests of the clubs, associations and various groups.

Here, for creating a more flexible system, its basis can be primary, training, procedural-training, technical-sports, sports and other organizations.

In the organizational activities, chief attention is to be focused on strengthening the physical plant of the base DOSAAF organizations in the aim of broadening their capabilities in the interests of the broad involvement of the youth in mass defense work and preparing them for service in the USSR Armed Forces.

For these purposes in the cities and rayons, it is advisable to focus mass defense and sports work around the primary organizations of large enterprises, the rayon and city technical sports clubs and training organizations of DOSAAF which have the corresponding physical plant. Considering the local particular features and general interests, both in rural localities and in the cities, the defense organizations of general education schools and other institutions of learning are to be combined with the primary DOSAAF organizations of major enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

Membership in the Society can be collective or individual. The right is to be given to the general assemblies of the defense collectives to set the periodicity and amount of payment of entrance and membership dues. The money collected from membership dues, deductions of enterprises, kolkhozes, sovkhozes and institutions and transfers by individual citizens can be left at the disposal of the corresponding defense organizations and also at the discretion of their general assemblies transferred to the superior leadership body for establishing and strengthening the physical plant as well as for further developing mass defense work.

The membership of the auditing commissions is to be strengthened by reorganizing the existing control-auditing service, by introducing the staff positions of chairman of the auditing commissions of the republic, kray and oblast defense organizations.

The RSFSR DOSAAF Central Committee is to be instructed to work out the draft Bylaws for the republic defense organization and submit these for approval by the republic DOSAAF Congress.

2. Increasing the Effectiveness of Military Patriotic and International Education of the Workers and Youth

Work is to be done steadily to deepen and update the content of military patriotic propaganda, and to explain the legacy of V.I. Lenin, the decisions of the CPSU and the provisions of the USSR Constitution on the questions of defending the socialist fatherland on the principles of the new political thinking and in close linkage to the military-political situation existing in the world.

There is to be greater education of the Soviet people in the glorious revolutionary, military and labor traditions of the party, the people and their Armed Forces. This work is to fully consider the multinational nature of the Russian Federation, the traditions and rites of the republic's peoples.

They must instill in the preinduction- and induction-age youth high moral-political and physical qualities, professional skills, and a readiness to carry out the constitutional duty of defending the socialist fatherland, in skillfully using here the authority and rich experience in life of the veterans of the war, the USSR Armed Forces and labor, combat skills and the loyalty of the young reserve personnel to military comradeship.

In every possible way they are to strengthening the explaining of the tasks and propagandize the patriotic activities of the Defense Society, its contribution to strengthening national defense and preparing the youth for Army and Navy service.

There is to be a constant search for new, more effective forms and methods of military patriotic work. For these purposes:

- They are to activate the work of the DOSAAF houses [clubs] which are the procedural centers for military patriotic propaganda, the network of these is to be expanded, primarily in the regions of Siberia and the Far East and the Nonchernozem Zone of the RSFSR;
- The role of children's technical creativity is to be raised to a level of today's requirements, and the level of military sports work is to be increased with children and juveniles in DYuSTSh [child-youth technical sports schools], military patriotic clubs and associations;
- Effective use is to be made of the local mass information media and the periodic press of the Defense Society the book and visual products of the Patriot Publishing House of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee in working constantly to fully satisfy the needs of the defense collectives for military patriotic, training-procedural and sports literature as well as visual agitation materials;
- The question is to be settled of establishing a printed organ of the RSFSR DOSAAF organization.

It is essential to steadily broaden and deepen at the center and on the spot professional ties with the trade unions, the Komsomol, troop units, military commissariats, the Znaniye [Knowledge] Society, the Civil Defense staffs, the bodies of the RSFSR State Committee for

Education, the war and labor veterans councils, as well as with various military patriotic youth clubs and associations, including the informal organizations supporting the positions of the need to improve the patriotic education of the youth and involving the youth in sports-defense work.

3. Improving the Preparation of Youth for Service in the USSR Armed Forces

It is essential to consider as a most important practical task ensuring the complete and high quality meeting of the demands raised by the directive bodies to further improve the preparation of the preinduction and induction youth for service in the USSR Armed Forces. For these purposes we are to:

- Steadily work to improve and intensify the training and educational process in the DOSAAF training organizations by widely introducing modern progressive teaching methods and computers, focusing attention on a decisive turn toward quality parameters in the training and education of the students;
- Continue the planned conversion of the DOSAAF schools and aviation organizations to the predominant study of new models of equipment in service in the Army and Navy and in 1990-1991, work out a comprehensive program for creating a training plant in all the RSFSR DOSAAF training organizations in accord with the scope and curricula as well as converting them in the future to studying the new equipment;
- Effectively improve the combined-arms and physical training of the preinduction and induction youth, give more attention to the practical and military focus in training the students, teaching them to fire combat weapons, introducing troop standards for the inductees aimed at the efficient use of the equipment under difficult conditions and in emergency situations;
- Together with the state bodies, the military districts, fleets, military commissariats and social organizations of the RSFSR to resolve the problems related to involving preinduction youth in basic military training, the complete and high-quality manning of the DOSAAF training organizations, the ubiquitous introduction of professional psychological recruitment of students and the employment of the graduates of the schools and the aviation training organizations of DOSAAF in the USSR Armed Forces strictly according to their immediate specialty;
- Together with the RSFSR public education bodies before the end of 1990, to work out a long-range program for establishing in the RSFSR DOSAAF schools and aviation organizations the military patriotic clubs such as "Young Motorist," "Young Aviator," "Young Sailor," and "Young Radio Operator" and strengthen their influence on the military patriotic training of the future defenders of the motherland.

4. Improving the Training of Personnel in the Mass Technical Professions for the National Economy

On the basis of introducing the new economic management methods, a fundamental rise is to take place in the quality of training technical specialists. For these purposes, we are to:

- Strengthen the DOSAAF STK [technical sports club] and schools with regular instructors and experts of job training and on this basis establish in each organization a dependable core of a highly trained pedagogical collective and with administrative-management personnel proceeding from economic advisability and the amount of work to be done in training the specialists;
- Organize the training of specialists for new professions, including industrial electronics, computer and microprocessor equipment;
- Under the new management conditions, introduce everywhere a system for manning the DOSAAF organizations with a contingent to be trained drawing on the enterprises, organizations, sovkhozes and kolkhozes on a direct contractual basis;
- Consistently develop the network of DOSAAF technical sports clubs, particularly in the areas of the new territorial-production complexes of Siberia and the Far East and the RSFSR Nonchernozem Zone considering the real needs for training the personnel in the mass technical professions as well as the proportional development of cost accounting activities and sports, to equip the existing STK and enlarge their training and production area.

5. Further Development of Technical and Applied Military Types of Sports

For this, we are to:

- Together with the involved RSFSR state bodies and public organizations during 1990-1991, work out a program for the long-range development of the technical and applied military types of sports in the labor and educational collectives of the Russian Federation, paying particular attention here to creating simple sports facilities and developing accessible types of sports not requiring significant material outlays;
- Realize the possibility of creating unified DOSAAF, trade union and sports organizations (clubs) in the aim of fully combining their efforts in the question of developing physical culture and sports;
- Prior to 1992, create Russian federations for technical and applied military types of sports and ensure their participation in the measures of the all-Union sports association;
- Prior to 1991, define the system for creating centers and support points for the technical and applied military types of sports considering the regional and zonal location of the RSFSR DOSAAF committees and sports organizations;
- Prior to 1992, establish republic clubs for the basic types of sports for training highly skilled athletes and composite teams of the Russian Federation;
- Take measures to improve the activities of the sports shooting clubs, the DYuSTSh, firing ranges and other

sports organizations and facilities, to increase their efficient use in training the youth for service in the Soviet Armed Forces, and together with the territorial and sectorial trade union bodies during 1990 and 1991, to work out long-range plans for the development of the DYuSTSh for technical and applied military types of sports as well as their dependable financing;

- Actively propagandize technical and applied military types of sports and during 1990-1991, to submit proposals to the editors of the republic and local newspapers and magazines and the mass information media on sponsorship for the technical and applied military types of sports, to hold for certain of these contests for prizes offered by the newspapers and magazines, and to make it a practice to conduct annual competitions for the best articles, essays and photographs propagandizing these types of sports.

6. Participation in Eliminating the Consequences of Accidents and Providing Aid to Victims Together With the State Bodies, the RSFSR Civil Defense and Concerned Public Organizations

For these purposes under each DOSAAF oblast and kray committee, voluntary rescue formations are to be organized from among professional pilots, parachutists, divers, dog trainers, ship operators, vehicle operators and radio operators.

7. Strengthening the Physical Plant

The RSFSR DOSAAF Central Committee, the kray and oblast DOSAAF committees are to work for the unconditional fulfillment of the capital construction plans and are to complete the projects at the designated date.

They are not to allow the squandering of funds allocated for capital construction, these are to be concentrated primarily on completed projects or carry-over projects which have a high construction completeness. Reconstruction of existing buildings and structures is to be carried out on a planned basis. Primary attention is to be paid to equipping the DOSAAF schools and aviation organizations and building student dormitories and housing.

Considering the local conditions, they are to continue the practice of building DOSAAF facilities by the direct labor method, in skillfully combining specialized general contracting organizations with the construction of large projects.

The amounts of incomplete construction and the material and technical supplies should not exceed the established standards.

The system of material and technical supply is to be improved in the interest of more fully satisfying the requirements of the DOSAAF committees and organizations for the necessary resources. The fixed capital, equipment and property are to be used more efficiently.

8. Development of Production and Financial-Economic Activities

In accord with the principles of the radical economic reform, as of one January 1991, the kray and oblast RSFSR DOSAAF committees are to be converted to full cost accounting and self-financing.

The RSFSR DOSAAF Central Committee, in using its financial and economic independence, is to establish the centralized funds of the Society using deductions from subordinate DOSAAF committees and organizations according to the established rates.

The RSFSR DOSAAF Central Committee is to work out the following:

- Five-year plans for the main areas of activity, in being guided here by the quotas, limits and standards set by the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and the RSFSR Council of Ministers;
- Stable norms for deductions and for forming the funds for the DOSAAF kray, oblast committees and organizations under the republic and which have been converted to cost accounting and self-financing, considering the deductions into the state budget, and the superior DOSAAF organization into the economic incentive fund and the fund for the formation of the wage fund or to the wage fund.

Effective measures are to be carried out to strengthen the financial situation of the DOSAAF committees and organizations on the basis of introducing the new forms of management, observing conditions of strictest economy, seeking out additional financial sources and the rational allocation of labor, financial and material resources.

Considering the demands of scientific and technical progress, to modernize the equipment at the DOSAAF production enterprises, to develop new production methods, to work steadily to improve the quality of the serially produced products and broaden the list of producing consumer goods.

9. Improving Work With the Leading Cadres of the Defense Society. Development of the Social Sphere

In cadre work Lenin's principles are to be strictly followed, and the role and responsibility of the presidiums and the buros of the presidiums of the DOSAAF committees are to be increased in recruiting, placing and educating the leadership cadres.

Under the conditions of the deepening democracy, the RSFSR DOSAAF Central Committee and the DOSAAF kray and oblast committees must decisively eliminate formalism and bureaucracy, eradicate the command and strong-arm methods of administrative activity, they must increase the demandingness placed on the cadres and their responsibility for the assigned area of work and exercise strict control over the carrying out of the adopted decrees and decisions.

A line must be carried out of the skillful combination of experienced and young cadres in the leadership personnel of the DOSAAF committees, organizations and enterprises. Work must be improved in recruiting and establishing a reliable reserve of cadres for promotion. For these purposes, fuller consideration must be given to the conclusions stemming from the certification of workers of the DOSAAF committees and organizations.

It is essential to instill in all DOSAAF workers and activists professionalism, high organization and the ability to work constructively under the conditions of perestroika.

We are to continue to improve the training of personnel of all categories in the interests of achieving higher indicators for the main areas of activity for the DOSAAF committees and organizations.

Collectivism and social principles are to be established everywhere in the work of all elements of the Defense Society.

In the area of educating DOSAAF personnel, more effective use must be made of measures of moral and material encouragement.

It is essential to increase the social focus in the work of the DOSAAF leading cadres, considering this the most important condition for mobilizing the human factor for a qualitative execution of the tasks confronting us. Effective measures are to be carried out in the interests of the accelerated solution to urgent social tasks including: increased wages, primarily for the lowly-paid category of workers, providing housing, improving medical services, everyday life and leisure of the workers and white collar personnel, the students and athletes of the DOSAAF organizations, establishing optimum conditions for work in all the DOSAAF collectives and organizations, preventing illness and injury and forming a healthy way of life.

The draft of the Basic Areas is being published for an extensive discussion among the DOSAAF members. This program document will be reviewed at the forthcoming organizational conference of the RSFSR DOSAAF considering the proposals and comments made on it.

Briefing Held Concerning Fall Military Draft

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in Russian 4 Oct 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by Major A. Vorobyev and Major M. Syrtlanov: "Briefing in the USSR Ministry of Defense Press Center": "The Draft—a Concern of the Entire Country"]

[Text] In accordance with a decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 25 September, the next draft into the active military service is under way. Many thousands of youths will join the ranks under the battle standards of

defenders of the Motherland. The draft is always a lot of work for the soviets, party organs, military commissariats, commanders, and political workers, particularly in today's rather complex sociopolitical situation.

A briefing that was organized by the USSR Ministry of Defense press center was devoted to problems of the fall draft. It was held on 2 October in the Central Soviet Army Club. Representatives of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, the Main Political Directorate of the Army and Navy, and the Main Staff of the Ground Forces answered journalists' questions.

"It is not necessary to convince anyone of the fact that the Army is needed not only by the Army," noted Colonel General D. Grinkevich, chief of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces. However a number of local, republic, and even Union organs at times do not go any farther in acknowledging this truth. Moreover, there are cases of a local approach to the resolution of questions of manpower acquisition and the performance of military service which have been reported more than once in the press.

Specific figures were given at the briefing that characterize the results of last year's draft and this spring's draft. Unfortunately, the figures are alarming. The number of those who evade the draft is increasing, and this does not always receive a thorough assessment. For example, the figure 462 was heard. This is how many criminal cases were instituted in Moscow involving cases of draft evasion. Legal proceedings were brought against only 14 persons. It is clear that we cannot resign ourselves to such permissiveness. This is made even more apparent by the fact that many republics, krais, and oblasts are successfully resolving all draft call tasks and that valuable experience has been gained in the preparation of youths for Army service. This applies for example to Stavropolskiy Kray and to Voronezh, Saratov, Sverdlovsk, and some other oblasts of Russia; to the Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic; and to a number of other autonomous republics. The spring draft call plan has been fully met in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. Belorussia is furnishing an adequate replenishment for the Armed Forces.... In a word, there are a lot of places where employees of the mass media could find good examples of organization of the effort and people who are doing their duty, including among officers of military commissariats where there are many conscientious workers. Unfortunately many publications, as was noted at the briefing, do not report on this.

Answering the questions of journalists, Major General A. Gorbachev, chief of the Directorate of Organizational-Party Work of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy; Lieutenant General N. Ter-Grigoryants, deputy chief of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces; Major General V. Nikitin, chief of a department of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces; and Major General V. Bepalov, Moscow City

military commissar, threw light on a number of questions associated with organizational, ideological, and legal provisions of the draft.

It was emphasized that the military patriotic education of the youth can be improved only with the participation of the public at large with the involvement of the participants of the Great Patriotic War. It is important that our youths get to know about the heroism and deeds of the older generation. Combat and revolutionary traditions must always be in the arsenal of educational work.

The attention of the public was also directed to legislative acts that contradict the USSR Constitution which were adopted in a number of republics and are aimed at pulling the Army apart into national headquarters, limiting the geography of a draft call to the territory of one or another region or even an oblast. This route is fraught with a breakdown of the foundations of the country's security.

The problems of the Fall draft that were examined at the briefing are inseparably linked with the implementation of military reform which is called on to give the Armed Forces a new quality status. There was frank talk about the sources of nonregulation behavior and other negative phenomena.

It was our civilian colleague who asked about the draft: What is especially significant about it? We answered: Everything, including the send-offs which are solemn, with parting words by parents and veterans, for the lads are off to serve the Motherland.

After the briefing its participants met with representatives of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers and answered their questions.

Odessa Military Staff Chief Discusses Fall Draft

91UM0041A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Oct 90 First Edition p 1

[Report on interview with Lieutenant General A. Sergeyev, chief of staff of the Odessa Military District, by Colonel N. Mulyar under the rubric "Fall Draft": "People Understand Us"]

[Text]

[Mulyar] Anatoliy Ipatovich, the upcoming callup of youth is different from preceding ones. The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and later the Moldavian Supreme Soviet adopted a number of legislative acts concerning military service by their citizens that contradict the USSR Law on Universal Military Duty. This is having significant influence on the action of the military commissariats. Under these conditions, how is work on the draft proceeding?

[Sergeyev] Yes, you are right. This callup has presented a whole series of problems to the headquarters of the district, the workers of the military commissariats, and

the families of the conscripts. For example, having learned of the Moldova [Moldavia] Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet decree of 4 September entitled "On Military Service by Citizens of the Moldova SSR" and that of 10 September entitled "On the Conscription of Moldova SSR Citizens for Military Service," many youths and their parents are wondering how they are supposed to act. Should they dodge the draft and become criminally liable, or should they obey Union legislation?..

[Mulyar] Yes, but the republics have abolished criminal liability for refusing military service.

[Sergeyev] Moldova belongs to the USSR, and Union legislation on questions of defense has precedence in any state. Nonetheless, the officers of the district staff, the military units, and the commissariats have had to restructure their operations as they go: They are not waiting until the conscript appears at the military commissariat in accordance with the callup papers, as they used to; they are going out to the masses themselves. They are working in the families, schools, technical institutes, and enterprises and explaining the existing situation, the features and procedure for serving, and other questions. This effort is underway even now. But representatives of the People's Front of Moldova, the Ukraine People's Movement for Perestroika, and several other organizations are trying to wreck the draft. They are using not only methods of persuasion, but blackmail and threats against conscripts and their parents. And here is the result: Over the nine months of this year, 367 Moldavian conscripts deserted. However, we have already succeeded in returning many of them to service. The appeal of the republic's Supreme Soviet to servicemen to finish their service honestly while negotiations with the Union Government are underway played a part in this. Nonetheless, 140 people are still at large.

And then take a legislative act like the September edict of the Moldova SSR president. It specifies that military commissariats have the right to conduct a draft of citizens of Moldova for active military service in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces only with a written statement from those citizens and with written agreement of the parents of the conscript. You must agree that this will lead to nothing but irritation, tension, and passions. Nevertheless, we have to work and to find compromises.

[Mulyar] And what do you say to the comment that appeared in the press from V. Berlinskiy, chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet standing commission on questions of fighting crime, to the effect that formation of a body of carbineers will be conducted using youths subject to conscription into the USSR Armed Forces?

[Sergeyev] We have not received notification on this. But if this happens, the military commissariats will be put in a difficult situation and the plan for the draft will be wrecked. Before making such a decision, the republic

government should coordinate the question with the USSR Council of Ministers and stipulate the legal norms for making up such a so-called body of carbineers. I believe that at the present time there is no burning need to create such a body. In order to improve the situation, we need to improve the work of the law enforcement organs and shore up discipline and organization.

[Mulyar] Anatoliy Ipatovich, you recently met with A. Statinov, Ukraine SSR Council of Ministers deputy chairman, and a little earlier with M. Snegur, Moldova SSR president, and M. Druk, Moldova SSR prime minister. What is their attitude toward the upcoming draft?

[Sergeyev] I wish to note immediately that in both republics we met with understanding. In Kiev there was a detailed analysis of a procedure for manning military construction units, railway forces, and civil defense units. We agreed that, to the degree that it is possible, they will be manned to the maximum extent by citizens residing on the territory of the republic. We looked at questions of the activation of commissions for the draft and other problems.

In Kishinev we talked about preconscription preparation of the youth and organization of the autumn draft. We created a republic commission for the draft headed by K. Oborok, Moldova SSR first deputy prime minister. For the first time the trade unions will take part in the organization of the draft as well.

[Mulyar] I would also like to clarify another issue. How are relations between the military commissariats and the local organs of Gagauz and Dnestr republics?

[Sergeyev] The formation of the new structures of power have not had an effect on the organization of the draft. At the request of the Gagauz, we created a branch of the republic induction center in Komrat. There are plans to draft more than 500 people of Gagauz nationality into the Army. Creation of an induction center will permit us not only to save on transportation resources and limit the period people are sent away, but it will also give the parents of the youth of Moldova's rayons more opportunity to be with their children. As for the Dnestr region, there were no problems with the draft earlier and there are none now.

[Mulyar] Are you convinced that the draft in Moldova will go normally?

[Sergeyev] I cannot give such a guarantee. The influence of the People's Front is strong in the republic, and its representatives have varying attitudes toward the draft. Therefore, I am not going to guess. The main point, and I stress this once more, is that in this important matter the leadership of Moldova and the majority of the population have shown us understanding. The first results of the draft will confirm this.

New Rules for Acceptance Into Military Schools

90UM0658A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
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[Interview with Maj Gen Yu. Rodionov, department chief in the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, by Col A. Garavskin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "If the Service Is Your Calling..."]

[Text] The new Rules For Admission to Military Educational Institutions of the USSR Ministry of Defense were approved last year. They indicate the schedule for entrance exams and professional screening: from 1 to 20 August for officers; from 10 to 30 July for all other applicants. The operating period for republic admissions commissions is 5 to 25 July.

Col A. Garavskin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, asked Maj Gen Yu. Rodionov, department chief in the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, to answer the questions of those who are preparing to enter or are only thinking about entering military educational institutions.

We tell about the rules for admission to military schools, institutes and academies.

[Garavskin] Let us begin with the academies....

[Rodionov] The military academies accept officers on active duty in the Armed Forces of the USSR who have a higher specialized military or higher civilian education and who are serving primarily in those branches of the Armed Forces and troop arms with which the military educational institution is affiliated. The service term for officer positions is at least 5 years only for those applicants entering the command departments of military academies. The maximum age for officers beginning the training depends upon the position occupied and ranges from 28 years for company and battery commanders, flight (or detachment) commanders (and navigators) and their equivalents who have served at least 3 years, to 41 years for commanders of a specific class of submarines.

In addition, deputy commanders (chiefs of staff) of battalions, divisions and squadrons, squadron navigators, tactical control officers of air units, commanders of Classification 3 ships and their equivalents are accepted up to the age of 32. The maximum age is set at 35 years for commanders of battalions, divisions and squadrons, commanders of Classification 2 ships and Classification 3 divisions, senior assistants to commanders of Classification 1 ships and their equivalents. The only exceptions are captains of ships with special power units, who are accepted up to the age of 39.

This is for the command departments at military academies. The engineer departments and academies and the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin have their own, also differentiated, breakdown by age and position.

[Garavskin] Now, if you do not object, let us discuss the requirements for admission to military institutes and schools.

[Rodionov] They accept officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers on active duty in the Armed Forces of the USSR, first-term and reenlisted servicemen, military construction workers, civilian youth, reservists who have served out their term of active military duty, graduates of Suvorov military and Nakhimov naval schools, the Moscow Military Music School and special boarding schools with intensive study of the Russian language and military physical education, who have completed secondary school.

Seagoing and shore-based warrant officers are accepted after serving 2 years in positions of seagoing or shore-based warrant officers or officers and reenlisted and first-term servicemen and military construction workers, after serving 2 years of extended duty, regardless of their military specialty or length of service. All of these categories of servicemen, as well as reservists who have completed their first-term duty, are accepted up to the age of 23; civilian youth, between 17 and 21 years of age.

The age for acceptance for training is determined....

[Garavskin] Excuse me, Yuriy Nikolayevich. I am somewhat familiar with the Regulations-89, and I would add some "information for thought" suggested by the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA mail. A considerable part of the youth began school at the age of 6 years and have not reached the age of 17 by 1 September of the year they enter a military school.

[Rodionov] Those who turn 17 in the year of admission have the right to apply.

[Garavskin] What other changes have been made in the regulations?

[Rodionov] The system of acceptance commissions has been abolished. All servicemen are now admitted for training right at the VUZs. Everyone must go through two screening stages before becoming a student or cadet, however. The first and preliminary stage is conducted by the professional screening commission of the military district, group of forces, fleet, formation or troop arm of the Armed Forces to which the VUZ instructors belong. Beginning this year—something else which is new—standardized and specific periods have been established for conducting these officer assemblies: from 5 to 15 February of the year of admission for training.

First-term servicemen are sent to 25-day training assemblies conducted from 5 to 30 June.

With respect to the selection of civilian youth, it is conducted by rayon (or city) admissions commissions before 15 May.

[Garavskin] Yuriy Nikolayevich, answer this question asked most frequently by the readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. The choice has been made: What next?

[Rodionov] Officers wishing to enter military educational institutions submit an application through the chain of command to the commander of the military unit prior to 1 January of the admission year; seagoing and shore-based warrant officers, first-term and reenlisted servicemen, prior to 1 April of the admission year. Civilian youth and reservists submit applications to the rayon (or city) military commissariat at their place of residence prior to 1 May of the admission year.

[Garavskin] The attempt to get through the difficulties of the preliminary screening has been successful, and the applicant is at the military educational institution. What awaits him there?

[Rodionov] I need to stress the fact that the procedure for evaluating one's knowledge of the general education (or military) subjects and disciplines has now been changed. Depending upon the specific field of the VUZ, the entrance exams consist of field (competitive) exams, which are graded on a 4-level scale (five, four, three and two), and general, which are graded on a 2-level scale (satisfactory or unsatisfactory). Officers entering military academies then take an exam on Marxism-Leninism.

Privileges are established for certain categories of people entering VUZs. Heroes of the Soviet Union and Heroes of Socialist Labor who meet all the other professional selection requirements are not tested on the general education subjects. The same applies to graduates of Suvorov military and Nakhimov naval schools entering military schools and institutes (except for the Military Institute, where, incidentally, beginning this year, officers who have completed military schools with a 4- or 5-year period of study are accepted into the training group for officers for military tribunals and the legal service of the USSR Ministry of Defense). This regulation extends also to graduates of special boarding schools sent to military schools by military commissariats. Graduates of the Military Music School are admitted to the Military Conductors' Department at the Moscow State Conservatory without a test of their knowledge. Youth who have completed secondary schools with a gold or silver medal and those who have completed tekhnikums or special vocational and technical schools with distinction are accepted into technical air schools without taking the exams.

Students who have completed the first or subsequent years at civilian VUZs in fields coinciding with the field of the VUZ of application are admitted to the first year of study at military schools and institutes without taking the general education exams.

In all other cases applicants who have completed educational institutions with a gold or silver medal take one exam designated by the chief of the VUZ in their field of study. If they receive a grade of "five," they are exempted from further exams. If they receive a "four" or "three," they take the exams in the rest of the fields.

The right to admission hors concours based on professional screening applies to commanders of companies,

batteries, battalions, divisions and their equivalents, and their deputy commanders who have taken first place in field, air or naval training for officers of the Soviet Army and Navy.

[Garavskin] But the privilege of preferential admission also existed previously, did it not?

[Rodionov] It remains, but is changed somewhat. It is now enjoyed by individuals awarded orders of the USSR, the Ushakov medal, the Medal "For Combat Merit" or the Nakhimov medal, and servicemen who have performed international duty or special assignments for the government of the USSR and have demonstrated a high level of morale and aggressiveness. The "beneficiaries" also include servicemen with a 1st-class or expert skills level if they are entering VUZs which train officers in their own or a related specialty. This right is extended, at the recommendation of Young Army staffs, to civilian youth with at least 1 year at a job who have completed military-patriotic youth schools (clubs); to youth who have received basic flight training at air clubs or sports clubs of the USSR DOSAAF [All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy of the USSR] for entering higher military schools for pilots or navigators. The group also includes first-term servicemen who have served at least 1 year.

[Garavskin] In what subjects, Yuriy Nikolayevich, are evaluations made of general education and professional military preparation?

[Rodionov] Some adjustments have been made here as well. At most military educational institutions training officers with a higher military education and for the engineering departments of military academies, for groups made up of officers with a higher specialized military education: in higher mathematics, in Marxism-Leninism, a foreign language, tactical (special tactical) training and technical military (special military) training;

—in most engineering departments of military academies and higher military engineering schools for officers with a higher education: in mathematics, physics, history of the CPSU at the level of the program for secondary military schools and in technical military (special military) training;

—at higher command and engineering command schools, schools for pilots and navigators, at naval and most other higher military schools and at the Military Engineering Institute: in the Russian language and literature (written), mathematics (written), physics and history of the USSR;

—at higher military political schools: in the Russian language and literature (written), mathematics, geography and history of the USSR. Those entering the Lvov Higher Military Political School take an oral exam on the Russian language and literature instead of the math exam.

At higher military chemical defense and rear service schools and the Ulyanovsk Higher Technical Military School, exams are taken on the Russian language and

literature (written), mathematics (written), chemistry and history of the USSR; at the Yaroslavl Higher Military Finance School, an oral exam on mathematics instead of chemistry;

—at higher military schools: on the Russian language and literature (written) and mathematics.

[Garavskin] Where can one see the detailed regulations for admission?

[Rodionov] Order No. 90 issued by the USSR Ministry of Defense in 1989 can be found at unit headquarters and the military commissariats.

European Conference on Conscientious Objectors, Alternative Service

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[Article by Col V. Volkov, colonel of justice and candidate of juridical sciences, and Major N. Glebov, major of justice and candidate of juridical sciences: "Freedom of Conscience and Military Service"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) initiated the development of more active and comprehensive interaction between 33 European countries, the United States, and Canada. This process of development served as the framework for conducting the Second Copenhagen Conference on Human Measurement of the CSCE. The conference included a number of military aspects, one of which is discussed below by participants in the "parallel measures" of the Copenhagen forum.

Debates continued from morning until late evening in the old education center of Vartov located on the town hall square in Copenhagen. In addition to the official Conference on Human Measurement of the CSCE, in which dialogues were being held between diplomats and politicians, there were "parallel measures" that consisted of discussions, seminars, and symposia. Participating in them were representatives of various organizations and social movements of human rights, pacifist, and national orientations.

One of the most pressing topics was refusal to enter military service as a matter of conscience. This was the first case on record whereby we—Soviet officers—found ourselves working in the thick of international pacifist and human rights movements. It seems strange on the surface that military persons are holding a dialogue with pacifists. However, the time has apparently come when comparison of different points of view could be useful. Military reform has come about in our country, and we as military jurists cannot help but be interested in the military aspects of human rights. The intensification of social protection for servicemen and a clearer definition of legal issues relative to military service are now generally acknowledged to be a part of the changes taking place in the Army. In addition, with our military legislation undergoing renewal, there can be no doubt about the importance that attaches to awareness of positive international experience.

The notion of state recognition of citizens' rights relative to refusal to enter military service as a matter of conscience arose in the 1960s as one of the tenets of the pacifist movement's challenge to militarism. In 1971 the UN Commission on Human Rights presented the initiative of relating the military obligation established by governments to international aspects of human rights. Later the UN General Assembly adopted several resolutions recommending that governments review the issue of recognizing the right of citizens to refuse to take up

military service as a matter of conscience. This issue was submitted for review at last year's Paris Conference on Human Measurement, on the basis of official recommendations made by CSCE member nations.

As a result, Article 18 of the Copenhagen conference sets down in writing the need to recognize refusal to enter military service as a matter of conscience. "The member countries," states the document, "agree to review the issue of adopting legislation and suitable measures to release citizens from compulsory military obligation in cases where their religious convictions do not permit them to carry out service in military units."

It remains for our internal legislative system to incorporate this norm of international human rights. It must be stressed here that the resolutions passed by the Copenhagen conference, the same as other international human rights acts, have nothing to do with the inalienable right of each nation to determine for itself those forms of military obligation that it considers necessary for security. The intent of the Copenhagen resolutions is not to impose immediate legalization of any refusal to enter military service. The issue is rather one of religious motives and service in military units.

The above raises a logical question: How does all this relate to universal military obligation?

It is common knowledge that this year our Army has experienced an unprecedented increase in draft dodging. Separatist and other destructive forces, spurred on by their political aspirations, intend to sacrifice the future of thousands of draft-age youths. They often employ legal jargon and demagogic slogans to goad people into violating the law. Existing legislation provides for levying of criminal charges for refusal to accept military service. This law may be debated and discussed, but, as long as it remains in force, it must be observed by everyone, everywhere.

Foreign experience in military legislation provides a multitude of examples of linking the universal military obligation to something other than direct military service. Thus, there is a universal military obligation in effect in Denmark, Sweden, France, and other countries, but a citizen can discharge it in various ways. If a draftee's religious beliefs do not permit him to shoulder a weapon or take the oath, he has the option of performing alternative service. In Denmark this consists simply of working in the draftee's civilian capacity or in museums, libraries, or construction. The proceeds so derived are added to the military budget, with the result that even the "refusenik" contributes to strengthening the defensive capability.

In the event a draft-age youth refuses to accept service of any kind, society has every right to pass judgement on the citizen who has no regard for national security interests. As a matter of practice, in virtually all countries this results in filing of criminal charges. In the U.S., where there is an all-volunteer army, those who refuse to register for the draft face confinement in prison.

According to data presented at the Copenhagen forum, in 1989 criminal indictments for refusal to enter military service were filed against 532 persons in Italy, 400 in Greece, and 534 in Switzerland.

Enormous importance attaches to the social and ethical aspects of refusal to discharge one's military obligation. We saw for ourselves the high degree of esteem in which society holds military service in Denmark, where being a refusenik carries a high price. Even if a draftee is not charged with a criminal offense and opts for alternative service, he still faces social ostracism. The reasoning is as follows: If you refuse service, you are refusing to protect the motherland and the Crown, which means that you are not patriotic and society cannot rely on you. Therefore, you are hereby branded as an unethical person. In Denmark, refuseniks are not permitted to take a position in the government, nor are they hired to fill any kind of responsible position.

On the other hand, persons who complete their military service conscientiously are treated quite differently. They are gladly offered jobs, and their service-acquired experience is valued. Even greater respect is accorded those who have served in the Queen's Guards. They are not required to take a competitive test to qualify for a job, even when applying for responsible and highly-paid government posts.

The question naturally arises of our country's attitude toward the Copenhagen document's recommendation that alternative service be provided for persons that refuse to enter military service on religious grounds. It appears that for us this is not an unsolvable problem.

The fact of the matter is that Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam, the dominant religions in our country, do not prohibit military service. On the contrary, they give their blessing to and encourage serving the Fatherland. It is true that there are religions that reject military service—Jehovah's Witnesses and Seventh-Day Adventists, and some others. In the last few years, the number of refuseniks citing these grounds has not exceeded 500 men a year for the country as a whole. Draft boards have been sending these draftees to military construction units as a rule, but so far this has not had a legitimate basis in law.

Nevertheless, how to establish the sincerity of those who refuse military service on grounds of religious convictions? Clearly, in this case a mere note from a priest would not suffice. The Copenhagen document recommends solving the problem by applying a special procedure to guide a panel of experts whereby refuseniks' religious motives would be examined on the basis of psychological and religious aspects. The experts would be in a position to look at the religion involved to establish the degree to which the refusenik adheres to its canons. This kind of panel should be independent, in keeping with the spirit of the document.

Heated debates with colleagues on the topic of establishing the sincerity of belief and convictions have produced a standoff. This is apparently a case where the concept of "human measurement" in its more or less legal interpretation is not applicable. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the provisions of the Copenhagen document and of other norms of international humanitarian law must be taken into account in our changing military legislation.